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It is 8:39 AM on a chilly Monday-morning, and I am waiting for the bus at Utrecht Central 
Station.
 I am standing in a long line together with about sixty students all waiting for number 
12 bus to arrive, a long bus with multiple entry-doors that has the local university as its 
destination. It is always very crowded at this hour given the fact that the first lectures of 
the day start at 9 o‘clock. Not yet completely awake, I am craving for the first cup of crappy 
coffee we can get from the coffee machine at our department. When the bus arrives we all 
take our positions, and when the doors open the daily race for a seat begins. Thankfully the 
doors on this bus are wide enough for multiple individuals to enter simultaneously. Upon 
entering, I quickly determine which seat is the most promising given its distance and the 
behavior of the competition. I hold my public transportation card against the nearest card 
reader, hear the ‘beep‘ that confirms I successfully checked in on the bus, and sit down 
quickly. About twelve minutes later two ticket inspectors board the bus and start checking 
everybody‘s transportation cards. When they arrive at my seat I dutifully hold up my card 
for inspection. When one of the inspector reads my card using his portable device he looks 
at me in an annoyed manner and then asks: “Sir, please explain to me why you did not check 
in?” I am quite surprised by this question, and I tell the inspector I did check in! Walking 
defiantly to the card reader to show him how I had done so, I suddenly see a sticker on the 
card reader stating: “Out of order”. Apparently, the card reader has been out of order for a 
week, making it impossible for me to have checked in. While I am left somewhat confused 
the inspector explains to me what had probably happened: The ‘beep‘ I heard was in fact 
caused by another passenger checking in at the same time on an adjacent card reader, and I 
mistakenly assumed that it was my ‘beep‘ that had been caused by my actions. My sense of 
personal causality, that sense of agency that I experienced for checking in, had just played a 
‘trick‘ on me! I put on my dumbest face – not much of an effort at that point in time – and 
to my relief, I am not given a fine. 
INTRODUCTION, OVERVIEW, AND IMPLICATIONS
The sense of agency refers to our experience of personal causality: It is the feeling that we 
cause and control our actions and through those actions change our environment. Each 
day we encounter a multitude of these experiences that seem to come to us in a very natural 
way. We flip a light switch to turn on the light in our office and it feels like we caused the 
light to occur; we start running in an attempt to catch a train that is about to leave and feel 
a degree of personal achievement when we actually make it; and we may even experience 
a degree of self-control when, after contemplating our plans for the coming evening, we 
decide not to work – for a change – and turn on the TV to watch the latest episode of Game 
of Thrones instead (or vice versa of course). These examples demonstrate that we often 
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seem to experience a coherent link between our thoughts and our body movements and, in 
turn, to the external effects in the world, which brings about a feeling of control over these 
events. We experience this feeling of agency as something logical and intuitive. But is this 
experience of causal control indeed such a given when we act, or is it, like so many aspects 
of human cognition, influenced by factors operating outside of our conscious awareness? 
The present dissertation will show that there are a number of external and internal factors 
that influence our sense of agency, and deals with how and when our personal sense of 
agency emerges. 
 The experience of agency is of interest and importance as it lies at the heart of our 
motivated behavior. Consider how important our perceptions of control are for our 
motivation to form deliberate intentions and set future goals. The shops are filled with 
books on dieting, workouts to obtain that perfect six-pack, and other volumes on behavioral 
change that promise life-changing transformations (while getting rich in the process). But 
would we still make our New Year resolutions, or try out the latest Dr. Phil self-help book if 
we did not experience a feeling of of control? Without a perception of personal causality and 
control over our actions and the environment, we would probably be much less motivated 
to change our behavior. That is also why perceptions of control are of central importance 
to a wide range of theoretical models of behavioral change (Ajzen, 1985; Ajzen, & Fishbein, 
1980; Bandura, 1986; Fishbein, & Ajzen, 1975; Prochaska & DiClemente, 1986; Schwarzer, 
1992). 
 Our sense of agency also influences the way we reflect on ourselves, our actions, and 
the world around us (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996). Imagine we 
push another person and that person falls and breaks an arm. How we interpret this event 
greatly depends on whether we intentionally pushed that person – intentionality being 
an important cue for the sense of agency – or whether it happened accidentally as we 
reflexively reached out for grip while falling down ourselves. Similarly, our perceptions of 
agency in others also often determines how we judge them. Attributions such as respect, 
love, resentment or indignation, responses that are of central importance to our lives, are 
often attributed because we judge individuals to be personally responsible for their actions 
and to have personal agency over them. Without these attributions it would seem out of 
place to either praise or blame another person. Ascriptions of agency therefore form the 
cornerstone for many of our legal and social systems (Bandura, 2001; Jeannerod, 1999). 
Consequently, individuals that acted without intent (e.g., accidentally not checking-in on 
the bus) or who are not regarded to have a fully developed agentic mind (e.g., children, 
mentally ill) are held less responsible for their actions.
 Interestingly, a growing body of scientific evidence is showing that agency is not a given 
when we act, but instead is the outcome of a multi-factor process involving prediction and 
inference. Depending on the specific circumstances in which we act, our experienced sense 
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of agency can be increased or reduced. In the remainder of this chapter, I will first discuss 
some instances that reveal agency is not as clear-cut as we may believe. Then, I will provide 
a brief historical overview of the scientific study of human agency and discuss the main 
theoretical models in the field in more detail. Subsequently, I will describe the research that 
represents the main body of the current dissertation. Based on those studies, I will explain 
how agency is influenced by a number of external and internal factors, in ways and contexts 
that had not been investigated in previous research. Specifically, I will show how contextual 
factors, such as cues to act and the presence of other agents in our environment influence 
our sense of agency; how internal factors, such as prior action plans and experiences of 
effort influence agency; and I will also show how experiences of agency in turn influence 
our behavior. Finally, I will outline the broader implications of the work described in the 
present dissertation. 
Is agency ever unclear?
During the course of a normal day, we are not continuously introspecting whether we truly 
did or did not cause actions and effects. We are instead focused on getting ‘things‘ done the 
right way and it is only when we discover those things were in fact done by another agent 
that we discover that our sense of agency was off the mark. Close inspection of our daily 
lives can reveal a lot of situations in which our experience of agency is not as clear-cut as we 
may intuitively believe it to be. The situation described at the beginning of this introduction 
is an illustration of experienced agency in the absence of a true effect: Because I expected a 
certain outcome (the ‘beep‘ sound), I judged an outcome that matched my expectations to 
have been caused by my actions. In a similar sense, we may have the feeling that we called 
for an elevator by pushing the elevator button, that we caused it to stop at our floor, and 
even that we caused the doors to open, while the elevator and a colleague in it were in fact 
already on their way to that same floor.
 We can also experience agency for events we are not directly involved in. For example, 
by rooting for our favorite sports-team to win, we can get the impression that we in fact 
helped-out; or instead jinxed them by running to the fridge and having them out of sight for 
a few seconds (Pronin, Wegner, McCarthy, & Rodriguez, 2007). As such, actions and effects 
that have no direct causal relation in real life nevertheless become related in our minds, 
making us believe we somehow influenced the outcome. As a by-product, we may start 
believing in the power of good luck charms or engage in ritualistic behavior1 in an attempt 
1 For example, Wayne Gretzky, widely regarded as the greatest hockey player in NHL-history, would not get 
his hair cut while his team was on the road because one time when he did, his team suffered a major loss. 
Furthermore, during practice he would begin by shooting a puck to the right of the net; he would then drink a 
Diet Coke, a glass of iced water, a Gatorade and another Diet Coke in that exact order. As for his uniform, he 
would always put the left side on first and he would always tuck in the right side of his jersey. Also, he would 
put baby powder on the blade of his hockey stick. 
Damen_NIEUW kopie.indd   13 26-02-15   15:49
Chapter 114
to enhance control and agency over outcomes that co-occurred with our actions by chance. 
 It is also possible to act without experiencing agency. For example, there is a large 
number of actions performed by our body that we shall never regard as being under our 
personal control: While we can experience agency for what we do with our arms, legs, 
and lips, we do not continuously experience agency for our breathing, the dilation of our 
pupils, nor for the contractions of our heart. We seem to perform a lot of actions without 
immediate experiences of agency. Our sense of acting is also seriously reduced when we act 
reflexively (e.g., when avoiding collision), in which our awareness of action performance 
seems to lag behind our actual acting. Although we may consciously know that we indeed 
had moved, our immediate experience of personal agency is nevertheless seriously reduced.
 A similar thing may happen for actions that are performed regularly or for prolonged 
periods of time: At a certain moment our attention shifts away from the action we are 
performing and our cognitive and perceptual lens is directed elsewhere (Schooler, 2002). 
Imagine riding a bike: Although in the beginning you may be focused on getting the cycling 
movement going, once you get some momentum and hit the main road, you may already 
be thinking about your upcoming day at work. Such a shift does not imply individuals 
will deny their agentic involvement when we ask them, “Were you the one who was 
cycling?”. Nevertheless, when we think about others things then the actions we are currently 
performing, our action awareness and the immediate experience of agency are likely to be 
reduced.
 That agency is not a given when we act is also illustrated when we consider less ordinary 
examples. For example, while individuals under hypnosis are able to perform a wide array 
of complex actions, their sense of personal control over such actions is absent; even for the 
behaviors performed due to posthypnotic suggestion while awake (Lynn, Rhue, & Weekes, 
1990). Similarly, survivors of life-threatening situations often report the events and their 
actions as being involuntary and automatic, as if they had experienced the event in a state of 
‘trance‘ (Noyes & Kletti, 1977). Furthermore, there are a number of pathological disorders 
that are accompanied with disruptions in the sense of agency. For example, patients with 
anarchic hand syndrome have the compelling experience that one of their hands is beyond 
their control, having its own will and responding to external cues (Marchetti & Della 
Sala, 1998). In contrast, patients suffering from utilization behavior will continuously and 
unnecessarily act upon the external stimuli in their environment (e.g., donning multiple 
spectacles; Lhermitte, 1983), and claim to have consciously willed those actions – even 
though all those actions were driven by exogenous factors. Finally, patients suffering from 
schizophrenia may indicate that their actions or thoughts feel as though they were externally 
generated or under the control of someone else (Graham & Stephens, 1994), or, they instead 
over-attribute their personal involvement in events, claiming control over the thoughts and 
actions of other persons (Jeannerod, 2009). 
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 In sum, while we often feel our sense of agency to be a clear-cut experience, closer 
inspection of a number of normal and somewhat less normal processes reveals that agency 
is not simply a given fact when we act. Experiences of agency over actions and outcomes can 
be absent even when we did in fact cause those actions and action outcomes to occur, and 
experiences of agency can be present when we did not act nor produced effects (Wegner, 
2003). It appears then that our sense of agency is not a given when we act. As I am about 
to show, agency emerges as the outcome of a complex process involving multiple cues and 
modules, and is therefore sensitive to a number of different factors.
The science of personal agency
The scientific inquiry in the origins of our experiences of agency goes back as far as science 
itself, to the ancient Greek world with the writings of Aristotle and Epicurus, who theorized 
about agency in decision making over 2000 years ago. Human agency and the question of 
free will or determinism have intrigued the minds of founding fathers of modern science and 
psychology such as David Hume (1739) and William James (1890). However, the amount 
of research into these concepts over the past two decades has been staggering and includes 
psychology (e.g., Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005; Marcel, 2003; Sato & Yasuda, 2005), 
philosophy (e.g., de Vignemont & Fourneret, 2004; Eilan & Roessler, 2003; Gallagher, 2000, 
2007; Pacherie, 2007; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008), neuroscience (e.g., Blakemore, 
Wolpert, & Frith, 1999; Chaminade & Decety, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003; Tsakiris & Haggard, 
2005), and psychopathology (e.g., Daprati et al.,1997; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; 
Stephens & Graham, 2000).
 A research line that has been pivotal for the renewed interest in this important topic 
is the work by Benjamin Libet (1985) and his studies on volitional acts and readiness 
potentials (representing activity in the motor cortex signaling a preparation to act). 
Although it was well known that readiness potentials precede physical actions, Libet 
investigated how readiness potentials corresponded to the conscious intention to move. In 
his studies, participants were asked to report the time at which they formed an intention 
to act. This point in time was then compared to the observed readiness potentials in the 
motor cortex signaling the preparation to act. Crucially, what Libet demonstrated was that 
the onset of readiness potentials regularly preceded awareness of the intention by several 
hundred milliseconds. This finding suggests that supposedly conscious decisions are in fact 
already prepared in the brain before we may become aware of them (Libet, 1985; Libet et 
al., 1983). These findings ignited a huge debate on free will and inspired research that has 
revolved around two central questions: First, is there such a thing as free will? And second, 
if our decisions to act do not emerge from our conscious intentions, then how, where and 
why does the sense of agency emerge? 
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 The debate with regards to the existence of free will continues until today, and though 
a conclusive “yes” or “no” may never be possible, the empirical efforts emerging within this 
fascinating domain have facilitated a greater understanding of the processes that lead to 
our personal sense of agency. Research on agency has resulted in two main models, each 
receiving extensive empirical support: first, the comparator model of agency (Blakemore, 
Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2002) and 
second the theory of apparent mental causation (Wegner, 2002; Wegner, 2003; Wegner & 
Wheatley, 1999). These two theories differ with respect to the degree which they emphasize 
either automatic processes of motor-prediction as being central to the sense of agency, or 
whether they consider high-level interpretative processes between thoughts and actions to 
underlie the sense of agency. We will examine both models briefly, then, we will discuss a 
third route to agentic experience that has recently attracted scientific interest: experiences 
of effort in acting.
A process of motor prediction
Comparator models view the brain as a prediction machine that continuously works to 
structure the input of our world around us based on our earlier experiences. We do not 
notice this during the course of a normal day until the moment comes that a prediction fails. 
For example, when an escalator is out of order, our brains will still attempt to compensate 
for the escalator‘s movement, thereby creating a visual illusion of movement. According 
to the comparator model of agency, the motor system in our brain also makes predictions 
about the sensory experiences of acting and the immediate sensory consequences of the 
outcomes of actions. Each action is therefore accompanied by information regarding 
sensory predictions. When we reach out for a glass of water, our motor system predicts what 
to expect regarding the movement (e.g., distance, position, expected effort), and it may also 
predict the immediate sensory effects (texture and temperature of the glass, taste of water). 
Agency is then derived from a match between the predicted and actual outcomes. When 
predicted and actual sensory signals match, we experience agency, however, when these 
happen to mismatch agency is reduced. For example, imagine reaching out for a glass of 
water but that the glass of water suddenly feels very heavy. You will probably be wondering 
what is happening to you, instead of experiencing what is being done by you.
 The impact of motor predictions on the sense of agency has been shown in a large 
number of studies. These studies regularly manipulate the availability of motor predictions, 
for example through the distortion of immediate action feedback (e.g., by giving false visual 
feedback; Leube et al., 2003), through the comparison of active and passive movements 
(e.g., pressing with your finger vs. having your finger pressed; Engbert, Wohlschläger, & 
Haggard, 2007), and through the variation of outcome probability (e.g., by manipulating 
whether specific key presses are followed by predictable outcomes; Moore, Lagnado, 
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Deal, & Haggard, 2009). Such findings helped shape and support the comparator model. 
 However, there are quite a number of situations that are difficult for the comparator 
model to explain (Synofzik et al., 2008). For example, we often act in situations in which the 
outcomes of our effects are unpredictable or incongruent to our predictions. Yet, that does 
not automatically mean we will attribute that action or action effect to another person. For 
example, I may believe that I am the agent of the action, just because I take into account 
the fact that I am the only one in the room (de Vignemont & Fourneret, 2004). We can 
therefore use inferential information when judging our own agency.
An inferential process of agency 
A model that acknowledges the influence of inferential processing with regards to agency 
and that has attracted considerable support, is the theory of apparent mental causation 
(Wegner & Wheatley, 1999), also known as the inferential account of agency. This model 
does not tie agency directly to motor control. Instead, agency is inferred when individuals 
retrospectively link their actions and/or perceived contextual effects, to any thoughts they 
may have had about actions or outcomes prior to acting. Specifically, agency is most likely 
to be experienced when one‘s thoughts precede the actions (the principle of priority); when 
thoughts are consistent with actions or action outcomes (the principle of consistency); and 
when personal thoughts are the only plausible causes of actions (the principle of exclusivity; 
Wegner, 2002). This model is able to explain why we may feel agency for actions that are 
novel and unpredicted, and why we may sometimes feel agency in situations in which 
we did not even truly act (e.g., Dogge, Schaap, Custers, Wegner, & Aarts, 2012; Moore & 
Haggard, 2008; Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009).
 Studies that support the theory of apparent mental causation have often manipulated 
contextual and social information, or personal beliefs. For example, a number of studies 
have shown individuals to experience an increased sense of agency when they were given 
previews (e.g. in the form of instructions or primes) of the actions or action‘s effects 
which they were about to perform or generate (e.g., Aarts et al., 2005; Wegner, Sparrow, 
& Winerman, 2004). Additionally, research has shown that the sense of agency can be 
influenced by manipulating the number of choice alternatives (fewer options can reduce 
the feeling of free choice and can thereby reduce agency; Barlas & Obhi, 2013) and by 
suggesting or priming the presence of potential other agents (e.g., by suggesting that the 
computer can cause certain effects to occur the sense of agency over those effects can 
be reduced; Dijksterhuis, Preston, Wegner, & Aarts, 2008; see also Desantis, Roussel, & 
Waszak, 2011).
 These two theoretical accounts of agency are not mutually exclusive. Recent integrative 
frameworks assume that both pre-motor cues and post-motor inferences contribute to the 
sense of agency (Moore, Haggard, & Wegner, 2009; Sato, 2009): Initially, motor predictions 
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and sensory feedback elicit the primary feelings of agency (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005); then, 
this low level information is integrated and subsequently adjusted by a person‘s intentions, 
thoughts, and social and contextual cues (Synofzik et al., 2008); these different agency cues 
may then combine to obtain the most robust and reliable estimate of agency (Synofzik, 
Vosgerau, & Lindner, 2009) as different cues are weighed differently depending on their 
reliability and availability given the situation (Moore et al., 2009). For example, the presence 
of potential alternative agents may change the weighting of internal signals: When a nearby 
glass falls on the floor, the knowledge of being alone in the room may be informative 
enough, whereas internal sensorimotor cues could receive more weight if other people were 
around (Gentsch et al., 2012).2
Experienced effort as cue to agency
Recently, there has been an increased interest regarding a third process potentially 
underlying the sense of agency. Specifically, it has been suggested that our experiences 
of effort can influence the likelihood for us to perceive ourselves as being causal agents. 
Effortful action is likely to reach our conscious awareness, and can therefore be a powerful 
cue to the sense of agency (Jeannerod, 1997; Pacherie, 2008). For example, we may be more 
aware of the fact that we are walking to the bus-stop when in full sprint compared to when 
we are walking at a leisurely pace. A number of recent empirical studies have indeed shown 
that when individuals have to exert effort, for example by holding a handgrip (Preston & 
Wegner, 2007) or pulling a stretch-band (Demanet et al., 2013), they are more likely to 
judge themselves as being agents in a parallel agency paradigm. Effortless acting is however 
linked to automaticity and thereby a reduced sense of agency. For example, a lot of the 
actions we perform have been practiced so often that they operate effortlessly, without 
conscious guidance (e.g., cycling) and therefore without our immediate action awareness 
(Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Schooler, 2002).
Measures of agency
There are a number of ways that have been regularly used by the scientific community to 
measure the sense of agency. One approach has been to ask participants for their sense of 
causation for actions directly (Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004), or for the effects their 
actions may or may not have caused (Sato, 2009). In experiments using such measures, 
participants are often made unsure of their sense of agency: Participants act (e.g., they 
press a keyboard button) and subsequently perceive effects (e.g., they hear a tone presented 
through a headset), but are instructed that these actions or effects can either be caused by 
2 Alternatively, another possibility is that we are more aware of others in a full room, increasing our reliance 
inferential information. Lots of alternative predictions for future research to explore.
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them but could also have been caused by another agent (e.g., the computer; Aarts et al., 
2005; or God, Dijksterhuis et al., 2008; Sousa & Swiney, 2013). At the same time, further 
ambiguity is often induced by varying the delay between action and outcome (the longer the 
delay, the more participants will become uncertain of their sense of agency; Sato & Yasuda, 
2005), or by varying the nature of the effect itself (expected vs. unexpected effects; Moore 
& Haggard, 2008). Such an ambiguous situation (reflecting the ambiguity of agency in daily 
life) allows for repeated measurements of the factors that are under empirical scrutiny. See 
Figure 1.1 for a typical pattern of results we regularly observe in such experiments.
A
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y 
Sc
or
es
25
50
75
100
Short Action-Effect Interval Long Action-Effect Interval
Experimental Condition
Control Condition
Figure 1.1. Example results of a simple agency experiment in which the action-effect delay 
is manipulated and which additionally features an experimental manipulation. It is often the 
case that the longer we havo to wait for the effects of our actions to occur, the lower the 
sense of agency becomes, hence the decreasing slopes. The differences between the lines are 
indicative of differences between experimental conditions.
 In addition, there are several fascinating implicit measures of agency that have been 
used in a large number of recent studies (Aliu, Houde, & Nagarajan, 2009; Bäß, Jacobsen, 
& Schröger, 2008; Blakemore et al., 1999; Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Cardoso-Leite, 
Mamassian, Schütz-Bosbach, & Waszak, 2010; Cravo, Claessens, & Baldo, 2011; Engbert, 
Wohlschläger, Thomas, & Haggard, 2007; Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Martikainen, 
2004; Sato, 2008). For example, because our actions carry with them the sensory predictions 
related to action performance, the experience of these effects is attenuated. Specifically, 
in the case of a match between predicted sensation and actual feedback, the anticipatory 
sensations are cancelled, and the sensory event is subsequently experienced as less intense. 
This phenomenon explains why it is difficult to tickle yourself (tickling is only tickly when 
the tickle is unpredictable or uncontrollable; Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998). Studies 
have therefore used intensity ratings of the experience of effects as an implicit measure 
of agency (e.g., Gentsch, Schütz-Bosbach, Endrass, & Kathmann, 2012; Sato, 2009). 
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 Another intriguing phenomenon that is related to the experience of agency is our 
perception of time. When we feel that we voluntarily perform actions, our actions and 
their effects are perceived as being closer together in time compared to when we feel we 
involuntarily perform actions (Haggard et al., 2002). This decrease in the perceived interval 
between action and its effect is known as intentional binding, and reliably occurs when 
we are – or think we are – agents (Moore & Obhi, 2012). Time perception is therefore 
often used as an implicit measure of sense of agency (Desantis, Hughes, & Waszak, 2012). 
In the present dissertation we have sometimes used paradigms of time perception as an 
implicit measure to complement and expand on explicit paradigms. Such implicit measures 
have the added advantage that they are much less susceptible to participants‘ prior beliefs 
(Orne, 1962) and demand characteristics (Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 2007) than explicit 
measures of agency.
Conclusion
To conclude the first part of this introduction: our sense of agency is of great importance to 
us as individuals and as social beings. However, while we may intuitively believe that agency 
comes naturally with our actions, we can experience agency over actions and effects we did 
not truly cause, and act and cause effects without the experience of being a causal agent. 
Over the past three decades, much empirical work has investigated how and when the 
sense of agency emerges. Using both methods of direct inquiry as well as implicit measures 
that are related to the sense of agency, research has revealed that agency is influenced by 
multiple factors, involving processes of automatic motor prediction, subjective inferences 
of being a likely agent, as well as cues of effort when we are acting. In the studies that will be 
described in the present dissertation, I have further explored the factors and contexts that 
influence this important experience.
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OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT DISSERTATION
The inspiration of this PhD-project comes from a social psychology experiment, a study 
that itself did not measure agency at all. In what can arguably be regarded as the most (in)
famous study in social psychology and psychology in general, Stanley Milgram showed 
that it was possible to create a situation that is so compelling that a majority of normal 
individuals showed willingness to deliver lethal shocks to their fellow human beings 
(Milgram, 1963). Crucially, Milgram not only believed that figures of authority represent 
powerful heuristics to which we are all susceptible, he also suggested that under the 
influence of a powerful authority figure we lose our sense of autonomy and thereby the 
sense that we are independent and responsible agents. He termed this (loss) the Agentic 
State (or Agentic Shift; Milgram, 1974). In turn, such a reduction in autonomy or agency 
could make individuals more receptive to the influences of powerful external forces, such as 
authority figures. However, the theory of the Agentic State has been criticized for its circular 
nature, and for the fact that Milgram did not have any empirical evidence to substantiate 
this theory (Blass, 2004; Darley, 1992; Haslam & Reicher, 2007; Helm & Morelli, 1979; 
Mantell & Panzarella, 1976; Miller, 1986; Miller, Collins, & Brief, 1995; Russell & Gregory, 
2005). In spite of these criticisms, the question remains, however, how other agents, such as 
authority figures, can influence our sense of agency.
Factors affecting agency – contextual cues
Milgram‘s account for the sense of agency implies that the presence of others will influence 
our sense of agency in acting. It could therefore be that our sense of agency is influenced 
when we are told what to do by another person. In Chapter 2 we describe four experiments 
in which we investigated whether actions that participants were commanded to perform 
or that were performed in the context of command cues, led to a different level of agency 
compared to actions performed in the absence of commands. Using both explicit and 
implicit agency paradigms we show that being commanded to perform a specific action 
leads to reduced experiences of agency compared to actions that are not performed in the 
context of a command. The reduction in agency was shown not to be due to a removal of 
choice opportunity, as verbal commands that did not reduce choice opportunity (e.g., the 
more general command ‘Press a keyboard button‘) reduced agency similarly to commands 
that did remove choice opportunity (e.g., the specific command ‘Press the left keyboard 
button‘). In a final study we discovered that external commands could even reduce agency 
during action performance, thus when actions had already been initiated, suggesting that 
the mere presence of a command can influence degree of experienced agency.
 In Chapter 3 we further investigated the influence of cues related to acting on the 
sense of agency. Instead of responding to explicit commands, participants acted freely in 
a context in which cues related to acting were presented. Specifically, participants acted 
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in the presence of action primes (words presented on screen compatible or incompatible 
to participants‘ actions), as we aimed to discover whether such contextual cues and the 
decision to follow them or act ‘against‘ them could influence the sense of agency. We 
discovered that the compatibility between primes and participant‘s actions influenced the 
sense of agency. Specifically, action primes decreased the sense of agency when participants 
acted in accordance and not contrary to these primes. Moreover, in the present study we 
also investigated whether the overtness of these primes changed these effects. It was found 
that when such action primes were presented subliminally and did not reach conscious 
awareness, the compatibility effect was reversed; subliminal primes reduced agency when 
they were incompatible rather than compatible. Apparently, when compatible action primes 
can be consciously perceived, we consider it possible that we have been influenced by those 
primes in our actions, subsequently reducing agency. Alternatively, when action primes are 
perceived but do not reach conscious awareness, the incompatible primes lead to a reduced 
sense of agency; likely the consequence of a disruption of the process of action selection.
 In Chapter 4 we investigated how the presence of other agents influences our sense of 
agency. Specifically, we investigated whether cues that indicate external authority would 
lower the sense of agency, a prediction following from Milgram‘s Agentic State theory 
(1974). In three studies, participants were given instructions by cues that either conveyed 
direct authority, or did not convey direct authority. We manipulated external authority by 
changing the vocal properties (depth, self-assuredness, intensity) of the verbal instructions 
participants were given, a subtle yet powerful cue which conveys external authority 
(Cashdan, 1998; Gregory Jr. & Webster, 1996; Kimble & Musgrove, 1988; Lamb, 1981), and 
by manipulating the physical presence of an authority figure (Milgram, 1974). Interestingly, 
the results suggest an increase in agency as a consequence of external authority. Specifically, 
both vocal properties of external authority as well as the direct presence of authority were 
related to increases in the sense of agency. The presence of authority figures or authority 
cues might have primed authority, heightened the motivation to perform the task well, or 
increased the degree to which participants internalized their agentic role, increasing action 
awareness and the sense of agency (Weiss, Herwig, & Schütz-Bosbach, 2011).
 Together, the studies in Chapters 2-4 revealed that the presence of other agents and 
action cues in the environment influence our sense of agency. Even when we act, the 
knowledge that we may have been influenced in our action reduces the sense of agency. 
However, contrary to what Milgram may have predicted, in general, cues indicating 
authority seem to increase, not reduce the immediate sense of agency.
Factors affecting agency – internal cues
As we described earlier in the introduction, experiences of effort have been suggested to 
represent a powerful cue to the sense of agency. However, as of yet there is still only limited 
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empirical evidence to substantiate this theory (e.g., Demanet et al., 2013). In Chapter 5 
we describe research in which we investigated whether the degree of effort we experience 
depending on the actual hand we use when performing actions can influence the sense of 
agency. 
 At already a young age we develop a clear preference for our left or our right hand, 
and non-dominant hand skills will rarely reach the level of ability of the dominant hand. 
We hypothesized that the actions we perform with our non-dominant hand are therefore 
experienced as more effortful and less automatic, thereby leading to an increased sense 
of agency. Dominant hand use should however be related to a reduced sense of agency 
as it is more practiced than the non-dominant hand and can therefore often act without 
experiences of effort. In two studies, participants performed an agency task in which 
they either acted with their dominant or non-dominant hand. The results show that non-
dominant hand use was related to an increased sense of agency compared to dominant 
hand use, and that this difference was to a large extent driven by differences in effort in the 
use of both hands. Our hands are the primary tools by which we produce changes in our 
physical environment. However, it appears that the specific hand we use can influence our 
sense of agency for those changes.
 To what extent do our own deliberate action plans influence our sense of agency? While 
a number of theoretical approaches (e.g. Brass & Haggard, 2008; Pacherie, 2008; Pacherie 
& Haggard, 2010) consider the act of planning to be beneficial for the sense of agency, no 
research has empirically tested this assumption. In Chapter 6 we describe eight studies in 
which we tested the influence of deliberate action plans on explicit and implicit measures 
of agency. Participants were either asked to plan ahead which action they were going to 
perform (e.g., which button they were going to press), or were not given the instruction or 
opportunity to plan and immediately had to decide and act. In these studies we discovered 
that action plans in fact reduced agency. Apparently, the separation in time between conscious 
decision-making and action performance reduces the sense of cognitive involvement or 
increases the sense of automaticity for action performance, thereby decreasing the sense 
of agency. An additional study indeed confirmed that a larger separation in time between 
action planning and action performance is related to reduced agency compared to a shorter 
temporal separation between planning and performance.
 Our sense of agency may influence a number of other aspects of human cognition. 
In several follow-up studies we investigated whether factors that influence agency, such 
as action plans, may similarly influence the intensity by which we experience our actions 
and feel responsible for them – constructs that flow from our experiences of agency (Frith, 
2013). Using moral judgment dilemmas, we showed that prior action plans reduced the 
experienced emotional intensity while acting, as a negative action was experienced as less 
unpleasant when that action was planned in advance. Similarly, participants also felt less 
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responsible for planned than for unplanned actions. Our findings also point to an intriguing 
actor-observer discrepancy: While action plans reduce the experience of responsibility as 
an agent, attributions of another person‘s responsibility actually increase when we perceive 
cues indicating planned behavior by that person. 
 Together, these findings show that deliberate action plans may influence the experience 
of subsequent actions in a number of different ways: they influence both our personal 
sense of agency and the emotional intensity of actions, and they can even influence our 
perceptions of responsibility.
Agency affecting behavior
While the scientific quest for the emergence of our agentic experience is an important one, 
it is equally important to investigate how these perceptions influence our behavior. Our 
perceptions of personal control and agency have been considered to be important for the 
degree to which we are motivated to act, and to our capacity to enact self-driven change 
(Ajzen, & Fishbein, 1980; Bandura, 1997). Many theories on self-change therefore consider 
a boost in the sense of control to be a first priority (Eden & Aviram, 1993; Vinokur, van 
Ryn, Gramlich, & Price, 1991). Alternatively, a disrupted or absent sense of control may 
increase susceptibility to external forces. For example, Milgram (1974) theorized that 
a reduced sense of autonomy would increase the susceptibility to external heuristics. In 
a recent study, Fennis and Aarts (2012) indeed showed that recent experiences of the 
absence of control made participants more likely to be influenced by social heuristics. 
 In Chapter 7 we describe a study in which we further investigated the relation between 
recent experiences of control, capacity for self-facilitated change, and external susceptibility. 
Using short or long delays between actions and action effects, and by changing the 
predictability of action outcomes, we manipulated participants‘ sense of agency. Participants 
were then either presented with arguments from the local municipality as to why a clean local 
environment was important (external persuasion), or alternatively, participants were asked 
to generate those arguments themselves (internal self-persuasion). The results in this study 
revealed an important interaction between recent experiences of agency and the degree 
to which these persuasion techniques were effective. Specifically, participants were more 
inclined to indicate that a clean environment was personally important to them, and were 
also more likely to volunteer in a cleanup of the campus when self-persuasion techniques 
were implemented and when, simultaneously, participants had recently experienced high 
rather than low agency. However, techniques of direct persuasion were more effective when 
participants had experienced low rather than high agency. These findings suggest that our 
recent experiences of control, such as our experiences of agency, can influence both our 
capacity for self-driven change and our susceptibility to external forces. 
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THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
As each chapter will itself present a more elaborate discussion, we will now shortly address 
the broader implications of the present dissertation.
The Agentic State
The studies presented in Chapters 2-4 and 7 are the first empirical attempts to investigate a 
number of explicit and implicit predictions following from Milgram‘s Agentic state (1974) 
theory. First, we tested whether experiences of agency influenced external susceptibility. 
In Chapter 7 we did indeed find that recent experiences of reduced agency can increase 
external susceptibility to external sources, such as authority heuristics. Second, we 
investigated whether external commands, action primes, and authority cues would 
reduce the sense of agency. The studies from Chapters 2 and 3 show that overt external 
commands and action-primes decrease agency. However, the studies from Chapter 4 
reveal that cues related to authority actually increase the sense of agency, a finding that 
was unexpected given Milgram‘s theories about agency and authority. A reduction in 
agency as a general consequence of the presence of cues of external authority, one of 
the main hypotheses flowing from Milgram‘s theory, could therefore not be supported. 
 We do wish to emphasize that the absence of a decrease in agency due to external 
authority does not falsify Milgram‘s ideas about what happened in his research. The 
paradigms featuring in the present dissertation greatly differ from that famous experiment. 
For example, in our studies participants produced relatively neutral action effects (tones). 
Perhaps, when the action becomes negative (e.g., giving electric shocks to another person; 
Milgram, 1963) cues of external authority have a different impact and reduce the sense of 
agency – a promising avenue for future research. Future studies should also investigate 
how authority cues can influences other states of mind. For example, the presence of 
authority cues may influence one‘s promotion or prevention focus (Higgins, 1998), or the 
representation levels, concrete or abstract, by which individuals define their own behavior 
(Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). However, for now we can say that instead of reducing the sense 
of agency as Milgram would have predicted, this first empirical investigation on the relation 
between authority and agency has shown that cues of external authority seem to increase 
rather than decrease the sense of agency.
The Agentic Boost
As described earlier in the introduction, our perceptions of control will determine the 
degree to which we are motived to change our behavior and improve ourselves. A first 
priority for interventions aimed at behavioral change is therefore to restore or boost 
perceptions of control (Eden & Aviram, 1993; Vinokur, et al., 1991). Using relatively short 
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temporal delays between actions and action effects, and by increasing the predictability of 
those effects, we induced experiences of increased agency in participants. The experiment 
described in Chapter 7 therefore suggests (although more research is needed to prove the 
direction of the effect) that with such a relatively short and simple intervention (a number 
of high-agency experiences), individuals‘ capacity to change their current attitudes and 
behavior can be increased. 
Action plans decrease experiences related to acting
A number of theoretical accounts on agency have considered the importance of prior plans 
for the sense of agency but largely consider such plans to contribute to agency (e.g., Brass & 
Haggard, 2008, Pacherie, 2008; Pacherie & Haggard, 2010). We show in a number of studies 
in Chapter 6 that the prior planning of actions actually reduced agency. These findings 
therefore have implications for previous models on the sense of agency (Synofzik et al., 2008; 
Wegner, 2003) that generally consider compatible prior planning to add to the sense of agency. 
 Additionally, we showed that similar to the effects on agency, action plans also 
influenced aspects of human cognition related to agency, as feelings of unpleasantness and 
responsibility were also lower when a negative action was planned in advance. A large body 
of literature on responsibility exists to show that indications of intentionality in, or planning 
by another person leads to increased attributions of responsibility towards that person 
(Malle, 2004; Shaver, 1985). Together, this literature and the present findings point towards 
an important actor-observer discrepancy: while prior planning reduces the experience of 
responsibility in agents, indications of planned behavior in others will make us judge those 
others as being and feeling more responsible. 
The processes related to action selection influence agency differently 
from effect related processing
The research presented in the present dissertation has regularly contrasted processes of 
action selection (what am I going to do) with processes related to outcome prediction (what 
effects am I going to see). While the process of action selection is considered a vital part of 
the actions sequence (e.g., Brass & Haggard, 2008), it has not received much attention in 
the literature on agency (for an exception see Wenke et al., 2009). In a number of chapters 
we have shown that factors that can be manipulated with regards to action selection often 
lead to outcomes that are different from similar manipulations in outcome prediction. For 
example, while both subliminal and supraliminal outcome primes can increase the sense 
of agency (Aarts et al., 2005; Moore et al., 2009), action primes reduce agency when they 
are consciously perceived. Similarly, while thoughts, intentions, and goals related to action 
outcomes may increase the sense of agency (van der Weiden et al., 2013), specific action 
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plans instead reduce agency. These results therefore reveal how manipulations within the 
context of action selection can have different effects on the sense of agency compared to 
similar manipulations within the context of outcome prediction.
Cues indirectly related to acting influence implicit measures of agency
In a number of studies we have used time estimation as an implicit measure of agency. 
Previous literature has often suggested that time perception is related to a lower, more 
primary feeling of agency, which is influenced by automatic motor prediction processes 
but not by cognitive deliberation or by contextual and social cues (Synofzik et al., 2008). 
Through a series of recent studies this view is slowly starting to change. A number of recent 
findings have shown that factors such as belief states and contextual cues may have more 
far-reaching effects than previously thought. For example, in a study by Rigoni, Kühn, 
Sartori & Brass (2012), individuals‘ belief in free will and beliefs about personal causality 
were shown to influence the degree of pre-motor activation in the brain: Individuals who 
disbelieved in free will showed a reduction in the amplitude of action related readiness 
potentials. Similarly, Desantis and colleagues (2011) showed that activating beliefs about 
personal agency increased intentional binding compared to individuals who were led to 
believe their actions were caused by another individual. The fact that we find effects of 
external commands (Chapter 2) and of prior planning (Chapter 6) on time perception 
further adds to these findings, suggesting that external and internal cues that are not 
directly related to motor prediction can influence time perception to a stronger degree than 
originally assumed.
Concluding remarks
The sense of agency is one of the most fundamental experiences of human consciousness. 
While we may intuitively feel that we should know when we have caused something to 
occur and when not, the research described in the present dissertation reveals that the sense 
of agency can be influenced by a number of different factors, including contextual action 
cues and internal action plans, the presence and nature of other agents, as well as hand 
dominance and experiences of effort. Importantly, experiences of agency in turn seem to 
influence our susceptibility to external forces and our ability to cause self-generated change. 
The present findings thereby further our knowledge on how, why, and when the sense of 
agency emerges and how that pervasive experience influences us in turn. 
Something I will have to keep in mind, and explain the next time I encounter that ticket 
inspector again.
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A SHORT NOTE ON RESEARCH TRANSPARENCY
In the present dissertation we have reported all measures and manipulations either in 
the main text of the chapters, or in a footnote when the manipulation was not of central 
importance to the presented research.
 Sample sizes were determined based on earlier experiences with the experiments, or 
as a function of the number of participant signups during the allotted lab-space period. 
None of the reported effects reached significance just by adding more participants. In case 
of a (suspected) power-problem, we re-ran the experiment with a sufficient number of 
participants. No data was excluded without reporting so.
The raw data files and the statistical syntax files are be made available online at:
https://osf.io/s4wxr/?view_only=4cc0482746fe43af9b1571a9768382db
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Chapter 2
Agency under Obedience:
External Commands Influence
the Sense of Agency
 
This chapter is based on Damen, T. G. E., van Baaren, R. B., Brass, M., Kühn, S., 
& Dijksterhuis, A. (under review). Agency under obedience: External commands influence 
the sense of agency.
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ABSTRACT
In four studies we show that being commanded to perform a specific action leads to lower 
experiences of agency compared to actions that were not accompanied by a command 
(Studies 2.1- 2.4). The commands also influenced intentional binding (Studies 2.2 & 2.4), an 
implicit measure of agency that is often considered to be relatively insusceptible to external 
factors. Furthermore, the present research shows that the reduction in agency was not due 
to a removal of choice opportunity, but was due to the presence of the command itself 
(Study 2.3). Finally, commands were even able to reduce agency when participants already 
initiated their action (Study 2.4). Together, the results show that our sense of agency for 
actions we perform can be influenced by external commands, and that commands can even 
influence levels of agency that originally were not assumed to be susceptible to external 
influence.
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Agency, the feeling that we are performing or causing an action, is a pervasive experience 
of human consciousness. Our experiences would be very different without the sense of 
agency; it would seem as if our bodies and actions were controlled by an external source. 
Although our body is never truly under the control of another person, in many hierarchical 
relationships individuals perform actions because they are told to do so. For example, in 
the army, it is a soldiers‘ duty to obey an order by a superior. The question is whether that 
soldier will experience the doing and causing of an action in a different way because s/he 
is obeying an order. In other words, does our agentic experience change when we perform 
an action instructed by another person, such as a superior? This question is important as 
experiences of agency influence the way we reflect on ourselves and on our actions (Bandura, 
Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996), and they influence our decisions to perform or 
not to perform certain actions (Milgram, 1974). In the present paper we report four studies 
in which we investigated how the sense of agency is influenced by external commands.
 Prior research has repeatedly shown that our sense of agency can be influenced by 
various sources (Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009). For example, the priming of agents 
(Dijksterhuis, Preston, Wegner & Aarts, 2008) as well as of action effects (Aarts, Custers, 
& Wegner, 2005; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999) increase agency; synchronous visual feedback 
of a virtual hand increases agency for the virtual hands‘ movements (Tsakiris, Prabhu, & 
Haggard, 2006); agency is increased when the outcomes of actions are compatible with 
people‘s expectations (Sato, 2009); and agency is reduced when there is a delay between 
action and effect (Sato & Yasuda, 2005).
  In contrast, little is known about the extent to which processes involved in the selection of 
actions contribute to our sense of agency (Wenke, Waszak, & Haggard, 2009). The selection 
of future actions represent a major part of the action sequence (Brass & Haggard, 2008), in 
which there is a competition between different response alternatives and a final decision 
on which action to execute (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Nachev, 
Wydell, O‘Neill, Husain, & Kennard, 2007). But it has only received limited attention as an 
important phase with regards to the sense of agency. Recently however, Wenke, Fleming 
& Haggard (2010) showed that the subliminal priming of actions facilitated responding, 
thereby increasing the sense of agency (see also Damen, van Baaren, & Dijksterhuis, 2014). 
Similarly, Chambon & Haggard (2012) have shown that a fluent process of action selection 
can be beneficial for the sense of agency.
 Why the phase of action planning and selection is important becomes clear when we 
think about how others influence our behavior. To a large extent, we rely on information 
from and about others for our future actions: we imitate (Miller & Dollard, 1941) and 
conform to others (Asch, 1956); we can be susceptible to suggestions from others 
(Bearden, Netemeyer, & Teel, 1989); and sometimes we are subject to direct commands 
of others telling us what to do (Milgram, 1974). In other words, the presence and the 
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behavior of others often influence the plans we make and the actions we perform. 
It is therefore important to explore how such influence affects our sense of agency. 
Models of agency
To describe the emergence of the sense of agency, the literature has mostly distinguished 
between two main models, each receiving extensive empirical support. These models are 
respectively referred to as the motor prediction model of agency (also known as forward or 
comparator models; Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; 
Wolpert & Flanagan, 2002) and the inferential model of agency (also known as the theory of 
apparent mental causation; Wegner, 2002; Wegner, 2003; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). Both 
models describe different processes leading to the sense of agency, either based on one‘s 
accuracy in motor prediction or based upon one‘s reflective inference of having been a likely 
agent (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008). 
 Motor prediction models suggest that when we are about to act, our motor system 
makes a prediction about the sensory signals we are likely to experience during acting and 
immediately after action performance. We feel agency when there is a match between these 
sensory predictions and the actual outcomes (Blakemore et al., 2000; Frith et al., 2000). 
However, when the outcomes are not what we had expected our sense of agency is likely to 
be reduced. For example, when we pull a chain to turn on the light, we feel agency when the 
light turns on, however our sense of agency in such a scenario would be much reduced if 
the lightbulb doesn‘t switch on, and the toilet starts flushing instead.
 According to the inferential models on agency judgments, we regularly reflect back 
upon our actions and then make interpretive judgments of having been a likely agent 
(Wegner, 2002). We judge ourselves to be agents when we can easily relate our actions or the 
action effects we produce to any thoughts preceding it (David, Stenzel, Schneider, & Engel, 
2011), and when our agency beliefs (Desantis, Hughes, & Waszak, 2012) or the contextual 
information (Synofzik et al., 2008) make us appear as the most likely agent. A likely source 
of such contextual information would be the presence of other agents: the more we observe 
other agents, the more likely it is that these other individuals were in fact responsible for the 
events around us. 
 Recent approaches actually consider agency to emerge from both processes (Synofzik et 
al., 2008). At a primary level, motor prediction processes first inform the sense of agency. 
The experiences of agency emerging from this motor prediction phase are often referred 
to as feelings of agency. Subsequently, inferential processes may further influence the sense 
of agency, and the experiences of agency that emerge from this inferential phase are often 
referred to as judgments of agency. 
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The presence of other agents
Although the presence of other agents has been described as a key factor in determining 
ones‘ sense of agency (Wegner, 2003), it has not received much empirical attention. 
While agency paradigms often suggest that another agent, human or artificial, could have 
produced an outcome (e.g., the computer could have caused a tone to occur or could have 
stopped a motion: Sato & Yasuda, 2005; van der Weiden, Aarts, & Ruys, 2010), experimental 
manipulations of the presence of agents, or their influence, during the action planning and 
selection process are rare (but see Dijksterhuis et al., 2008). Hence, the question remains 
whether actions we perform on our own initiative are experienced differently compared to 
actions that we perform at the command of another. 
 Related approaches would suggest so. For example, research has shown that the 
motivation to act is reduced after receiving rewards for action performance (Lepper, Greene, 
& Nisbett, 1973), and that depending on one‘s personal sense of power, individuals are in 
general more likely to make dispositional or contextual attributions (Keltner, Van Kleef, 
Chen, & Kraus, 2008). These studies show that the degree to which we see our actions as self-
driven will influence our motivation to perform these actions and our global attributions 
about these actions. But will our state experiences of acting be similarly influenced?
 While our sense of responsibility will often flow from our sense of agency (e.g., 
Frith, 2013), it is not difficult to imagine situations in which experiences of agency and 
responsibility can diverge (David, Newen, & Vogeley, 2008). When a person is explicitly 
divested of all responsibility (Milgram, 1963), or when forced compliance makes individuals 
to feel less responsible for their actions (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959), a person remains an 
agent with the ability to fully experience the sensations involved in action performance. The 
question then is whether our immediate agentic experience is influenced when we act on 
the command of another.  
Measuring agency
Agency has often been measured with explicit measures. In many experiments, participants 
were simply asked for the degree to which they felt like they caused an action (e.g., Wegner, 
Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004) or an action effect to occur (e.g., Aarts et al., 2005). However, 
a considerable number studies have also used implicit measures to determine agency 
(Aliu, Houde, & Nagarajan, 2009; Bäß, Jacobsen, & Schröger, 2008; Blakemore, Wolpert, 
& Frith, 1999; Cardoso-Leite, Mamassian, Schütz-Bosbach, & Waszak, 2010; Cravo, 
Claessens, & Baldo, 2011; Engbert, Wohlschläger, Thomas, & Haggard, 2007; Haggard, 
Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Martikainen, 2004; Sato, 2008) 
thereby avoiding potential problems caused by prior beliefs and demand characteristics 
(Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 2007). For example, it has been shown that feelings of 
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control and voluntariness affect one‘s perception of time: when we feel we are voluntarily 
performing actions, our actions and their effects are perceived as closer together in time 
compared to when we feel we are involuntarily performing actions (Haggard et al., 2002). 
This decrease in the perceived interval between action and its effect is known as intentional 
binding. This phenomenon is derived from our feelings of personal causation, and is thus 
used as an implicit measure for sense of agency (Desantis et al., 2012). Often, intentional 
binding effects are considered to reflect motor prediction processes also responsible for the 
emergence of feelings of agency, while the agency judgments of the explicit paradigms are 
considered to reflect both motor prediction effects and reflective inferences. 
The present investigation
In four studies we investigated the influence of external commands on the sense of agency. 
Using both explicit and implicit measures, the present investigation aimed to determine 
whether external commands influence both agency judgments and feelings of agency. In 
Study 2.1 we investigated obedience to verbal commands in an explicit agency judgment 
paradigm; we expected that obedience to commands would lower agency judgments. In 
Study 2.2 we investigated whether obedience to commands would also influence the more 
primary feelings of agency, using a time estimation paradigm as an implicit measure of 
agency; we expected verbal commands to lower feelings of agency. In Study 2.3 we set out 
to determine the underlying process in the reduction in agency due to obedience. In an 
explicit agency judgment paradigm we investigated whether the reduction in agency was 
due to removal of choice opportunity, or due to the contextual presence of the command. 
Finally in Study 2.4, again using a time estimation paradigm, we investigated whether 
feelings of agency could be influenced when verbal commands were given after participants 
had already initiated their action; we expected commands that were compatible with the 
performed action to lower agency compared to incompatible commands.
STUDY 2.1
Obeying to the commands of another person has been shown to shift the sense of 
responsibility (Milgram, 1974). But to what extent do other agents influence our sense 
of agency? While a study by Dijksterhuis and colleagues (2008) showed that subliminally 
priming participants with other agents (e.g., a computer) could lower the sense of agency, 
the question remains whether our sense of agency is also affected when we are given a 
command by another person to perform an action. Is our sense of performing an action, 
like our sense of responsibility, lowered when obeying the commands by another person?
  In Study 2.1 we looked at whether actions that are performed at the command of 
another person influence explicit agency judgments. Participants were either commanded 
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to perform specific button-presses, or they were free to choose and press one of two buttons. 
Each button-press caused a subsequent tone and participants were asked to rate the degree 
to which they felt they had caused the tone to occur. We expected lower agency judgments 
when participants were commanded to press a specific button, compared to when they were 
free to choose and press a button. 
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-six undergraduate students from the Radboud University Nijmegen (23 females; 
Mage = 20.31, SD = 1.64) participated in exchange for five euros or course credit.
Explicit agency task
Participants completed an adapted version of a paradigm earlier used by Sato and Yasuda 
(2005) as an explicit measure of agency. Over multiple trials, participants were either given 
a command by one of two confederates1 to press a keyboard button, or were not given a 
command and thus could choose freely. After each button-press participants heard a tone. 
Participants were told that there were two possibilities: either the tone had been generated 
by the computer, or by their own button-press. Participants had to indicate the degree to 
which they felt as if they had caused the occurrence of the tone.
 Three seconds after the trial started, when a visual timer on the screen hit zero, 
participants had to press one of two buttons on a keyboard. During the countdown to zero, 
one of the two confederates, both present in the room, could give a verbal command (saying 
“Left” vs. “Right”) to press either button, and participants had to press the designated 
button. If participants made a mistake, and pressed the wrong button, it was excluded from 
the analysis (1.46 % of trials). Confederates knew when to give a command by hidden 
visual cues presented on screen2. Participants reported no awareness of these cues during 
the debriefing. Participants were not able to successfully press a button and generate a tone 
1 The two confederates were the experimenter and another alleged participant. This was done to additionally 
explore the influence of authoritativeness on agency. To check whether the two confederates indeed differed 
on characteristics as perceived authoritativeness, dominance, and liking, these characteristics were explicitly 
measured using a 7-point scale (example item: ‘How much authority did the experimenter / other participant 
have?‘). However, none of these explicit measures revealed any differences, F’s < 1, n.s. As there were also 
no differences in agentic experience (results Study 1), we did not feel justified to draw any conclusions. For 
motivations of both ease of interpretation and research transparency we chose to address this exploration 
in the present footnote. All other manipulations and dependent variables have been reported in the present 
investigation.
2 Each trial, the following instruction was displayed: “If no command is given at 0 seconds, choose and press a 
button yourself.” When this sentence did not begin with a capital letter, the confederate on the left would give 
a command. When the sentence ended without a period, the confederate on the right gave a command. When 
the sentence both began with a capital letter and ended by a period, no command was given.
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before the visual timer had reached zero. This was done to ensure that there was a fixed 
point in time at which participants would act over all conditions. This procedural safeguard 
was present in all studies. After each button-press participants would hear a tone: a 1000 
Hz tone for a duration of 300 ms after a left button-press, and a 600 Hz tone for a duration 
of 300 ms after a right button-press. After hearing a tone, participants had to indicate the 
degree to which it felt like they had just produced that tone (“To what degree did it feel 
like you produced the tone and not the computer?”). They could do this by clicking on a 
100-point scale slider, with higher scores indicating higher experienced agency, and lower 
scores indicating lower experienced agency.
 Tones occurred after fixed time lags (0 ms vs. 200 ms vs. 400 ms vs. 600 ms after button-
presses). These were produced randomly but evenly divided over experimental conditions. 
Although temporal delay between action and effect influences sense of agency (Sato & 
Yasuda, 2005), it was not a main factor of interest. It was used in the current paradigm to 
make the task more ambiguous.
 The main task consisted of 106 trials. In 64 trials participants were given a command 
by one of two confederates to press a certain button, in 32 of the trials participants were 
given no command. Finally, there were 10 filler trials in which no command was given and 
a random tone automatically occurred 200 ms before participants would press a button. 
The purpose of these trials was to have participant experience trials in which the computer 
clearly produced the tone. These filler trials were not analyzed.
Procedure
Participants were welcomed and introduced to two other participants who had allegedly 
received prior instructions. The two other participants were in fact confederates. Participants 
and confederates were seated together in front of a computer, the participant in the middle 
and the two confederates on either side. Participants were told that this study was on feelings 
of causation. They were then informed that on each trial they were going to press a keyboard 
button; either one they chose themselves or one they were commanded to press by one of 
the confederates. Participants were told that after each button-press they would hear a tone, 
caused either by their button-press, or by the computer itself. Participants had to indicate 
the degree to which it felt that they had produced that tone. Afterwards participants were 
thanked and debriefed. Funneled debriefings indicated that none of the participants were 
aware of the true nature of the study.
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RESULTS
Agency ratings
Figure 2.1 shows the average agency ratings per condition. A 4 (Time lag: 0 ms vs. 200 
ms vs. 400 ms vs. 600 ms) x 3 (Agent: Self vs. Confederate 1 vs. Confederate 2) repeated 
measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on participants‘ reported agency ratings showed 
a main effect of Time lag F(3, 75) = 56.28, p < .001, η2p = .69. Shorter Time lags between 
button-presses and tones led to higher experiences of agency compared to longer Time lags 
(M0 = 83.22, SD = 12.59; M200 = 78.02, SD = 11.26; M400 = 60.70, SD = 13.29; M600 = 50.90, 
SD = 16.34).
 There was a main effect of Agent condition F(2, 50) = 5.94, p = .005, η2p = .19. Planned 
contrasts revealed that a command by a confederate to press a button led to lower 
experiences of agency compared to when participants received no command (M = 72.48; 
SD = 9.20). Agency ratings were significantly lower when commanded by Confederate 1 
(M = 65.81; SD = 12.44), F(1, 25) = 8.42, p = .008, η2p = .25, and also when commanded by 
Confederate 2 (M = 66.35; SD = 13.87), F(1, 25) = 8.42, p = .03, η2p = .17. There were no 
differences in experienced agency as a function of Confederate, F < 1, n.s. There was no 
significant interaction between the Time lag conditions and Commander conditions, F < 1, n.s.
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Figure 2.1. Mean agency ratings per Time lag and Agent conditions. 
Reaction times
A 4 (Time lag: 0 ms vs. 200 ms vs. 400 ms vs. 600 ms) x 3 (Agent: Self vs. Confederate 
1 vs. Confederate 2) repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on participants‘ 
Reaction Times (RT‘s) showed a main effect of Agent condition, F(2, 50) = 43.30, p < .001, 
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η2p = .63. Participants were slower to respond on trials in which they received no command 
compared to trials in which they received a command by Confederate 1 (MSelf = 1350; SD = 
83.651 vs. MConfederate 1 = 840; SD = 44.70; F(1, 25) = 53.48, p < .001, η2p = .68) and also slower 
compared to trials in which they received a command by Confederate 2, (MSelf = 1350; SD = 
83.651 vs. MConfederate 2 = 936; SD = 46.823; F(1, 25) = 34.25, p < .001, η2p = .58). There was no 
main effect of Time Lag condition, F < 1., n.s., nor was there an interaction effect between 
the Time Lag and Command conditions, F(6, 150) = 1.05, p = .39
Mediation analysis
To test for mediation in a within-subjects design, we followed the procedure outlined by 
Judd, Kenny, and McClelland (2001). As described by Judd and colleagues (2001), one can 
test for mediation in a two-level within subjects design by regressing the difference score 
of the two levels of the dependent variable on both the sum- and difference scores of the 
two levels of the proposed mediator. In this analysis, a significant regression coefficient 
for sum-scores would indicate moderation while a significant regression coefficient for the 
difference scores would indicate mediation (see Judd et al., 2001, for further details).
 To test for mediation in the present study we first collapsed the agency scores over the 
Time lag conditions. We then conducted two regression analyses: In the first we compared 
the trials without a command to the trials in which the participant was instructed what to 
do by Confederate 1. Following the procedure outlined above, we regressed the difference 
scores in agency levels (MAgencyNo-command – MAgencyConfederate 1) on both the sum-scores and 
difference-scores of the average RT‘s (MRTNo-command – / + MRTConfederate 1). This analysis did not 
show a significant regression coefficient for the RT sum-scores, B = .00, p = .73, nor for the 
difference scores, B = .00, p = .62. In a second analysis, we compared the trials without a 
command to the trials in which the participant was instructed what to do by Confederate 
2. Similar to the first analysis, the second regression showed neither a significant regression 
coefficient for the RT sum-scores, B = .00, p = .78, nor for the RT difference scores, B = 
.00, p = .64. The results from the mediation analyses therefore suggest that the difference 
in response latencies caused by the Agent manipulation did not mediate or moderate the 
agency scores.
DISCUSSION
The main question in the first study was whether following a command given by another 
person influences our sense of agency. The results suggest that, compared to a situation in 
which individuals were free to decide and act on their own, agency judgments are reduced 
when people follow a command. These results thus expand the literature on responsibility 
and authority (e.g., Milgram, 1974), showing that performing actions commanded by others 
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influences the experience of causation. While studies on obedience show that responsibility 
is displaced when commanded (Bandura, 1999; Milgram, 1963), following commands also 
alters our conscious experience of agency: the commands reduce one‘s sense of causation. 
The present findings also replicate results from earlier work by Wenke and colleagues 
(2010) who cued participants to give specific responses using arrow-shaped targets pointing 
towards the left when requiring a left response, and pointing towards the right when 
requiring a right response. However, when participants were cued with a double-headed 
arrow they were free to give either response. In line with the present results, they showed 
that when participants had most frequently been cued with single arrows requiring specific 
responses, participants reported - at the end of the experiment - reduced agency compared 
to when they had frequently been cued with the double arrows offering freedom of choice. 
The present study expands on this research by showing the same effects can be obtained on 
separate trials in a relatively strong contextual setting, and using verbal commands that are 
quite different from the targets in the study by Wenke and colleagues (2010).
 Due to the explicit nature of the previous study, it is possible that the agency scores that 
were reported did not represent the actual experience of the participants. The ratings could 
have undergone correction as most participants seek opportunities to be a good subject 
(Orne, 1962), and often act in accordance with what they see as the purpose of a study 
(Goldstein, Rosnow, Goodstadt, & Suls, 1972). To avoid the risk of experimenter demand 
we used an implicit agency paradigm in the next study.
STUDY 2.2
We used participants‘ estimates of the time lags between button-presses and subsequent 
tones as an implicit measure of feelings of agency. Several studies have used time estimation 
as a measure of feelings of agency. It appears that when actions are experienced as caused 
or controlled, the onset of the action and the onset of the consequence of that action are 
experienced as being closer together in time (Moore et al., 2009). Thus, the perceived time 
of self-generated actions and subsequent effects show a perceptual attraction or binding 
(Haggard & Clark, 2003). In contrast, the perceived onset of an involuntary action and its 
effect show repulsion, as the time of the action is experienced earlier and the consequence of 
that action as later. This intentional binding effect (Haggard et al., 2002) is used as a measure 
of feelings of agency, because the binding between voluntary actions and effects reliably 
occurs in situations in which the participant is an agent (e.g., Engbert, Wohlschläger, & 
Haggard, 2008), compared to situations in which a participant is not an agent (e.g., passive 
movements, movements of other individuals). As in Study 2.1, participants were either 
commanded or not commanded to press a specific button. Presses were again followed by 
tones, however, instead of giving agency judgments, participants were asked to estimate the 
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time interval between their pressing of the button and the presented tone. To further reduce
the risk of experimenter demand, participants were recruited and tested online (Nichols & 
Maner, 2008).
METHODS
Participants
Fifty3 American adults (29 females; Mage = 30.32, SD = 9.64) participated in this study, in 
exchange for $2 dollars. Participants were recruited through Amazon.com‘s Mechanical 
Turk service, an integrated participant recruitment and compensation system that is both 
diverse and reliable (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). The experiment was conducted 
using the online environment of Inquisit 4.0.2 (Draine, 2012). One participant was removed 
from the analysis for not understanding the instructions. Two participants did not complete 
the experiment and were therefore removed from the analysis.
Interval judgment task
The interval estimation task has been used as an implicit measure of feelings of agency 
(Engbert et al., 2007). While paradigms on judgments of agency typically describe the 
presence of an alternative agent (e.g., a computer), no alternative agent is needed in a 
time interval task (Moore et al., 2009). In our version, participants had to perform left 
and right button-presses, but could also be commanded by recorded verbal commands to 
press specific buttons. After each button-press participants heard a tone after varying time 
intervals and were asked to estimate the time they thought it took for the tone to occur 
following their button-press.
 Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross. Participants were instructed 
to press a left or right keyboard button the moment the fixation-cross disappeared, which 
was after 5 seconds. In the command trials, participants heard a verbal command indicating 
the required response (“Left” vs. “Right”) 2 seconds after the start of the trial. The verbal 
commands were equalized in volume level, and were recorded and configured to last exactly 
700 ms. In the no-command trials no verbal command was given, and participants were 
free to press a button. After each button-press participants would hear a tone: a 1000 Hz 
tone for a duration of 300 ms after a left button-press, and a 600 Hz tone for a duration of 
300 ms after a right button-press. Tones occurred 500 ms, 900 ms, or 1300 ms after button-
presses, and were produced randomly but evenly divided over experimental conditions. 
After hearing the tone, participants indicated on a scale of 1-2000 ms how long they thought 
it took the tone to occur after their button press. 
3 The sample size in Study 2 was larger than in the other studies, as we wanted to be sure we had enough power 
to remove participants in case of noisy data, as this could have been an issue with online experimentation. 
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There were 96 trials in total. In 48 trials participants were given a verbal command. In 
48 trials no command was given. Online debriefing procedures indicated that none of the 
participants was aware of the true nature of the study.
RESULTS
Time estimates
Figure 2.2 shows the average time estimates per condition. Higher time estimates indicate 
decreased agency. A 3 (Time lag: 500 ms vs. 900 ms vs. 1300 ms) x 2 (Agent: Self vs. 
Command) repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on participants‘ interval 
judgments showed a main effect of the actual Time lag conditions F(2, 92) = 114.12, p < 
.001, η2p = .71. As expected, shorter Time lags between button presses and tones led to lower 
time estimates compared to longer Time lags (M500 = 560, SD = 308; M900 = 811, SD = 316; 
M1300 = 1105, SD = 399). 
 There was a main effect of Agent condition F(1, 46) = 14.31, p = .001, η2p = .24. Contrast 
analyses revealed that a command by a confederate to press a button led to higher time 
estimates compared to when participants received no command (Mcommand = 852, SD = 320; 
Mself = 798, SD = 313). There was no significant interaction between the Time lag conditions 
and Commander conditions, F < 1, n.s.
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Figure 2.2. Mean time estimates per Time lag and Agent conditions. 
Damen_NIEUW kopie.indd   45 26-02-15   15:49
Chapter 246
Reaction times
A 3 (Time lag: 500 ms vs. 900 ms vs. 1300 ms) x 2 (Agent: Self vs. Command) repeated 
measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on RT‘s showed a main effect of the Agent 
condition, F(1, 46) = 19.17, p < .001, η2p = .29. Participants were faster to respond on trials 
in which participants were commanded to perform an action compared to when they were 
not given a command (Mcommand = 863, SD = 962; Mself = 1255, SD = 956). There was no main 
effect of Time Lag condition, F(2, 92) = 1.80, p = .17, nor was there an interaction effect 
between the Time Lag and Command conditions, F < 1., n.s.
Mediation analysis
To test for mediation in a within-subjects design, we again followed the followed the 
procedure outlined by Judd and colleagues (2001). We collapsed the interval judgments 
over the Time Lag conditions and regressed the difference scores between the two Agent 
conditions (MTimeCommand – MTimeSelf) on both the sum-scores and difference-scores of the 
average RT‘s of the Agent conditions (MRTCommand + / – MRTSelf). This analysis did not show 
a significant regression coefficient for the RT sum-scores, B = .01, p = .41, nor for the 
difference scores, B = .00, p = .90, suggesting that the difference in response latencies caused 
by the Agent manipulation did not mediate or moderate the interval judgments.
DISCUSSION
The results from the Study 2.2 showed that actions and effects that were preceded by a 
verbal command were judged to be further apart in the participants‘ perception of time, 
compared to actions and effects that were not preceded by a verbal command. This implies 
that participants experienced decreased agency in the command trials compared to the 
no-command trials, a replication of the findings from Study 2.1. The fact that we also find 
this pattern of results using an implicit measure provides strong additional evidence that 
following commands influences the actual experience of agency, and not only the reported 
agency scores. 
 The present results also add to recent studies (e.g. Desantis, Roussel, & Waszak, 2011) 
that reveal that contextual cues not only influence agency judgments, but they can also 
influence measures that are presumed to reflect a more primary and lower level sense of 
agency (Synofzik et al., 2008), or feelings of agency. This may suggest that contextual cues 
may actually have more influence on these lower levels of agency than originally assumed 
(see also Rigoni, Kühn, Sartori, & Brass, 2011). 
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STUDY 2.3
Being free to choose between actions is vital for our feelings of control (Skinner, 1996), 
and we feel a psychological reactance when another threatens that freedom (Brehm, 1966). 
Our previous studies have shown that following commands lowers the sense of agency. 
However, the question is what exactly causes the reduced sense of agency. It is possible that 
the mere presence of a command lowers the sense of agency. Agency could then be affected 
by the inference of external influence. In other words, the awareness that we may have 
followed another‘s command instead of freely chosen an action may undermine our sense 
of freedom, and decrease the sense of agency. Alternatively, it is also possible that agency 
is reduced because the opportunity of choosing (between action alternatives) is removed 
from the process of action selection. In Study 2.3 we investigated these hypotheses. 
 In an explicit agency paradigm, participants received either a command that still allowed 
participants to choose between action alternatives, or participants received a command that 
was specific and removed choice opportunity. Both conditions were compared to a baseline 
condition in which no command was given. If specific commands lead to lower agency 
than general commands, a large part of the reduction due to obedience is likely due to the 
removal of choice opportunity. If no difference between command conditions is observed, 
the presence of the command itself is most likely to reduce the sense of agency.
METHOD
Participants
Thirty undergraduate students from the Radboud University Nijmegen (25 females; 
Mage = 19.92, SD = 1.15) participated in exchange for five euros or course credit. One 
participant was removed from the analysis as this person was extremely slow and needed 
more than double of the average experiment time. 
Explicit agency task
In a paradigm similar to Study 2.1, participants could be given a verbal command through 
a headset. The command was either specific (“Left” vs. “Right”), or non-specific (“Press”). 
Participants were free to choose and press a keyboard button, except when a specific 
command was given which had to be obeyed. Button-presses again caused tones, and 
participants had to indicate the degree to which they and not the computer had caused the 
occurrence of the tone.
 Each trial started with a blank screen. After 2 seconds a verbal command could be given. 
The verbal commands were equalized in volume level, and were recorded and configured to 
last exactly 600 ms. Participants had to press a button the moment a fixation cross appeared 
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on a screen, which was presented after 3.5 seconds. After each button-press participants 
would hear a tone: a 1000 Hz tone for a duration of 300 ms after a left button-press, and 
a 600 Hz tone for a duration of 300 ms after a right button-press. After hearing a tone, 
participants had to indicate the degree to which it felt like they had just produced that tone. 
They could do this by clicking on a 100-point scale slider, with higher scores indicating 
higher experienced agency, and lower scores indicating lower experienced agency. Tones 
occurred after fixed time lags (0 ms vs. 250 ms vs. 500 ms after button-presses) that were 
produced randomly but evenly divided over experimental conditions. 
 The main task consisted of 72 trials. In 24 trials participants were given a specific 
command, in 24 trials they received a non-specific command, and in 24 trials no command 
was given. Funneled debriefings indicated that none of the participants were aware of the 
true nature of the study.
RESULTS
Agency ratings
A 3 (Time lag: 0 ms vs. 250 ms vs. 500 ms) x 3 (Command condition: Specific vs. Non-specific 
vs. No-command) repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on participants‘ 
reported agency ratings showed a main effect Time lag, F(2, 56) = 39.84, p < .001, η2p = 
.59. Shorter Time lags between button-presses and tones led to higher experienced agency 
compared to longer Time lags (M0 = 76.53, SD = 14.59; M250 = 57.25, SD = 12.17; M500 = 
40.96, SD = 18.79).
 Figure 2.3 shows the averaged agency ratings per command condition. For the sake of 
interpretation, reported means are the averages collapsed over Time lag conditions. There 
was a main effect of command condition F(2, 56) = 5.33, p = .008, η2p = .16. Planned 
contrasts revealed than being given a specific command (Mspecific = 56.34, SD = 12.01), 
or being given a non-specific command (Mnon-specific = 57.62, SD = 7.97), lead to lower 
experiences of agency compared to the condition in which no command was given (Mno-
command = 60.78, SD = 10.02), F(1, 28) = 8.40, p = .007, η2p = .23, and F(1, 28) = 6.06, p = .02, 
η2p = .18 respectively. Contrast revealed no differences between the specific and non-specific 
command conditions F < 1, n.s. There was no significant interaction between the Time lag 
conditions and Command conditions, F < 1, n.s.
Reaction times
A 3 (Time lag: 0 ms vs. 250 ms vs. 500 ms) x 3 (Command condition: Specific vs. Non-
specific vs. No-command) repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on RT‘s 
showed a main effect of command condition, F(2, 56) = 19.00, p < .001, η2p = .40. RT‘s 
were the lower when participants received a non-specific command compared to when 
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participants received a specific command (Mnon-specific = 403, SD = 131 vs. Mspecific = 589, SD 
= 315; F(1, 28) = 17.81, p < .001, η2p = .39) and lower compared to when participants were 
given no command (Mnon-specific = 403, SD = 131 vs. Mno-command = 1048, SD = 702.359; F(1, 28) 
= 26.44, p < .001, η2p = .49). Participants were also faster to response to a specific command 
compared to when no commands were given, F(1, 28) = 12.29, p = .002, η2p = .31. There was 
no main effect of Time Lag condition, F < 1, n.s., nor was there an interaction effect between 
the Time Lag and Command conditions, F(4, 112), p = .29. As the main effects of the RT‘s 
did not map onto the main effects of the agency scores, we did not investigate mediation.
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Figure 2.3. Mean agency ratings per command condition. Error bars represent Standard 
Errors.
DISCUSSION
In a recent study, Barlas & Obhi (2013) showed that a reduction in the number of action 
alternatives is related to decreases in the sense of agency. It was therefore possible that any 
reduction in the sense of agency after participants had followed commands would be due to 
a removal of the availability of choice in the process of action selection, and not due to the 
contextual presence of a verbal command. However, the present results showed a reduction 
in agency to occur both in the condition in which a command was given that removed the 
opportunity of choice, as well as in the condition in which participants were still able to 
choose between action alternatives. This finding suggests the reduction in agency is caused 
by the individuals‘ awareness that a command has been given, not by a process-difference 
related to choice. 
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STUDY 2.4
The results from the previous study suggest that the mere presence of commands could 
decrease the sense of agency. The question is whether commands that are given during 
action performance, and thus after action selection and action initiation, can also influence 
agency. In Study 2.4, participants initiated their action, and during action performance 
they heard verbal commands that were compatible, opposite, or unrelated to the performed 
action. The commands were purely contextual, irrelevant for the participants‘ current task, 
but merely matched or did not match participants‘ ongoing action. We again used an interval 
judgment task introduced in Study 2.2 as an implicit measure of agency. We expected that 
time estimates were higher, indicating a lower sense of agency, when participants heard a 
command that was compatible to the action they were performing, compared to opposite 
commands or commands that were unrelated to the performed action.
METHODS
Participants 
Thirty-one undergraduate students from the Radboud University Nijmegen (23 females; 
Mage = 23.66, SD = 1.79) participated in exchange for course credit. 
Interval judgment task
Participants were presented a red circle on their monitor, ostensibly representing a balloon. 
They were instructed to inflate the balloon until it popped. They could start inflating the 
balloon by clicking once on the red circle and holding down the mouse-button, thereby 
causing the red circle to gradually become bigger. After a fixed period of time (2500 ms vs. 
3000 ms. vs. 3500 ms evenly divided over a total of 27 trials), the balloon popped, indicated 
by the recorded sound of a balloon burst and the presentation of the picture of a popped 
red balloon. Participants were then asked to give their estimation of the time it took for the 
balloon to pop. They were first required to indicate seconds, and then they were able to add 
decimal seconds. In case participants did not hold down the mouse-button and accidentally 
released it prior to the balloon burst, an error message appeared and the trial restarted. As 
an additional instruction, participants were explained that during the inflation process, they 
were going to hear recorded voices delivered over a headset, which they should however 
disregard. Evenly divided over trials, participants would hear the words ‘Press‘ (compatible 
command); ‘Stop‘ (opposite command); or ‘Swim‘ (unrelated command). The verbal stimuli 
were delivered two times during the inflation process: 2000 ms and 1000 ms before trial 
end, were equalized in volume level, and were recorded and configured to last exactly 600 
ms. Funneled debriefings indicated that none of the participants were aware of the true 
nature of the study.
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RESULTS
A 3 (Action time: 2500 ms vs. 3000 ms vs. 3500 ms) x 3 (Command type: compatible 
commands vs. opposite/incompatible commands vs. unrelated commands) repeated 
measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant main effect of Action time, 
F(2, 60) = 238.94, p < .001, η2p = .88. As expected, shorter Action times led to lower time 
estimates compared to longer Action times (M2500 = 3.40, SD = .87 vs. M3000 = 4.06, SD = .99 
vs. M3500 = 4.60, SD = .87). 
 There was also a main effect of Command type, F (2, 60) = 4.26, p = .02, η2p = .12. 
Figure 2.4 shows the averaged time estimates per Command type conditions. For the sake 
of interpretation, reported means are the averages collapsed over Action time conditions. 
Higher time estimates indicate decreased agency. Planned contrasts revealed that when 
participants were given compatible commands they reported increased time estimates, 
suggesting a reduced sense of agency, compared to when they were given opposite 
commands (Mcompatible = 4.11, SD = 1.01 vs. Mopposite = 3.93, SD = .919; F(1, 30) = 6.56, p = .016, 
η2p = .18). Compatible commands lead to marginally higher time estimates than unrelated 
commands (Mcompatible = 4.11, SD = 1.01 vs. Munrelated = 4.02, SD = .969; F(1, 30) = 3.71, p = .06, 
η2p = .11). The difference between opposite and unrelated trials did not reach significance, 
F(1, 30) = 2.04, p = .16, η2p = .06. No interaction effect between Command type and Action 
time was observed, F(4, 120) = 1.70, p = .15.4
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Figure 2.4. Mean time estimates per Command type condition. Error bars represent Standard 
Errors.
4 To explore whether the influence of commands in Study 4 was specific to self-performed actions and was not a 
general compatibility effect, we conducted an additional study in which 31 participants were presented with an 
experiment similar to Study 4. The main difference was that instead of acting themselves, participants saw the 
‘computers‘ cursor moving towards the balloon and inflating the balloon until it popped. There was however no 
difference in time estimation between command types, F < 1, n.s., suggesting the influence of the commands in 
Study 4 was specific to the action related processes in that study.
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DISCUSSION
The present study showed that participants‘ sense of agency could be influenced by 
contextual cues that were given after they had already initiated their actions. Even though 
participants were instructed to ignore whatever they heard through their headset, trials on 
which participants heard compatible commands were experienced as significantly longer 
than trials on which participants heard incompatible commands, suggesting a decreased 
sense of agency for compatible compared to incompatible commands. Although the present 
study differed from the previous study in that participants were not able to choose among 
different action possibilities, the present findings again suggest that the mere presence of 
verbal commands is able to influence agency. These findings also expand on some recent 
findings by Damen and colleagues (2014), who showed that compatible supraliminal action 
primes given before actions lead to lower agency ratings than incompatible primes. The 
present findings show that this process can also occur after action initiation. 
 It is interesting to note that participants‘ time estimates were relatively inaccurate. 
Specifically, time estimates were almost a second higher than the actual time intervals. 
Instead of intentional binding or temporal attraction, we observed increases and decreases 
in temporal separation depending on experimental condition. We can think of three 
explanations as to why this occurred: First, the presence of a potential other agent decreased 
the sense of agency in general, and as a related process, increased overall time estimates. 
Second, while traditional agency paradigms often feature a single quick action (e.g., a quick 
button-press) followed by an action effect, in the present study participants had to continue 
their action for a prolonged period of time until the action effect occurred, which may in 
itself increase time estimation. Finally, as shown by Humphreys and Buehner (2009), while 
binding does reliably occur at super-second intervals, longer intervals are associated with 
relatively inaccurate estimates.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
External commands influence the sense of agency
The present research explored whether the commands by another agent influence 
perceptions of one‘s own sense of agency. Using different measures, we found that obedience 
or acting compatible to a verbal command decreased the sense of agency. To some degree, 
these effects were to be expected as earlier research has shown that individuals experience 
less responsibility after forced compliance (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959), and personal low 
power will lead to less agentic global attributions (Keltner, et al., 2008). However, the present 
research extends these findings by showing that even our immediate action experiences are 
influenced by acting upon commands (Study 2.1); that commands influence action related 
time perception (Studies 2.2 & 2.4); are even able to do so when individuals have already 
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started their action (Study 2.4); and that such effects are likely to occur not because of a 
limitation in choice opportunity, but are likely due to the contextual presence of an external 
command (Study 2.3).
 Study 2.3 suggests that the reduction due to obedience was mostly due to the presence 
of the command itself, and is not the consequence of a removal in choice opportunity. As a 
recent study has shown that a reduction in the number of action alternatives is related to a 
decrease in the sense of agency (Barlas & Obhi, 2013), a reduction in the number of action 
alternatives to one possible action – essentially what a command does – could have been the 
process underlying the reduction in agency due to obedience. However, the findings from 
Study 2.3 suggest this is not the case: commands that did not alter choice opportunity led 
to lower agency levels, just as commands that did limit the number of action opportunities. 
This suggests this process is not due to the presence or absence of action alternatives, but 
that it is the presence of the command itself that influences the sense of agency.
 The findings from Study 2.4 further support this explanation. Here, commands did 
not relate to choice opportunity as the commands were given after participants‘ actions 
had already been initiated. The results showed that these commands were again able to 
influence the sense of agency, depending on their compatibility with the ongoing action: 
verbal commands that were compatible with the action reduced agency compared to 
unrelated or opposite commands. While Moore et al. (2009) showed that supraliminal effect 
primes (a preview of a tone), increased agency when the effects were compatible rather than 
incompatible (for similar findings see Aarts et al., 2005), the present research shows that the 
presence of action related commands decreases the sense of agency when those commands 
are compatible. The findings from Study 2.4 also expand on a recent study by Damen and 
colleagues (2014), who showed that compatible supraliminal action primes given prior to 
action performance lead to lower agency ratings compared to incompatible primes. The 
present findings show that this process can also occur after action initiation. The conscious 
awareness that we may have been influenced or are actually doing something in line with 
the suggestions or commands of another will reduce our sense of agency (Damen et al., 
2014). Imagine driving and taking a left turn, and someone in the passenger seat tells you 
to keep going left. You are then likely to experience decreased agency for taking the left turn 
compared to when the passenger was actually telling you to take a right turn instead. 
Agency levels
Since previous literature has argued that explicit judgments and implicit feelings of agency 
reflect different levels of agency (Synofzik et al., 2008), both concepts of agency were 
investigated by using both explicit and implicit measures. In general, our results show that 
commands influence agency at both levels; receiving a command affects both our immediate 
feelings of agency, as well as our reflective judgments of being a likely agent.
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 However, the question remains why external commands would actually influence time 
perception, an implicit measure that has been considered to reflect a more primary or 
lower level of agency assumed to be unaffected by contextual cues (unrelated to motor 
prediction). Given the present findings, the most likely explanation is that processes of 
motor prediction can in fact be influenced by contextual cues: If you suddenly receive a 
voice command during your motor preparation, as in the present studies, it is not hard 
to imagine that you will be distracted and subsequently your sense of agency becomes 
reduced. Such an explanation would be in line with a number of recent findings that indeed 
challenge the view that motor prediction processes are inoculate to inferential cognitions 
and contextual cues, and suggest that factors such as belief states and contextual cues may 
have a much more fundamental effect than previously thought. For example, in a study 
by Rigoni and colleagues (2012), individuals‘ belief in free will and personal causality 
was shown to influence the degree of pre-motor activation in the brain; individuals who 
disbelieved in free will showed a reduction in readiness potential amplitudes. In similar 
vein, the readiness potentials can perhaps also be influenced by the presence of a verbal 
command; an interesting avenue to investigate in future research. 
 A second - and intriguing - explanation is that inferences and beliefs, perhaps also 
influenced by contextual cues, can influence feelings of agency and intentional binding 
more directly then previously considered. Desantis and colleagues (2011) showed that 
inducing participants with high beliefs about personal agency led to increased intentional 
binding compared to individuals who were led to believe their actions were caused by 
another individual. However, such an effect may still be caused by a difference in motor 
prediction. As mentioned above, Rigoni and colleagues (2012) have shown that beliefs 
about free will did also influence pre-motor activity. However, the results from Study 2.4 
open the possibility of another explanation: that of a direct effect of contextual inference on 
time perception. 
 Previous studies in the domains of agency and binding have regularly required their 
participants to perform a single short action (e.g., a button-press) and to observe a single 
event (e.g., a tone). Study 2.4 is, to our knowledge, the first study to show that time estimation 
can be influenced on a task involving an ongoing action. The context of an ongoing action 
and over several seconds, makes it difficult to explain the present findings as an effect related 
to motor prediction. While one may reasonably argue that in Studies 2.1-2.3 ones motor 
preparation is disrupted due the context of a verbal command, and therefore the amount 
of sensory information the participants are receiving during the motor preparation period 
is different for the separate conditions, such an explanation is less likely to have occurred 
in Study 2.4. The results from Study 2.4 therefore suggest an effect that is inferential rather 
than related to motor prediction.
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Optimal cue integration
In recent attempts to develop a comprehensive model for the sense of agency, researchers 
have advocated agency to arise by a process of optimal cue integration, also referred to as 
the Bayesian model of agency (e.g., Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Voss, 
2013). According to these theories, multiple cues of agency are thought to be continuously 
integrated and weighted depending on their availability and reliability in a given situation. A 
key prediction of the Bayesian model is that when automatic motor processes that are linked 
to agency (e.g., sensory-motor prediction) become less reliable, the influence of other cues 
(e.g., contextual cues) becomes stronger. Although support for this model is limited as of yet 
(Gentsch, Kathmann, & Schütz-Bosbach, 2012; Moore et al., 2009), it would be interesting 
for future research to investigate the influence of external commands, in conditions 
in which automatic processes are less reliable (e.g., by manipulating contingency); the 
Bayesian model of agency would predict stronger effects of commands in these situations. 
In view of this theory, it is however interesting that we did not find an interaction between 
the experimental conditions and temporal delay in any of the studies. A Bayesian approach 
may have predicted increased influence of contextual factors (the commands) with longer 
temporal delays, as these delays may influence the degree to which internal predictions are 
perceived as reliable. Though speculative, this could suggest that increased temporal delay 
does not lead to an immediate susceptibility to contextual cues – or at least not when long 
temporal delays occur frequently.
Limitations
There are limitations in the present investigation that have to be addressed: first, due to the 
large number of females in a number of studies, we were often unable to investigate gender 
differences. It has been shown that gender interacts with the experience of self-causation in 
priming experiments (e.g., Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2010; Jones, de Wit, Fernyhough, & 
Meins, 2008), and any future studies should therefore test for gender differences. Second, we 
operationalized obedience in the current studies by having participants obey the commands 
of the experimenter. Such a setup may not fully capture the powerful and dominating 
context that is present in true hierarchies or conditions of obedience, in which an individual 
is bound by formal and informal conventions and group pressures to obey authority. We 
are however confident that the basic processes underlying the present studies also operate 
(and are likely to operate even stronger) in real life hierarchical situations. Finally, the use 
of intentional binding as an implicit measure of agency is not entirely uncontroversial. For 
example, intentional binding and explicit agency judgments have been dissociated in some 
studies (Ebert & Wegner, 2010; Obhi & Hall, 2011; Strother, House, & Obhi, 2010), making 
the link between intentional binding and feelings of agency still rather tentative.
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CONCLUSION
In the present studies we find that agency, the experience of self-causation, is lowered, 
when following another‘s command. This in essence reflects what Milgram (1974) may 
have referred to as the agentic shift in which the experience of causing is transferred to 
another individual, and may in part explain why individuals show destructive obedience: 
if an action does not feel ones own, there is no urgency to control it. While research on 
(destructive) obedience has emphasized the importance of the experience of responsibility 
(Milgram, 1974), the experience of agency may be just as important: if a person does not 
feel as a performer or agent, that person should be less inclined to stop their actions or show 
the ability to change those actions. In a recent study by Fennis and Aarts (2012) a lowered 
sense of agency was linked to increased susceptibility to a request from an authority. The 
findings from Fennis & Aarts (2012) and the findings presented in this research may 
show parts of a potentially reinforcing cycle, as obeying orders will lower your sense of 
agency, while experiences of lowered agency will make you more likely to be obedient. Of 
course, these studies touched upon the following of commands, which is not necessarily 
the same as destructive obedience as defined by Milgram. Future studies on destructive 
obedience and agency are required to further experimentally investigate these hypotheses. 
 To conclude, in the present set of studies we investigated the sense of agency when 
participants were free to act or had to obey commands. Using different measures, and 
investigating agency on different levels of cognition, we repeatedly find that obedience 
to commands, or compatible command cues, decrease the sense of agency. The present 
investigation thereby reveals the importance of action selection process: agency is not fixed, 
even when you perform an action on your own, your sense of acting or causing can change 
as a result of external commands.
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Chapter 3
You Should Read This! 
Perceiving and Acting upon Action Primes 
Influences One’s Sense of Agency
 
This chapter is based on Damen, T. G. E., van Baaren, R. B., & Dijksterhuis, A. (2014). You 
should read this! Perceiving and acting upon action primes influences one‘s sense of agency. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 50, 21–26. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2013.09.003
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ABSTRACT
In two studies, we investigated the degree to which action primes, and acting upon those 
primes affect agency ratings. Participants performed left or right button-presses that 
generated tones, and were subsequently asked to indicate the degree to which they felt that 
they, instead of the computer, had caused the tones. Prior to button-presses, participants 
were subliminally or supraliminally primed with “left” or “right”. Participants were free 
to press either button, and thus could perform prime-compatible or prime-incompatible 
actions. Results showed that incompatible primes lowered sense of agency compared to 
the effects of compatible primes, when primes were presented subliminally. In contrast, 
supraliminal compatible primes lowered agency compared to incompatible primes.
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The sense that we are performing an action or causing an effect – that is, the sense of 
agency – is a pervasive feature of consciousness. In conscious experience, we intuitively 
differentiate between states in which we feel that we caused something to occur, and states 
in which we feel no agency (Wegner, 2002). Although we like to think that our sense of 
agency is a clear-cut and robust sensation, recent investigations have shown that people 
can experience different degrees of agency, and that agency can be influenced by a number 
of different factors (Wegner, 2003). For example, numerous studies have shown that an 
important determinant for the experience of agency is the compatibility between an agent‘s 
prior thoughts and the effects that follow (Pronin, Wegner, McCarthy, & Rodriguez, 2006). 
 Studies have often used effect priming to influence or simulate those prior thoughts 
(Aarts, 2007; Sato, 2009), thereby activating the representation of those outcomes before 
the actions are performed (van der Weiden, Aarts, & Ruys, 2012). Effect primes have been 
shown to increase agency by subliminally priming the location where participants will stop 
a movement (Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005); by having participants hear a tone before 
they subsequently cause that tone by their button-press (Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 
2009); or by subliminally priming the word “blue” before participants cause a blue circle to 
appear by their button-press (Sato, 2009). While such studies have established that giving 
a preview of an outcome just before that outcome occurs increases our sense of agency, 
related questions, namely how thinking about and selecting between appropriate actions 
influence agency, have received only limited attention (Wenke, Waszak, & Haggard, 2009). 
This neglect is surprising as individuals not only think about desired outcomes, but they 
can also think thoroughly about appropriate actions, making the process of action selection 
a major part of the action sequence (Brass & Haggard, 2008). 
 In a recent investigation by Wenke, Fleming, and Haggard (2010), the importance of 
action selection for sense of agency was investigated by subliminally priming participants 
with potential future actions. Participants experienced increased agency when their 
performed actions were compatible with the earlier action primes, compared to when they 
were incompatible. According to Wenke et al. (2010), compatible action primes ‘smoothen‘ 
action selection, thereby increasing the sense of agency. That is, compatible primes facilitated 
responding, while incompatible primes interfered with response selection. 
 However, these findings may not generalize to situations where the primes are processed 
consciously rather than unconsciously. The explicit awareness of the action primes, may 
influence the subsequent sense of agency differently: when we become aware that we 
are doing (or may have done) something compatible with an external action prime, it is 
possible that our sense of agency is not increased, but weakened instead. Being free to 
choose between actions is vital for our feelings of control (Skinner, 1996), and we feel a 
psychological reactance when another threatens that freedom (Brehm, 1966). Awareness 
that we may have followed action primes instead of freely chosen an action ourselves may 
therefore undermine our sense of freedom, and decrease the sense of agency.
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 In two experiments we investigated the relation between action prime visibility, and the 
compatibility of the action prime with the following action, on the sense of agency. Using an 
explicit agency task, participants were subliminally and supraliminally primed with possible 
actions – ‘left‘ or ‘right‘ – prior to action execution – pressing a left or right keyboard button 
–, and were subsequently asked to report their sense of agency for the effects their actions 
caused; namely, a tone. We expected that subliminal primes compatible with subsequent 
actions lead to increased agency compared to incompatible primes. In contrast, awareness 
of the externally generated primes may reverse this pattern; primes compatible with actions 
may then lead to reduced agency compared to incompatible primes.
STUDY 3.1
METHOD
Participants
Twenty undergraduate students (Mage = 19.50; 15 females) participated in exchange for €10 
euros or course credit.
Materials and procedure
Participants were welcomed and explained the study was about feelings of causation. They 
were going to produce tones with button-presses, but were told that it was also possible for 
the computer to generate tones, thereby creating an ambiguous situation. In fact participants 
always produced the tones.
 The task comprised 300 trials (120 subliminal, 120 supraliminal, and 60 
no-prime) presented in random order. In each trial, participants were either primed 
subliminally, supraliminally, or they were not primed. Participants focused on a row of X-es 
for 800 ms, during which time they were subliminally (16.7 ms 1) or supraliminally (200 ms) 
primed (‘LEFT‘ vs. ‘RIGHT‘), or were not primed. Post-mask X-es appeared for 50 ms, and 
then disappeared. Participants were instructed to press a left or right button. On average, 
participants acted compatible with the action primes on 57.8% of the subliminal trials, and 
64.0% of the supraliminal trials. These percentages did not significantly differ from one 
another F(1,19) = 1.12, p = .30. While responses to subliminal trials did not differ from 
chance level t(1,19) = 1.53, p = .14, responses to supraliminal trials were beyond chance 
level t(1,19) = 3.91, p = .001.
 Participants were to press a button the moment the X-es disappeared. As such there was 
a fixed point in time when participants had to press a button of their choosing. Trials on 
which no response was given after 5000 ms were excluded from the analysis (0.4% of total 
trials). Participants were told that they could see words or flashes appearing within the X-es. 
1  Represents 1 frame on a 60 Hz monitor.
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They were instructed that these words should not distract them, and that they were always 
free to press a button of their own choosing. Button-presses generated a tone: a 1000 Hz 
tone for a duration of 500 ms after a left button-press, and a 600 Hz tone for a duration of 
500 ms after a right button-press. The tones occurred after fixed time lags (0 ms vs. 200 ms 
vs. 400 ms vs. 600 ms; evenly divided over experimental conditions). Although temporal 
delay between action and effect influences sense of agency (Sato & Yasuda, 2005), it was 
not a main factor of interest. It was used in the current paradigm to make the task more 
ambiguous. At the end of each trial, participants had to indicate on a 100-point scale the 
degree to which they felt they had caused the tone to occur.  
 Debriefings indicated that none of the participants were aware that words were also 
presented during subliminal trials. Furthermore, none of them realized the true nature of 
the study. 
RESULTS
Agency ratings
A 4 (Time Lag: 0 ms vs. 200 ms vs. 400 ms vs. 600 ms) × 2 (Prime Visibility: subliminal vs. 
supraliminal) × 2 (Prime Compatibility: compatible vs. incompatible) repeated-measures 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on agency ratings showed a main effect of Time Lag, F(3, 
57) = 23.86, p < .001, η2p = .56. Shorter Time Lags led to significantly higher agency ratings 
than longer Time lags (M0 ms = 77.94, SD = 16.73; M200 ms = 74.79, SD = 11.73; M400 ms = 64.58, 
SD = 12.24; M600 ms = 51.54, SD = 14.14). There was no main effect of Prime Visibility, F < 
1, n.s., nor of Prime Compatibility, F(1, 19) = 1.24, p = .28. Analyses showed no interaction 
between Time Lag and Prime Visibility, nor was there an interaction between Time Lag and 
Prime Type, both F‘s < 1, n.s. Finally, there was no three-way interaction between Time Lag, 
Prime Visibility, and Prime Compatibility, F < 1, n.s.
 However, analyses did show a significant interaction between Prime Visibility and Prime 
Compatibility, F(1, 19) = 7.87, p = .01, η2p = .29 (see Fig. 3.1). Planned contrasts show that 
when primes were presented subliminally, compatible primes led to higher agency ratings 
compared to incompatible primes (Mcompatible = 69.78; SD = 9.43 vs. Mincompatible = 65.12; SD 
= 12.39; F(1, 19) = 5.18, p = .04, η2p = .21). However, the reverse was observed within the 
supraliminal prime condition: here, compatible primes led to less agency compared to 
incompatible primes (Mcompatible = 63.85; SD = 12.46 vs. Mincompatible = 70.11; SD = 10.48; F(1, 19) 
= 8.89, p = .008, η2p = .32). In an additional repeated-measures ANOVA, we contrasted the 
no-prime condition (Mno-prime = 69.69; SD = 9.29) with the four conditions of the interaction 
between Prime Visibility and Compatibility. Contrasts showed that compared to the no-
prime baseline, agency was reduced both in the subliminal incompatible condition, F(1, 19) 
= 10.35, p = .005, η2p = .35, and in the supraliminal compatible condition, F(1, 19) = 16.31, p = 
Damen_NIEUW kopie.indd   63 26-02-15   15:49
Chapter 364
.001, η2p = .46. Contrasts between the no-prime condition and the subliminal compatible and 
supraliminal incompatible conditions revealed no differences in sense of agency, F‘s < 1, n.s. 
Reaction times
The repeated-measures ANOVA on Reaction Times (RT‘s), which was similar to the analysis 
on agency ratings, showed a main effect of Prime Visibility, F(1, 19) = 27.60, p < .001, η2p 
= .59. RT‘s were higher after subliminal primes than after supraliminal primes (Msubliminal = 
670.52; SD = 259.27 vs. Msupraliminal = 573.12; SD = 241.57). The interaction between Prime 
Visibility and Compatibility on RTs, which was the crucial test for the analysis on agency 
ratings, was not significant, F < 1, n.s.; similarly, none of the other tests in this analysis 
reached significance. A subsequent repeated-measures analysis on the average RT‘s of the 
subliminal, supraliminal and no-prime (Mno-prime = 548.57; SD = 203.86) conditions showed 
that participants were slower to respond in the subliminal condition compared to the 
supraliminal condition (F(1, 19) = 13.38, p = .002, η2p = .41) and also compared to the no-
prime condition (F(1, 19) = 23.56, p < .001, η2p = .55) 2.
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Figure 3.1. Mean agency ratings per Visibility and Compatibility conditions, collapsed over 
Time lag conditions. Error bars represent standard errors.
DISCUSSION
Our results showed that when primes were subliminal, compatible action primes led to 
higher agency ratings compared to incompatible primes. We thereby replicated the findings 
reported by Wenke et al. (2010), who showed higher agency ratings for compatible rather 
than incompatible subliminal primes. However, when we contrasted the subliminal prime 
2  In a further exploration of the data, we excluded 20, 40 and 50 percent of the slowest RT‘s per participant and 
condition in both studies. These analyses did not reveal any differences with regards to significance and non-
significance, on response behavior, agency judgments, and RT‘s, compared to the results reported in the main text.
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conditions to the no-prime control condition, only the incompatible primes led to different 
agency ratings; that is, incompatible primes resulted in lower agency ratings compared to 
the control condition. No difference was observed between the no-prime condition and 
the compatible prime condition. Taken together, these findings would suggest that agency 
is not enhanced by subliminal compatible primes, and instead, that the incompatible 
primes drive the effect: agency is reduced when subliminal primes are incompatible. The 
reverse findings were observed when the action primes were supraliminal. First, compatible 
primes led to lower ratings of agency compared to incompatible primes. When contrasting 
the supraliminal conditions to the no-prime condition, a difference was only observed 
compared to the compatible condition. That is, when we follow a visible action prime, we 
experience reduced agency. 
 The present study also showed a difference in RT‘s due to prime visibility, as responses 
were slower after subliminal prime trials compared to the supraliminal and no-prime trials. 
It‘s possible that subliminal action primes could have disrupted the action selection process. 
The supraliminal primes may have had no such effect because of their overt nature, and/or 
because participants were given the explicitly instruction not to be distracted by the words 
they would see in the experiment. With regard to the present study, however, it‘s important 
to note that there were no differences in RT‘s when testing for the interaction between 
prime visibility and prime compatibility. This suggests that differences in agency in this 
interaction cannot be explained by differences in RT‘s.
 In the first study, we contrasted our findings to a condition in which no prime was 
presented. In a second study, we aimed to replicate the results from our first study, 
additionally priming participants both subliminally and supraliminally with non-word 
primes, keeping priming a constant factor across study conditions.
STUDY 3.2
METHOD
Participants
Twenty undergraduate students (Mage = 20.25; 17 females) participated in exchange for €10 
euros or course credit.
Materials and procedure
Study 3.2 was similar to Study 3.1; the differences being that there were three time lag 
conditions (0 ms vs. 300 ms vs. 600 ms; evenly divided over trials), and that participants 
were subliminally and supraliminally primed with a non-word (‘WOTSL‘) instead 
of not primed. Trials on which no response was given after 5000 ms, were excluded 
from the analysis (0.8% of total trials). The explicit agency task comprised 324 trials 
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(81 subliminal, 81 subliminal non-word, 81 supraliminal, and 81 supraliminal non-
word) presented in random order. On average, participants acted compatible with the 
action primes on 50.5% of the subliminal trials, and 51.0% of the supraliminal trials. 
These percentages did not significantly differ from one another or from chance level. 
 To further examine the subliminal nature of the prime presentation, participants worked 
on a 20-trial prime detection task. Participants were subliminally primed with ‘LEFT‘ and 
‘RIGHT‘, and were to try to determine the presented word. They were to indicate this with 
the responses “Left”, “Right”, and “Unclear”. None of the participants scored beyond the 
50% chance level when their proportion of correct responses was calculated (Mproportion correct 
= .29). Debriefings indicated that none of the participants were aware that words were also 
presented during the subliminal trials in the main task. Finally, none of the participants 
realized the true nature of the study.
RESULTS
Agency ratings
A 3 (Time Lag: 0 ms vs. 300 ms vs. 600 ms) × 2 (Prime Visibility: subliminal vs. supraliminal) 
× 3 (Prime Type: compatible vs. incompatible vs. non-word) repeated-measures ANOVA 
on agency ratings showed a main effect of time delay, as shorter Time Lags led to higher 
agency ratings than longer Time Lags (F(2, 38) = 43.45, p < .001, η2p = .70; M0 ms = 85.60, SD 
= 7.85; M300 ms = 68.22, SD = 16.21; M600 ms = 46.99, SD = 23.34). There was no main effect 
of Prime Visibility F(1, 19) = 2.82, p = .11, nor was there a main effect of Prime Type F < 1, 
n.s. Analyses showed no interaction between Time Lag and Prime Visibility, F(2, 38) = 2.53, 
p = .09, nor was there an interaction between Time Lag and Prime Type, F(4, 76) = 1.71, 
p = .16. Finally, there was no three-way interaction between Time Delay, Prime Type, and 
Prime Compatibility, F < 1, n.s.
 There was a significant interaction between Prime Visibility and Prime Type, F(2, 38) 
= 13.671, p < .001, η2p = .42 (see Fig. 3.2). Compatible and incompatible primes led to 
different agency ratings between the subliminal and the supraliminal prime conditions, 
F(1, 19) = 11.69, p = .003, η2p = .38. When primes were presented subliminally, compatible 
primes led to significantly higher ratings of agency than incompatible primes (Mcompatible = 
68.98; SD = 13.35 vs. Mincompatible = 66.90; SD = 14.03; F(1, 19) = 8.41, p = .009, η2p = .31). 
Again, a reverse trend was observed in the supraliminal condition, as compatible primes 
then led to significantly lower ratings of agency compared to incompatible primes (Mcompatible 
= 64.62; SD = 11.76 vs. Mincompatible = 67.58; SD = 13.68; F(1, 19) = 4.34, p = .05, η2p = .17). 
When looking at the direction of the compatibility effects relative to the non-word primes 
we found that when primes were presented subliminally, compatible primes led to higher 
agency ratings than non-word primes (Mnoprime = 66.23; SD = 13.72 vs. Mcompatible = 68.98; 
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SD = 13.34; F(1, 19) = 11.25, p = .003, η2p = .37). However, when primes were presented 
supraliminally, non-word primes instead led marginally higher agency ratings (Mcompatible = 
64.62; SD = 11.76 vs. Mnoprime = 67.30; SD = 14.57; F(1, 19) = 4.20, p = .06, η2p = .18). In both 
the subliminal and supraliminal conditions, there were no differences in agency between 
the non-word and incompatible primes, F‘s < 1. The non-word primes thereby led to agency 
ratings similar to the incompatible primes.
Reaction times
The repeated-measures ANOVA on RT‘s, which was similar to the analysis on agency 
ratings, showed a main effect of Prime Visibility, F(1, 19) = 27.60, p < .001, η2p = .59. As in 
Study 3.1, RT‘s after subliminal primes were higher than after supraliminal primes (Msubliminal 
= 861.60; SD = 488.22 vs. Msupraliminal = 707.94; SD = 379.62). The interaction between Prime 
Visibility and Compatibility on RT‘s, which was the crucial test for the analysis on agency 
ratings, was not significant, F < 1, n.s.; similarly, none of the other tests in this analysis 
reached significance.
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Figure 3.2. Mean agency ratings per Visibility and Prime-Type conditions, collapsed over Time 
lag conditions. Error bars represent standard errors.
DISCUSSION
Again, we found that compatible subliminal primes led to higher agency ratings when 
compared to incompatible subliminal primes, while the reverse was true for supraliminal 
primes. Comparisons with the non-word prime conditions suggest an increase in the sense 
of agency by compatible subliminal primes, and a decrease in agency due to compatible 
supraliminal primes. A conclusion on the direction of the effect would be different from 
Study 3.1, in which incompatible subliminal primes and compatible supraliminal primes 
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reduced agency compared to the baseline. This discrepancy will be addressed in the general 
discussion. Finally, the analysis on RT‘s again showed no differences in RT‘s when testing 
for the interaction between prime compatibility and visibility, suggesting that differences in 
agency ratings were not driven by differences in RT‘s.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The central question of the current two studies was whether consciously perceiving and 
acting upon primes influences our sense of agency. Results showed that when action primes 
were presented subliminally, primes that were incompatible to the following actions led to 
a decrease in the sense of agency compared to compatible primes. However, the reverse 
pattern was observed when primes could be consciously perceived, as when participants 
were aware of the external primes and acted compatible to them, their sense of agency was 
reduced compared to when they acted in an incompatible manner.
 The observed compatibility effect of subliminal primes replicates earlier work by Wenke 
et al. (2010), who showed higher agency ratings for compatible rather than incompatible 
primes. Compatible subliminal action primes may facilitate action selection, and give a 
perception of smooth processing, ultimately increasing experiences of agency compared 
to incompatible primes (Chambon & Haggard, 2012). Additionally, the fact that the effects 
of supraliminal primes were in a different direction than those of the subliminal primes 
provides strong additional evidence that subliminal action primes indeed affected agency 
experiences, and cannot be explained by assuming that the primes were not fully subliminal. 
The present study showed that when the primes were consciously perceived, compatible 
action primes led to lower reported experiences of agency compared to incompatible 
primes. Likely, the awareness that one has potentially followed an external action prime 
lowers the sense of agency compared to the awareness that one disregarded an external 
action prime.
 The present research differs from many previously conducted priming studies on 
agency with regard to the nature of the primes employed. While in many previous 
studies participants were primed with the potential effects of their actions (e.g., Aarts et 
al., 2005), and thus given a preview of the effect of a subsequent action, in the present 
studies participant were instead primed with possible actions. Agency was, therefore, not 
influenced by a match between effect primes and actual effects, but by a match between 
action primes and actual actions. The results reveal differences in the consequences action 
primes may have on agency compared to effect primes. While Moore et al. (2009) showed 
that supraliminal effect primes (a preview of a tone) increased agency when the effects 
were compatible rather than incompatible (for similar findings see Aarts et al., 2005), in 
the present study compatible supraliminal action primes reduced agency compared to 
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incompatible primes. These divergent findings show that action primes influence us more 
than by simply giving a preview of things to come as effect primes do. As freedom of choice 
is vital to our sense of control (Skinner, 1996), the conscious awareness that we may have 
been influenced will reduce our sense of agency when we act compatibly to an external 
prime.
 In a recent study on response interference, Morsella and colleagues (2009) showed 
reduced perceptions of control to occur after incompatible trials on a Stroop task (Stroop, 
1935). However, compared to the present agency paradigms, response interference 
paradigms do not suggest the presence of another agent, and, more importantly, do not 
provide the participant with the freedom to act. These differences, together with the present 
findings revealing increased agency after incompatible subliminal action primes, suggest 
these different paradigms also reflect different processes.
 In the present studies two types of controls were used: a no-prime condition in Study 3.1 
and non-word prime conditions in Study 3.2. Intriguingly, the different control conditions 
lead to different conclusions regarding the direction of the general effect of compatibility. 
How one interprets the results depends on one‘s view of the best control condition: if one 
considers non-word primes to be the most appropriate controls, then compatible subliminal 
primes increase agency while compatible supraliminal primes decrease agency. The finding 
that compatible subliminal primes increase agency would be in line with previous findings 
on subliminal outcome priming (e.g., Aarts et al., 2005). However, if one considers the no-
prime baseline to be the most appropriate control condition, then agency is reduced after 
subliminal incompatible primes and supraliminal compatible primes. Such a conclusion 
would have theoretical implications, as agency is not increased compared to a baseline, 
but reduced depending on visibility and compatibility. This is, however, different from the 
effects of outcome priming, in which primes can increase levels of agency compared to 
baseline levels (e.g., Moore et al., 2009). It would also suggest that the non-word primes 
were actually experienced as incompatible primes. Although this view is intuitively 
appealing, given the observation (in Study 3.2) that agency levels of the non-word primes 
always closely followed the agency levels of the incompatible prime conditions, it is clear 
that more research is required before any strong claims about the direction relative to a 
baseline could be made.
 We have to address some limitations in the present study. First, considering the high 
number of females across studies it was not possible to control for a potential gender effect 
in the present research. As it has been shown that gender interacts with the experience of 
self-causation in priming experiments (e.g., Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2010; Jones, de-
Wit, Fernyhough, & Meins, 2008), future studies should include gender as a factor. Second, 
it is unclear why supraliminal priming affected response selection in Study 3.1 but not in 
Study 3.2. It‘s possible that the introduction of non-word primes invalidated, to a certain 
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extent, the action primes, thereby decreasing the influence of primes on response selection. 
It is however, unlikely that differences in behavior priming led to the differences with regard 
to the control conditions. The difference between the two studies is such that in Study 3.1 
supraliminal action primes influenced behavior, whereas none of the primes seemed to have 
affected behavior in Study 3.2. For the results on agency, however, the crucial differences with 
regard to the different control conditions are within the subliminal conditions, for which 
there are no indications of behavioral priming in either of the studies. Third, the results 
from the present studies are different from the results reported by Wenke and colleagues 
(2010) with regard to response facilitation and selection. Wenke and colleagues showed 
both response priming and shorter RT‘s for compatible primes compared to incompatible 
primes. In the present studies differences in RT‘s were only observed due to prime visibility, 
however there were no differences in RT‘s due to prime compatibility. Furthermore, only 
in Study 3.1 did the results suggest a behavioral priming effect (in the supraliminal prime 
condition). This indicates that the compatibility effect on agency is neither due to differences 
in RT‘s nor due to response priming, but can be considered to be an independent effect. It 
is difficult to explain the cause of the differences in RT‘s and response selection between 
the investigation by Wenke and colleagues and the present investigation, as there were also 
marked differences between the respective paradigms 3.
 Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen (2008) have recently emphasized the importance 
of investigating agency not solely as a consequence of motor control processes, such as 
efferent motor information and sensory feedback (e.g. Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000), 
but also as a consequence of higher-order sources of information, such as beliefs, social 
and contextual cues, goals, and intentions (e.g. Aarts et al., 2005). Synofzik and colleagues 
(2008) therefore proposed a two-step account of agency. According to this account, feelings 
of agency arise primarily, which are derived from sensorimotor processes, and operate 
before a reflective act of consciousness occurs. In a second step, an explicit higher-order 
agency judgment can occur, which is informed not only by feelings of agency, but is also 
based on the reflective attributions of being a likely agent. These reflective attributions can 
be influenced by higher-order information, such as contextual cues. The present study is 
an example of the second step in this model, and it is thereby in line with a number of 
other studies showing that contextual cues can indeed influence agency judgments beyond 
the influence of the primary feelings of agency (e.g., Aarts, 2007; Dijksterhuis, Preston, 
Wegner, & Aarts, 2008; Wenke et al., 2010). Interestingly, some recent studies have shown 
that contextual cues were also able to influence feelings of agency (Desantis, Roussel, & 
Waszak, 2011), suggesting that contextual cues may actually have more influence on these 
3 The moments of measurement (trial by trial vs. at the end of the paradigm); nature of the effect (sound vs. 
color); presence of supraliminal primes; and the presence of forced choice trials (responses tot targets vs. free 
choice responses) all represent differences between the paradigms used in the present investigation and the 
investigation by Wenke et al. (2010).
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primary and lower levels of agency than originally assumed. Future studies should therefore 
establish whether action primes also influence measures of feelings of agency (through other 
processes than behavior priming), for example using intentional binding (e.g., Haggard, 
Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002) or sensory attenuation paradigms (e.g., Blakemore et al., 2000).
 The present investigation showed that our sense of agency, which we may think of as 
robust and clear-cut, can be influenced by action primes and our subsequent actions. A 
future question is whether action primes work similarly to suggestions with regards to 
agency. Others often suggest actions such as to buy shampoo of brand X rather than Y, to 
watch the new TV show by Michael Palin, or to avoid the horrible new vegetable soup in the 
cafeteria. Our findings suggest that our awareness of those suggestions, and our decisions to 
act upon them or not, influence our sense of agency.
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Agency and Authority: 
Authority Cues Increase
 the Sense of Agency
 
This chapter is based on Damen, T. G. E., van Baaren, R. B., Brass, M., Demanet, J., & 
Dijksterhuis, A. (in prep). Agency and authority: Authority cues increase the sense of agency.
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ABSTRACT
In three studies, we investigated the influence of cues of external authority on the sense of 
agency. Participants performed a task in which their sense of agency for the effects of their 
actions was made ambiguous. Participants were instructed what actions to perform by voices 
that inherently conveyed or did not convey external authority. In Study 4.1, participants were 
instructed what actions to perform by either a low-pitched and confident voice, or a high-
pitch hesitant recorded voice. In Study 4.2, the instructions varied in another vocal quality 
that has been associated with authority, namely vocal intensity. Results in both studies 
show that on trials in which participants were instructed by a voice conveying external 
authority, they were more likely to experience agency than on non-authority trials. In Study 
4.3 participants were either given instructions by an experimenter who was physically 
present, or they heard the experimenters‘ recorded instructions through a speaker. Agency 
was increased when the experimenter was physically present. These findings do not support 
Milgram‘s (1974) notion of an Agentic State, a hypothesized lowered state of consciousness 
in the presence of authority. Instead, the presence of cues of external authority seems to 
increase the sense of agency over action effects.
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“For a man to feel responsible for his actions, he must sense that the behavior has flowed 
from ‘the self.‘ In the situation we have studied, subjects have precisely the opposite view 
of their actions—namely, they see them as originating in the motives of some other person.”
(Milgram, 1974, p. 146).
In what can arguably be described as the most (in)famous study in psychology, Stanley 
Milgram (1963) investigated how far participants were willing to go under the influence of 
a powerful authority figure. Milgram showed that most participants were actually prepared 
to inflict lethal harm on their fellow participants when the experimenter instructed them 
to do so in the name of ‘science‘. In trying to account for these findings, Milgram did not 
merely view authority as a powerful heuristic to which individuals are susceptible, he also 
theorized that in the presence of authority, people lose their sense of autonomy and the 
sense that they are independent agents. He termed this loss the ‘Agentic Shift’ and the 
resulting mindless state the ‘Agentic State’ (Milgram, 1974).
 Over the years Milgram‘s notion of an Agentic State has been criticized (e.g.,Blass, 2004; 
Darley, 1992; Haslam & Reicher, 2007; Helm & Morelli, 1979; Mantell & Panzarella, 1976; 
Miller, 1986; Miller, Collins, & Brief, 1995; Russell & Gregory, 2005). Milgram himself 
devised his theory more than a decade after the first publication of his research and was 
unable to provide empirical evidence to substantiate his ideas. Furthermore, recent archival 
research has revealed a lot about the process leading up to Milgram‘s paradigm (e.g., Perry, 
2012; Russel1, 2011). For example, Milgram worked on his paradigm for almost two years, 
adding so-called binding factors (e.g., having participants sign a contract) and strain-
resolving mechanisms (e.g., greater distance to victim; Russell, 2011). Milgram‘s paradigm 
incorporated a considerable number of factors that together led to an extremely powerful 
situation. Consequently, there has been much attention for the effects of these situational 
factors, and the notion of a mindless state triggered by the presence of authority as being 
the primary explanation behind (destructive) obedience, has received much less support 
(Miller, 2004). However, no research has actually empirically investigated whether cues of 
external authority can in fact influence our state of mind. Do we indeed become more 
mindless, and is our conscious experience indeed reduced in the presence of authority, as 
Milgram proposed? 
 An important part of that conscious experience is our sense of agency. Agency is the 
experience that one is performing an action or causing an effect (Gallagher, 2000). It is the 
feeling that we, through our actions, cause changes in the world around us. While we may 
intuitively think agency comes naturally when we act, over the past three decades research has 
shown that agency is the outcome of a complex process involving prediction and inference, 
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including both automatic motor processes (e.g., feed-forward cues, proprioception, sensory 
feedback; Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008), and also 
higher inferential processes (e.g., beliefs, prior intentions, contextual cues; Synofzik et al., 
2008; Wegner, 2003). Hence, agency can be influenced by a number of internal and external 
factors (Wegner & Sparrow, 2004).
 For example, the presence of other potential agents has often been considered to be 
a powerful factor influencing the sense of agency. When the effects we observe in our 
environment can also be attributed to potential other agents, our sense of agency may be 
reduced. If a glass of water falls from a table surrounded by six others, we may be less 
inclined to attribute this event to any action of ours, compared to a situation in which 
the glass falls from our table without others being present. We are therefore susceptible 
to the presence of other potential agents in judging our own agency. Previous research 
by Dijksterhuis, Preston, Wegner, and Aarts (2008) illustrates this effect. In their studies, 
participants were primed with words representing agents (e.g., a computer, God) and were 
then asked whether they experienced agency for effects that could have also been caused by 
someone else. The agent primes made participants less likely to judge themselves as being 
agents. 
 However, while it is clear that the presence of other agents influences our sense of 
agency, the question remains whether the nature of those other agents is also important 
in determining our personal agency. For example, will cues that indicate the presence 
of external agents with authority lower our sense of agency compared to the presence of 
agents without clear authority? Considering that authority has so often been regarded as a 
powerful cue to which we are all susceptible (Cialdini, 2001; Milgram, 1974), it is perhaps 
possible that cues of external authority trigger a subordinate mindset that makes us less 
inclined to see ourselves as potential agents. 
 Research in a related domain, the domain of power, does suggest a relation between the 
ability to influence others and action-related cognitions. Power is the (perceived) capability 
to limit or steer the behavior of others (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 
2008), and thereby represents a situation that is quite the opposite of a situation in which one 
is a subordinate compared to an external authority figure. The priming of personal power 
has been shown to increase action orientation tendencies (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006) 
and to activate the behavioral approach system (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). 
Alternatively, the absence of power seems to limit the action oriented mindset (Magee, 
Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007). Furthermore, the absence of power makes individuals more 
likely to make situational rather than dispositional attributions (Keltner, Van Kleef, Chen, & 
Kraus, 2008). We therefore wondered whether instructions that conveyed external authority 
would, in a similar vein, decrease an individuals‘ sense of autonomy and the likelihood for 
individuals to perceive themselves as independent agents, reducing the sense of agency.
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 In the present paper we report three studies in which we explored the applicability of 
Milgram‘s (1974) Agentic State theory to the sense of agency. In all studies, participants 
performed a task in which their sense of agency was made ambiguous. Participants 
performed actions (button-presses) and were subsequently presented with action effects 
(tones). Participants were told that either they could have caused those tones with their 
actions, but that it was also possible that the computer had caused the tones instead – 
irrespective of their button-presses. In addition, participants received external instructions 
as to which buttons they should press by low-pitch confident voices that conveyed external 
authority or high-pitch insecure voices that did not convey authority (Study 4.1); by voices 
that varied in vocal intensity, a characteristic linked to authority (Study 4.2); or they 
were given instructions by the experimenter who was either physically present with the 
participants or absent instead (Study 4.3). Following Milgram‘s reasoning, we expected 
that an instruction that conveyed external authority would make participants less likely 
to perceive themselves as agents compared to instructions that did not (directly) convey 
authority.
STUDY 4.1
In one of his experiments, Milgram (1974) showed the importance of appropriate clothing 
for authority. Obedience levels were shown to be higher when the person who was 
requiring obedience was wearing a scientific lab-coat, compared to a situation in which that 
person was wearing casual clothing. While clothing is certainly one of the factors through 
which individuals can convey their status and authority, another powerful way by which 
one can convey authority is through non-verbal communication. For example, while we 
may intuitively feel that our perception of another person should only to a small degree 
be influenced by the characteristics of that person‘s voice, research has shown that vocal 
properties are in fact extremely important for impression formation (e.g., Addington, 1968; 
Mohammadi & Vinciarelli, 2012) – and are likewise vital to our impressions of power and 
authority of that other person (Bradac & Street, 1989). Specifically, vocal features such as 
the amount of talking-time, speech loudness, tempo, and pitch seem to play a key role in 
our perceptions of dominance, credibility, and leadership ability (Cashdan, 1998; Gregory 
Jr. & Webster, 1996; Kimble & Musgrove, 1988; Lamb, 1981). 
 In the present study participants performed a task in which their sense of agency was 
made ambiguous. Participants performed actions (the pressing of buttons) and observed 
action effects (tones), and were then asked for their sense of agency regarding these action 
effects (see also Damen, van Baaren, & Dijksterhuis, 2014). Participants were, however, 
given verbal instructions as to which button they should press. We manipulated both pitch 
and perceived self-confidence of these verbal instructions to convey authority or non-
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authority. We expected that participants would experience reduced agency for authoritative 
compared to non-authoritative instructions. 
METHOD
Participants
Twenty-six undergraduate students (20 females; Mage = 21.33) at the Radboud University 
Nijmegen participated in exchange for 5 Euro‘s or course credit.
Materials and procedure
Participants completed an adapted version of a paradigm used earlier by Sato and Yasuda 
(2005) as an explicit measure of agency. Over multiple trials, participants were instructed 
to press specific keyboard buttons by voices that either did or did not convey external 
authority. After each button-press participants heard a tone. Participants were told that 
there were two possibilities: the tone had been generated by the computer or by their own 
button-press. Participants had to indicate the degree to which they felt they had caused the 
occurrence of the tone.
 Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation-cross. After 2 seconds, participants 
heard a verbal instruction (“Left” vs. “Right”) through a headset indicating the required 
response (a designated left or right button on their keyboard). The instructions were the 
recordings of two voices that a pilot study 1 identified as respectively conveying the most 
and the least external authority. The authoritative instruction was confident and relatively 
low-pitched. The non-authoritative instruction was uncertain and relatively high-pitched. 
The verbal instructions were equalized in volume level, and were recorded and configured 
to last exactly 700 ms. After each button-press participants would hear a tone: a 1000 Hz 
tone for a duration of 300 ms after a left button-press, and a 600 Hz tone for a duration 
of 300 ms after a right button-press. Participants were instructed to press a left or right 
keyboard button the moment the fixation-cross disappeared, which was 5 seconds after trial 
start. At the end of each trial, participants had to indicate on a 100-point scale the degree to 
which they felt that they, not the computer, had caused the tone to occur.
 Tones occurred after fixed time lags (0 ms vs. 200 ms vs. 400 ms vs. 600 ms after button-
presses). These were produced randomly but evenly divided over experimental conditions. 
1 Two pilot studies were conducted. In a first study forty-nine participants were asked to list three speech qualities 
that they believed to convey authority. There was a clear Top 4 of: 1. Confidence/Self-assuredness, 2. Loudness, 
3. Directness, and 4. Pitch. We then recorded the voices of six individuals with a low pitch voice, and asked them 
to speak in a confident and direct manner. We also recorded the voices of six males with a high pitch voice, 
and asked them to speak in an uncertain manner. Twenty-four participants ranked these twelve voices on the 
question “To what degree does the voice you just heard convey authority?”, and for Study 4.1 selected the top 
and bottom ranked voices.
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Although temporal delay between action and effect influences sense of agency (Sato & 
Yasuda, 2005), it was not a main factor of interest. It was used in the current paradigm to 
make the task more ambiguous.
 The main task consisted of 74 trials. In 32 of the trials participants were given an instruction 
by a high authoritative voice, in 32 of the trials the instruction was non-authoritative. Finally, 
there were 10 filler trials in which participants heard a random tone 8 seconds after they had 
pressed the instructed button. The purpose of these trials was to convince the participants of 
the fact that the computer could also produce the tones. These filler trials were not analyzed. 
 At the end of the experiment participants heard the recorded voices again, and were 
required to rate each voice on a 7-point scale on the degree to which they believed the voices 
conveyed authority (1 = Not at all; 7 = Completely). After the experiment participants were 
thanked, debriefed, and paid. In the debriefings participants were asked what they believed 
to be the research question that was investigated, and were additionally asked when these 
beliefs (if any) had emerged. The debriefings indicated that none of the participants realized 
the true nature of the study while they were performing the main task.
RESULTS
Manipulation check
A 2-level (Voice: authoritative vs. non-authoritative) repeated-measures Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) on authority ratings showed a main effect of Voice, F(1, 25) = 128.05, 
p < .001, η2p = .84. Participants judged the authoritative voice to convey more external 
authority (Mauthoritative = 6.00; SD = 1.20) compared to the non-authoritative voice (Mnon-
authoritative = 2.69; SD = 1.23). 
Agency scores
The results for agency scores are depicted in Figure 4.1. A 4 (Temporal delay: 0 ms vs. 
200 ms vs. 400 ms vs. 600 ms) × 2 (Voice: authoritative vs. submissive) repeated-measures 
ANOVA on mean agency scores, showed a main effect of Temporal delay, F(3, 75) = 59.17, 
p < .001, η2p = .70. Shorter delays led to higher agency scores than longer delays (M0 ms = 
89.16, SD = 8.28; M200 ms = 78.46, SD = 11.63; M400 ms = 67.19, SD = 18.99; M600 ms = 55.39, 
SD = 22.51). Additionally, there was a main effect of Voice, F(1, 25) = 7.85, p = .01, η2p = 
.24, as an instruction by an authoritative voice led to higher agency scores compared to 
an instruction by a non-authoritative voice (Mauthoritative = 74.15, SD = 13.59; Mnon-authoritative 
= 70.95, SD = 14.08). There was no interaction between the Temporal Delay and Voice 
conditions F(3, 75) = 1.23, p = .31. 
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Figure 4.1. Mean agency ratings per Temporal delay and Voice conditions. 
DISCUSSION
The present study shows that when individuals act after being instructed by a voice that 
conveys external authority, they are more likely to experience agency compared to when they 
act after being instructed by of a non-authoritative voice. This finding was contrary to our 
expectations, as we actually predicted a decrease, not an increase in agency when participants 
were instructed by an authoritative voice. The current result is also incompatible with 
Milgram‘s (1974) idea about a lowered sense of consciousness in the presence of authority. 
 Before proceeding to a discussion about the potential processes underlying this result, 
we first wished to establish whether the current finding is a reliable effect. In Study 4.1 
we contrasted a confident and low-pitch voice with an insecure and high-pitch voice as a 
manipulation of external authority. In Study 4.2 we manipulated another vocal characteristic 
that is indicative of authority, namely vocal intensity.
STUDY 4.2
Higher than normal vocal intensity has been considered to represent a degree of dominance 
in interpersonal communication, as it constitutes an invasion of another‘s acoustic space 
(Aronovitch, 1976; Goffman, 1971; Minter, 1974; Remland, 2009). Especially in hierarchical 
contexts, where communication flows from high to low-status agents, increases in vocal 
intensity are likely to occur (Remland, 2009; Smith & Galinksy, 2010). The tendency for 
one agent to speak louder towards another agent can therefore be perceived as conveying 
a higher degree of authority in the former, and a lower degree of authority in the latter. A 
person receiving relatively loud instructions may therefore also be more likely to perceive 
his/her actions as being directed by that other person, potentially influencing the sense of 
being an autonomous and independent agent.
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 In Study 4.2 we investigated whether the degree in vocal intensity by which a person 
is instructed to perform actions influences the experienced agency for the effects of those 
actions. First, it is possible that loud instructions may increase the idea that we have acted 
(as a subordinate) upon the instructions of another, thereby reducing the sense of agency. 
Alternatively, it was also possible that we found the same pattern as in Study 4.1, in which 
vocal cues that convey external authority, such as loud instructions, actually increase the 
sense of agency.
METHOD
Participants 
Twenty-three undergraduate students (20 females; Mage = 20.59) at the Radboud University 
Nijmegen participated in exchange for 5 Euro‘s or course credit.
Materials and procedure
Study 4.2 was similar to Study 4.1, except that participants heard only one male voice that 
a pilot study showed to be neither extremely authoritative nor extremely submissive. The 
loudness of these instructions was then varied across trials to obtain instructions that 
were relatively soft (played at 50 db perceived volume) and relatively loud (70 db), next to 
instructions of normal loudness (60 db). The main task consisted of 76 trials. In 24 trials 
participants received an instruction that was soft, in 24 trials they received an instruction of 
normal loudness, and in 24 trials they received a loud instruction. There were 10 filler trials 
similar to the filler trials from Study 4.1. Debriefings indicated that none of the participants 
realized the true nature of the study.
RESULTS
A 4 (Temporal delay: 0 ms vs. 200 ms vs. 400 ms vs. 600 ms) × 3 (Loudness: soft vs. normal 
vs. loud) repeated-measures ANOVA on mean agency scores, showed a main effect of 
Temporal delay. Shorter delays led to higher agency scores than longer delays, F(3, 66) = 
48.97, p < .001, η2p = .69 (M0 ms = 86.06, SD = 12.33; M200 ms = 74.29, SD = 12.66; M400 ms = 
62.38, SD = 15.92; M600 ms = 50.02, SD = 18.70). Additionally, there was a main effect of 
Loudness, F(2, 44) = 3.59, p = .036, η2p = .14. Contrast analyses revealed that a there were 
no significant differences in agency scores between instructions of soft and normal vocal 
intensity (Msoft = 66.78, SD = 12.33 vs. Mnormal = 67.58, SD = 12.23; F < 1., n.s.). However, 
the loud instructions (Mloud = 70.20, SD = 13.14) led to significantly higher agency scores 
compared to both the instructions of normal loudness (F(1, 22) = 4.37, p = .048, η2p = .17), 
and the soft instructions (F(1, 22) = 5.58, p = .027, η2p = .20). There was no interaction 
between the Temporal Delay and Loudness conditions, F < 1, n.s.
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Figure 4.2. Mean agency ratings per vocal Intensity condition, collapsed over Temporal delay 
conditions. Error bars represent standard errors.
DISCUSSION
In Study 4.2 we discovered that vocal intensity - a vocal characteristic of dominance and 
authority (Minter, 1974; Remland, 2009) - can influence the personal sense of agency. 
Specifically, loud instructions led to an increased sense of agency compared to instructions 
of normal and soft vocal intensity. The present results seem to offer a conceptual replication 
of Study 4.1. Both studies suggest that vocal characteristics that are linked to external 
authority increase rather than decrease the sense of agency. These findings are not in line 
with Milgram‘s theory (1974) about an Agentic Shift - a reduced sense of consciousness in 
the presence of authority (cues).
  However, one could argue that in the studies presented so far participants may not have 
interpreted the situation as one that was hierarchical, in the sense that participants perceived 
that their actions were directed by a high-status agent whom they were required to obey. 
Perhaps the cues of authority were too subtle to transcend the context of a mere stimulus-
response task, and therefore primed a degree of authority in the participants themselves 
instead. An important next step to further validate the finding that agency is increased by 
cues of external authority, is to have an experimental setting in which participants were 
directly instructed by an authority figure who was physically present. 
STUDY 4.3
In one of the several variations of the obedience experiments, Milgram manipulated the 
physical distance of the experimenter. Instead of being physically present in the room 
and instructing the participant to continue the experiment, the experimenter was absent 
and instructed the participant through a telephone. Crucially, obedience rates dropped 
Damen_NIEUW kopie.indd   82 26-02-15   15:49
Agency and Authority: Authority Cues Increase the Sense of Agency 83
Chapter 
4
dramatically, from 65% in the original study to 20.5% in this variation (Milgram, 1974). 
This finding highlights the importance of the physical presence of authority in order to 
establish a hierarchical situation in which one agent perceives him/herself to be subject to 
the instructions of another – especially in situations that are novel, or in which the low-
status agent feels reluctant to continue. But does this then also imply that the actual physical 
presence of an authority figure could influence the sense of agency?
 As in the previous studies, participants in Study 4.3 acted in a situation in which 
their agency over action effects was made ambiguous. Crucially however, in Study 4.3 the 
instructions were either provided verbally by an experimenter who was physically present 
in the same room as the participant, or participants received the recorded instructions of 
the experimenter through a speaker which was connected to the computer on which the 
experimental program was run. Based on Studies 4.1 and 4.2, we expected that a situation 
in which the experimenter was physically present would increase the sense of agency 
compared to a situation in which participants acted on the instructions delivered through 
a speaker. Again, participants could be instructed to press a specific button, however, there 
were also trials in which participants were free to act and to choose a button themselves. 
These trials were added to the experimental design as we were wondering how general 
or specific a potential effect of an authority‘s physical presence would be. For example, it 
could be that only on trials in which the participants were verbally instructed the presence 
of authority would affect the sense of agency, as on these trials participants were directly 
influenced in their actions. Alternatively, it could also be that the mere presence of authority 
would be able to influence agency without requiring direct interaction. An effect of 
external authority would then also be possible on the trials in which participants were not 
(specifically) instructed by the experimenter.
METHOD
Participants
Twenty-eight undergraduate students (19 females; Mage = 22.39) at the Radboud University 
Nijmegen participated in exchange for 5 Euro‘s or course credit.
Materials and procedure
The trials were similar to the trials in Studies 4.1 and 4.2. Each trial started with the 
presentation of a fixation-cross that disappeared after 5 seconds at which time participants 
were required to act. After two seconds participants could be given an instruction. 
Participants were either given an instruction to press a specific button, or heard a unrelated 
control word (“Swim”) that allowed participants to choose a button themselves. It was also 
possible that the participants did not get any instruction, allowing them to freely choose 
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and press a button. The trials differed from the previous studies in that there were three 
(instead of four) temporal delay conditions (100 ms vs. 400 ms vs. 700 ms) between button-
presses and tones.
 The experiment consisted of two blocks. In one block the experimenter (male) was 
physically present in the room where the participant was performing the experiment. 
The experimenter was trained to keep the volume level of his instructions as constant 
as possible at around 60 db. Additionally, the volume levels of the experimenter‘s 
instructions were measured and displayed on a portable decibel meter (only visible for 
the experimenter). The experimenter knew the appropriate response by hidden visual 
cues presented on screen 2. Participants reported no awareness of these cues during their 
debriefing. The second experimental block featured the same types and number of trials 
however without the physical presence of the experimenter. Instead, participants heard the 
experimenters‘ recorded voice presented through a speaker (at 60 db) at the same location 
as were the experimenter was sitting or would sit (depending on block order). Participants 
were also informed that the voice they heard was the voice from the experimenter. 
 Block-order was counterbalanced between subjects. Each block consisted of 36 trials. 
In 12 trials participants were given a direct instruction, in 12 trials participants heard a 
control word, and in 12 trials nothing was said at all. This experiment did not feature filler 
trials. At the end of each block participants were asked to indicate: “To what degree did you 
feel subject to the instructions of the experimenter in the previous experimental block?” 
Participants were required to give their response on a 7-point scale on (1 = Not at all; 7 = 
Completely).
 Debriefings indicated that none of the participants realized what the true nature of 
the study was. One person was removed from the analysis as it became clear s/he was not 
proficient enough in Dutch to have comprehended the instructions well enough.
RESULTS
Manipulation check
A 2-level (Block: authority present vs. authority absent) repeated-measures ANOVA 
showed a main effect on the degree to which participants experienced themselves subject to 
the commands of the experimenter, F(1, 26) = 45.14, p < .001, η2p = .33. Participants were 
more likely to experience a subordinate role when the experimenter was present compared 
to when he was absent (Mpresent = 5.21; SD = 1.27 vs. Mabsent = 3.54; SD = 1.16). 
2 At the start of each trial, the following instruction was displayed: “If no instruction is given when the fixation 
cross disappears, choose and press a button yourself.” When this sentence did not begin with a capital letter, the 
experimenter would give a direct instruction (“Left / Right”). When the sentence ended without a period, the 
experimenter would say “Swim”. When the sentence both began with a capital letter and ended with a period, 
no instruction was given.
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Agency scores
A 2 (Block: authority present vs. authority absent) × 3 (Temporal delay: 100 ms vs. 400 
ms vs. 700 ms) × 2 (Trial-type: instruction vs. control word vs. no-instruction) repeated-
measures ANOVA on mean agency scores, showed a main effect of Temporal delay. Shorter 
delays led to a higher agency scores compared to longer delays, F(2, 52) = 60.74, p < .001, 
η2p = .70 (M100 ms = 85.31, SD = 12.99; M400 ms = 68.67, SD = 17.51; M700 ms = 52.52, SD = 
21.51). Additionally, there was a main effect of Trial-Type, F(2, 52) = 23.07, p < .001, η2p = 
.47. Specifically, acting on the instruction of another led to lower agency scores compared 
to actions that were done in the absence of an instruction (Minstruction = 66.60, SD = 16.53 
vs. Mno-instruction = 71.99, SD = 14.48; F(1, 26) = 44.53, p < .001, η2p = .63). The agency scores 
on trials in which participants heard a control word (Mcontrol = 67.91, SD = 15.28) were 
marginally higher compared to instruction trials, F(1, 26) = 3.09, p = .09, η2p = .11, and 
lower than on trials in which no instruction was given, F(1, 26) = 19.63, p < .001, η2p = .43.
 Finally, there was also a main effect of block condition, F(1, 26) = 12.95, p < .001, η2p 
= .39. Agency scores were higher in the block in which the experimenter was physically 
present than in the block in which the experimenter was absent (Mpresent = 71.08, SD = 
15.48 vs. Mabsent = 66.59, SD = 15.54). This effect became more pronounced with longer 
Temporal Delays, indicated by a significant interaction between the Block and Temporal 
Delay conditions, F(2, 52) = 4.62, p = .014, η2p = .15 (Presence – Absence difference scores: 
M100 ms = 1.17; M400 ms = 4.10; M700 ms = 8.19). There were no other significant interactions (p‘s 
> .05).
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Figure 4.3. Mean agency ratings per Block and Trial-type conditions, collapsed over Temporal 
delay conditions. Error bars represent standard errors.
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DISCUSSION
The findings from Study 4.3 are in line with the results from the first and second study, in 
the sense that cues that conveyed external authority increased the sense of agency. Whereas 
in the previous studies we used subtle markers of authority, in Study 4.3 we directly 
manipulated the physical presence of authority. The fact that all studies show the same 
pattern suggests that results from Studies 4.1 and 4.2 were not merely findings that occur 
in a context where participants reacted to instructions delivered through the computer, 
but also occur when participants are truly under the instruction of the experimenter. 
Interestingly, the physical presence of the experimenter led to a general increase in the sense 
of agency, as both on trials in which participants were specifically instructed to perform an 
action, as well as on trials where participants were able to choose an action themselves the 
agency scores were higher. This suggests a general increase in action awareness and agency 
in the presence of authority. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the present research we investigated whether cues that convey external authority could 
influence the personal sense of causation known as agency. Initially we expected that cues of 
external authority would lower the sense of agency, a prediction following from Milgram‘s 
Agentic State theory (1974). In a line of studies we contrasted the influence of vocally 
authoritative and non-authoritative instructions on agency (Study 4.1); we investigated the 
influence of instructions that differed in vocal intensity, a cue for authority (Study 4.2), and 
finally, we investigated the influence of the physical presence of authority on the sense of 
agency (Study 4.3). Across these studies, a similar pattern emerged in that cues conveying 
external authority were related to increases in the sense of agency. Instead of decreasing 
the sense of agency as Milgram would have predicted, authority cues actually increased the 
sense of agency.
 There are a number of explanations as to why this effect may have occurred. First, it 
is possible that by our manipulations, instead of increasing participants‘ awareness of a 
subordinate role, participants actually became primed with authority. Research has shown 
that power increases action orientation (e.g., Anderson & Galinsky, 2006) and is also able 
to activate the behavioral approach system (Keltner et al., 2003). A process in which an 
individual is primed with authority (or power), therefore represents a possible explanation 
in the context of a paradigm in which the participant does not construe the experimental 
setup as hierarchical, and does not see his/her behavior as subject to the instructions of 
the experimenter. However, this explanation becomes less likely given the fact that we see 
the same pattern occurring in Study 4.3, where the physical presence of an (instructing) 
authority did make participants more likely to experience a hierarchy, and where they were 
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aware of their subordinate role in it. Nevertheless, also in Study 4.3 the presence of authority 
increased the sense of agency. 
 Another possibility is that the presence of authority cues increased individuals‘ 
motivation to perform the task well, increasing task-related focus and action awareness, 
and finally, the sense of agency. In other words, authority may have led to an observer-effect 
(or Hawthorne effect; Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939) that is more strongly triggered by 
cues of external authority. The finding that we see a general increase in the sense of agency 
in Study 4.3, for both actions that participants were instructed to perform as well as for 
actions that participants themselves chose to perform could be interpreted as support for 
this explanation.
 A final possibility is that the presence of other agents in general increases the sense of 
agency. While other agents are often regarded as cues that are likely to reduce the sense of 
agency (e.g., Wegner, 2003), they may also serve as reminders that we are in fact agents 
ourselves. This explanation would suggest a paradoxical effect where acting upon the 
instruction of another person would reduce the sense of agency, while the increased agentic 
nature of that other person at the same time increases the likelihood of perceiving oneself 
as an agent. Some preliminary work in our lab does suggest that acting in the presence of 
potential agents who are not perceived as being fully able to intently initiate goal-directed 
actions (e.g., children, computers), will reduce the sense of agency compared to acting in 
the presence of ‘more‘ agentic agents (e.g. human adults). However, it is clear that more 
research is needed to determine which of the above explanations is valid.
 We have to address some limitations in the present study. First, as we wished to keep 
our studies relatively simple, in Study 4.1 participants were presented with one authoritative 
and one submissive voice instead of a large number of voices. We were afraid that multiple 
authoritative and non-authoritative voices would make the design unnecessarily complex, 
and that participants would be distracted when they were often presented with novel 
voices. That said, we are well aware that an experiment with multiple voices would be 
more convincing with regards to the generalizability of the effect. Second, in Study 4.3 
participants were not given a non-authority control condition. We therefore cannot rule 
out that the increase in agency observed there is due to the presence of any agent, and not 
specific to authority. However, given the nature of the paradigm it seemed paradoxical to 
include a non-authority person who nevertheless was required to give instructions to the 
experimenter. But while these individual studies have their inherent limitations, we are 
confident of the validity of the overall pattern that is displayed across these studies: The 
sense of agency increases when individuals act within the context of external authority - a 
finding quite different from what Milgram would have predicted.
 We do wish to emphasize that the absence of a decrease in agency due to external 
authority does not falsify Milgram‘s ideas about what happened in his research. The 
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paradigms featuring in the present paper greatly differ from the Milgram experiments. 
For example, in our studies participants produced relatively neutral action effects (tones). 
Perhaps, when the action becomes negative (e.g., giving electric shocks to another person; 
Milgram, 1963) cues of external authority have a different impact and reduce the sense of 
agency since an experience of agency over negative effects is an unpleasant experience. A 
manipulation of outcome valence may therefore be a promising avenue for future research 
with regards to agency and authority. However, the present research shows there is no 
general reduction in agentic experience due to the presence of authority cues. Our work on 
the relation between authority and agency instead shows that in the present paradigms cues 
of external authority seem to increase rather than decrease the sense of agency.
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Factors Affecting Agency – Internal Cues
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Chapter 5
On the Other Hand:
Non-Dominant Hand Use Increases 
Sense of Agency
 
This chapter is based on Damen, T. G. E., Dijksterhuis, A., & van Baaren, R. B. (2014). On 
the other hand: Non-dominant hand use increases sense of agency. Social Psychological and 
Personality Science, 5, 680-683. doi: 10.1177/1948550614527626‘.
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ABSTRACT
In two studies we investigated the influence of hand dominance on the sense of self-
causation, or agency. Participants alternately used their dominant or non-dominant 
hand to cause the occurrence of an effect (a tone) in a task in which agency was made 
ambiguous. Participants were subsequently asked to indicate the degree to which they 
felt they had caused that tone to occur. Results showed that the sense of agency was 
increased when individuals used their non-dominant hand prior to the onset of the 
tone, compared to when they used their dominant hand. Furthermore, the degree of 
experienced agency was moderated by perceived effort. The difference in agency levels 
occurred independently of experimentally induced or naturally occurring differences 
in response latencies, and even occurred in the absence of (major) arm movement. 
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Our hands play a vital role in shaping our everyday experience. They reach out to inform 
our bodies about the world and to relay back into the world our physical response. The 
precise origins of handedness remain unknown (Vuoksimaa, Koskenvuo, Rose, & Kaprio, 
2009), but ultrasound studies suggest that the formation of handedness already takes place 
prenatally (Hepper, Mccartney, & Shannon, 1998). Over time the dominant hand becomes 
both stronger and more precise than the non-dominant hand (Petersen, Petrick, Connor, 
& Conklin, 1989). While one can learn to do simple tasks with the non-dominant hand, 
the non-dominant hand will seldom reach or exceed the level of skill of the dominant hand 
(Annett, 2002; Peters, 1981). In general, whereas people experience relative ease when using 
their dominant hand, performing actions with their non-dominant hand often requires 
considerable effort, even when it concerns relatively simple tasks.
 The sensations of effort that may accompany our actions have consequences for our 
conscious experience of those actions: They are able to contribute to the experience of 
performing an action or causing an effect, an experience also known as the sense of agency 
(Jeannerod, 1997; Pacherie, 2008). For example, research has shown that squeezing a 
handgrip (Preston & Wegner, 2007), or pulling stretch bands during action performance 
(Demanet, Muhle-Karbe, Lynn, Blotenberg, & Brass, 2013) can increase this sense of agency 
for concurrent actions and events. 
 Conversely, a degree of effortlessness in action is more characteristic of automaticity, and 
thus a low sense of agency, as the easiest actions require little control or conscious supervision 
(Bargh, 1994; Wegner & Sparrow, 2004). Actions that become more efficient over time, due 
to practice, can operate effortless and without conscious guidance (Bargh & Chartrand, 
1999; Schooler, 2002). Effortlessness can thereby give the impression of events happening 
to a person instead of being authored by that person (Csikszentmihalyi, Abuhamdeh, & 
Nakamura, 2005). The question is whether the degree of effort or effortlessness that we 
experience in our everyday hand use can also influence these perceptions of agency. Does 
use of the non-dominant hand, because it is relied upon less often (Hollis & Watson, 1993) 
also influence the sense of agency, and in a different way than dominant hand use?
 In two studies we investigated the sense of agency as a function of hand dominance. 
Participants alternated between using their dominant and non-dominant hand in a task 
in which agency was ambiguous. We expected that use of the non-dominant hand would 
be experienced as less automatic and more effortful, and would therefore lead to higher 
experienced agency compared to dominant hand use.
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STUDY 5.1
METHOD
Participants
Thirty-two undergraduate students (29 females; 28 right-handed; Mage = 21.75) at the 
Radboud University Nijmegen participated in exchange for 4 Euro‘s or course credit.
Materials & Procedure
Participants performed a mouse-click agency task. Participants had to respond to targets 
by clicking on them with the mouse cursor, and clicks were followed by tones presented 
through a headset. Participants were told that the tones could be generated by their mouse-
clicks, but could also be produced by the computer; participants had to indicate the degree 
to which they felt that they - not the computer - had caused the tone to occur. In fact, 
participants always produced the tones. 
 The mouse cursor was always positioned center screen at trial start. Targets were 
black squares (1 cm2) that were presented in the center of the monitor at trial start. As the 
mouse cursor was also positioned in the center of the monitor at the beginning of each 
trial, participants were only required to click to give their response; no arm movement was 
necessary. Clicks on the squares were followed by 1000 Hz tones for 500 ms. To increase 
agency ambiguity, the time interval between clicks and the subsequent tones was manipulated 
(100 ms vs. 400 ms vs. 700 ms evenly divided over trials). For sake of interpretation, 
we collapsed the temporal delay conditions over the other factors in the design1. 
 While an increased delay between action performance and its subsequent outcome is 
well known to reduce the sense of agency (Sato & Yasuda, 2005), we thought it was also 
possible that a delay in action initiation could influence agency (e.g., Chambon & Haggard, 
2012). We were interested in the possible effects of a delay in action initiation as our non-
dominant hand may similarly be slower to act than our dominant hand. In the present study 
we therefore experimentally manipulated the moment participants were able to successfully 
click on the squares, which was after a presented timer reached 0 (timer duration: 4s vs. 3s 
vs. 2s). At the end of each trial, participants used the keyboard to enter a number between 
1-100 to indicate the degree to which they felt that they had caused the tone to occur (1= 
absolutely no self-causation; 100 = certainty of self-causation). 
 The task consisted of 144 trials divided over 8 blocks. At the start of each block, 
participants were instructed to use the left or right hand; block-order was counterbalanced 
between subjects. 
1 Temporal delay between action and effect has been shown to influence the sense of agency (Sato & Yasuda, 
2005). In the present study, we indeed found that shorter intervals led to higher agency ratings than longer 
intervals (Sato & Yasuda, 2005). Study 5.1: F(2, 62) = 63.36, p < .001. Study 5.2: F(2, 58) = 28.00, p < .001. 
There were no interactions between intervals and experimental conditions.
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RESULTS & DISCUSSION
A 2 (Hand: dominant vs. non-dominant) × 3 (Timer duration: 4s vs. 3s vs. 2s) repeated-
measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) showed a main effect of hand use, F(1, 31) = 
8.25, p = .007, η2p =  .21. Participants reported increased agency after non-dominant hand 
use compared to dominant hand use, (Mdominant = 65.45, SD = 15.52; Mnon-dominant = 68.67, 
SD = 13.90)2. There was no effect of Timer duration (Mtimer4s = 66.93, SD = 14.52; Mtimer3s 
= 67.08, SD = 15.07; Mtimer2s = 67.17, SD = 14.37), and no interaction between Hand and 
Timer duration, F‘s < 1, n.s. A similar analysis on response latencies showed no significant 
differences between Hand conditions, F(1, 31) = 2.08, p = .16 (Mdominant = 482, SD = 42; Mnon-
dominant = 512, SD = 48).
 The results were in line with the expectation that non-dominant hand use would lead to 
higher experiences of agency compared to dominant hand use. As it was possible that the 
use of the non-dominant hand could have been slower compared to use of the dominant 
hand, and that it would have been this delay that influenced the agency ratings, we included 
a timer in the design to indirectly test the validity of this alternative explanation. However, 
the timer duration conditions did not show differences in agency ratings, and thus, the 
experimentally induced delays did not influence levels of agency. Furthermore, the analysis 
on response latencies revealed no actual differences in response speed between hand 
conditions. These findings suggest that the increased agency levels that were experienced 
after non-dominant compared to dominant hand-use were not caused by differences in 
response latency. 
 In the second study we attempted to replicate the previous findings, and to investigate 
the importance of experienced effort in hand use for the increased agency by the non-
dominant hand.
STUDY 5.2
METHOD
Participants
Thirty undergraduate students (24 females; 29 right-handed; Mage = 21.73) at the Radboud 
University Nijmegen participated in exchange for 4 Euro‘s or course credit.
2 Five participants in Study 5.1 and two participants in Study 5.2 regularly used the lower end of the agency 
scale compared to the other participants, leading to relatively high overall SD‘s. Including or excluding these 
participants did not meaningfully change the results for significance testing, but did greatly lower SD‘s, 
indicating the sizes of the SD‘s were mostly due to individual differences in scale use.
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Materials & Procedure
Study 5.2 was similar to Study 5.1, except for the differences described below. First, target 
squares were now presented in random corner sections of the monitor. Successfully 
clicking a target square therefore required an arm movement, in going from the cursors‘ 
starting point in the center of the monitor to the corner section where the target square was 
presented. A second difference was that there was no timer to delay responding; participants 
were therefore able to start their action (arm movement and mouse-click) as soon as the 
target square appeared on the monitor. Third, participants alternated using their left and 
right hand in 4 blocks instead of 8. Finally, to test for the hypothesized importance of 
effort, participants were required to indicate on a 7-point scale the degree of effort they had 
experienced for use of each hand (1 = no effort; 7 = much effort), at the end of the main task.
RESULTS & DISCUSSION
A 2-level (Hand: dominant vs. non-dominant) repeated-measures ANOVA again showed 
increased agency after non-dominant hand use compared to dominant hand use, F(1, 29) 
= 16.61, p < .001, η2p = .36 (Mdominant = 62.88, SD = 18.68; Mnon-dominant = 65.63, SD = 18.48). 
A similar analysis on response latencies indicated slower responses when using the non-
dominant hand, F(1, 29) = 235.42, p < .001, η2p =  .89 (Mdominant = 1296, SD = 175; Mnon-dominant 
= 2080, SD = 326). 
 A 2-level (Hand: dominant vs. non-dominant) repeated-measures ANOVA on effort 
ratings showed a main effect of hand condition on effort, F(1, 29) = 148.06, p < .001, η2p 
= .84. Participants experienced increased effort for use of the non-dominant hand  (Mnon-
dominant effort = 5.03; SD = 1.42) compared to dominant hand use (Mdominant effort = 1.27; SD = .83). 
 To test for mediation and moderation in a within-subjects design, we followed 
procedures described by Judd, Kenny, and McClelland (2001), and regressed the 
difference scores in agency levels (non-dominant – dominant) on both the sum- and 
difference scores of the effort ratings for both hands. In this analysis, a significant 
regression coefficient for the effort sum-scores would indicate moderation while a 
significant regression coefficient for the difference scores would indicate mediation 
(see Judd et al., 2001, for further details). The analysis showed a significant regression 
coefficient for the effort sum-scores, B = .94, p = .045, but not for the difference scores 
(p = .48) thereby suggesting that the effort scores moderated the sense of agency. 
 The findings from the second study replicated and expanded the results from the 
first study. Again, experiences of agency were higher after non-dominant compared to 
dominant hand use. Second, we showed that the differences in participant‘ effort ratings for 
use of their dominant and non-dominant hand moderated the difference between agency 
levels. The higher the difference in effort ratings, the larger the difference in agency levels 
following dominant and non-dominant hand use.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
While the link between effort and agency has been suggested in previous literature 
(Jeannerod, 1997), only recent investigations have empirically shown that increased effort 
leads to increased experiences of agency (Demanet et al., 2013; Preston & Wegner, 2007). 
The present investigation adds to these findings, and suggests this process can also occur 
as a function of hand dominance. The use of your non-dominant hand can, at least partly 
due to experienced effort, increase the sense of agency. The results from Study 5.1 suggest 
that this effect occurs independently of experimentally induced or naturally occurring 
differences in response latency, and even occurs in the absence of (major) arm movement.
 Although a number of studies have suggested that smooth or fluent processing can 
increase the sense of agency (e.g., Wenke, Fleming & Haggard, 2010), such effects seem 
limited to the phase of action selection (Chambon & Haggard, 2012); and can be annulled 
by contextual cues (e.g., the presence of other agents; Damen, van Baaren, & Dijksterhuis, 
2014). For example, a recent study by Chambon and Haggard (2012) showed that while 
fluent processing with regards to action selection increased the sense of agency, action 
performance that was not fluent (or effortful) also led to an increased sense of agency. In 
sum, fluency does not in general seem to lead to increases in the sense of agency, as the 
present study and a number of other investigations have shown how effort experienced 
during action performance increases the likelihood that we see ourselves as intentional 
agents (Bargh, 1994; Demanet et al., 2013; Preston & Wegner, 2007; Wegner & Bargh, 1998).
 In the present investigation participants were required to do a relatively simple task. 
However, it is possible that the link between hand use, effort, and agency may be influenced 
be the degree of task difficulty and chances of success (Aarts, 2007; Miller & Ross, 1975). 
Imagine throwing darts with your non-dominant hand. As accurate dart-throwing requires 
a great deal of skill, throwing darts with the non-dominant hand may feel weird, and 
accurately hitting the bull‘s-eye unreal. Future research could therefore explore how hand 
dominance influences agency with increased task difficulty. Similarly, although the current 
findings are well grounded in other literature on effort on agency, and we did observe 
moderation by effort, future research could investigate whether the novelty of a situation or 
an action could also influence agency, as use of the non-dominant hand for the computer 
mouse may have been both effortful and novel.
 Due to the large number of right-handed participants, we were unable to include 
handedness as a factor in our analyses. We have indications that the present findings can 
be generalized across individuals: the significant moderation by the effort ratings strongly 
suggests the importance of experienced effort. Therefore, as long as individuals experience 
increased effort for non-dominant compared to dominant hand use, the current findings 
should apply for both right- and left-handed individuals.
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 Although we like to think that our sense of agency is a clear-cut and robust sensation, 
recent investigations have shown that people can experience different degrees of agency, 
and that agency can be influenced by a number of different factors (Wegner, 2002). The 
present investigation showed that our sense of agency, which we may think of as robust 
and clear-cut, can actually be influenced by the hand we use. We use our hands everyday, to 
brush our teeth in the morning, to request a stop when we‘re on the bus, or to switch the tv-
channel to watch the latest episode of Game of Thrones. Our hands are thereby the primary 
tools by which we produce changes in our physical environment; however, the specific hand 
we use can influence our sense of agency for those changes.
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Chapter 6
The Influence of Action plans on 
Agency and Responsibility
 
This chapter is based on Damen, T. G. E., van Baaren, R. B., Brass, M., Aarts, H., & 
Dijksterhuis, A. (in press). Put your plan into action: The Influence of action plans on 
agency and responsibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.
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ABSTRACT
While action plans and intentions have been considered to be important factors contributing 
to the personal sense of causation known as agency, the present research is the first to 
empirically investigate how action plans influence agency. Participants in multiple studies 
were required to plan or not to plan ahead their actions. Results consistently show that on 
trials in which participants were required to plan their actions, participants experienced 
reduced agency compared to trials in which participants were not required to plan their 
actions. These results were found for both explicit agency paradigms in which participants 
were asked for their experiences of causation (Studies 6.1 & 6.2), as well as in an implicit 
agency paradigm in which participants were asked to estimate the time between their 
actions and the consequences of their actions (Study 6.3). In addition, it was shown that the 
reduction in agency was smaller when plans and actions were temporally closer together 
(Study 6.4). In a final line of experiments we discovered that prior planning similarly 
reduced both the emotional experience of acting and feelings of responsibility in agents 
(Studies 6.5 & 6.6). However, the direction of this effect was reversed in observers, for 
whom cues related to planning by others increased attributions of responsibility towards 
those others (Study 6.7 & 6.8).
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Think of your plans for the coming evening. We often have a fairly good idea of what our 
plans for an upcoming evening are: We may have decided to make pasta for dinner, to go 
for a run in the park, or we may have made an explicit intention not to work this evening 
but watch the latest episode of Game of Thrones instead (or vice versa). Plans and intentions 
seem to account for a considerable proportion of the contents of our consciousness (Brass 
& Haggard, 2008). Interestingly, the plans we make can influence another important part of 
our conscious experience, namely the sense that we are purposefully performing an action 
or causing an effect, a sensation known as agency. Usually, when our actions result in the 
planned outcome we experience more agency compared to situations in which the outcome 
was not what we had in mind. If we cook pasta but end up with pizza, our expectations 
are not in line with the eventual outcome and our sense of personal causation is likely to 
be reduced. Although a lot of previous studies have indeed shown that a match between 
predicted outcomes and actual outcomes contributes to the sense of agency, much less 
empirical attention has been directed towards the effects of action planning. The question 
therefore remains whether the prior planning of actions can influence the experience of 
agency.
 In the present paper we present a number of studies in which we investigated how 
action plans can influence agency and the subsequent sense of responsibility. In these 
studies we explored whether performing actions that were planned in advance would be 
related to an increased sense of agency. Such a prediction would seem logical given the 
abundance of literature showing that cognitions about action outcomes contribute to the 
sense of agency when the outcomes are as expected, and it is implicitly assumed that action 
cognitions would work similarly. However, we also considered it possible that action plans 
could increase the relative automaticity of action performance and then reduce the sense of 
agency instead, a process suggested by the literature on implementation intentions; which 
in essence are very specific action plans. We now discuss these alternative predictions more 
thoroughly.
Agency: Predicting and reflecting upon action outcomes
Agency has been argued to be the outcome of two distinct processes. According to one 
account, agency is the outcome of an automatic motor process in which predicted sensory 
consequences of acting are compared to the actual sensory results (Blakemore, Wolpert, & 
Frith, 2002; Frith, 2013; Moore & Haggard, 2008; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2002). According 
to a second account, our sense of agency is derived from a process of cognitive inference 
in which thoughts, beliefs and external cues shape our sense of agency (Wegner, 2002; 
Wegner, 2003; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). Clearly, our own expectations and intentions 
about action outcomes are important: We feel agency when what we expect to happen, 
implicitly or explicitly, also actually happens. 
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 A lot of empirical effort has therefore been put into investigating the automatic and 
deliberate emergence of these prediction and expectations. For example, by priming possible 
effect outcomes (e.g., Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005; Linser & Goschke, 2007; Sato, 2009) 
and the setting of deliberate goals (Pronin, Wegner, McCarthy, & Rodriguez, 2006; van 
der Weiden, Aarts, & Ruys, 2010) agency can be increased when the outcome is also in 
line with the primed effect or intended goal. Alternatively, effects that are unexpected or 
unintended decrease the sense of agency for those effects (Gentsch, Kathmann, & Schütz-
Bosbach, 2012; Sato & Yasuda, 2005). Although these studies have empirically established 
that manipulating the thoughts or cognitions related to the outcomes of actions influence 
the sense of agency, relatively few studies have addressed whether and how thinking 
about our future actions influences agency (Wenke, Waszak, & Haggard, 2009). While 
the process of action selection represents a major part of the action sequence (Brass & 
Haggard, 2008), exactly how this process influences our sense of agency remains unclear. 
 Recent studies by Wenke, Fleming & Haggard (2010) and Damen, van Baaren, & 
Dijksterhuis (2014) have shown that the subliminal priming of potential actions will 
increase agency when actions are also compatible to the primed actions. They thereby show 
that the unconscious activation of cognitions related to future behavior increases the sense 
of agency. However, although behavioral intentions we are not consciously aware of are 
undoubtedly be linked to a high proportion of human behavior, many of our action plans 
and intentions eventually do reach conscious awareness. The question then is how our 
conscious and deliberate action plans relate to the sense of agency?
 While a number of theoretical approaches consider plans and intentions to be 
important to the sense of agency (e.g., Brass & Haggard, 2008; Pacherie, 2008; Pacherie 
& Haggard, 2010), there is not much empirical evidence to validate this relation. 
Although a number of studies did investigate proximal or immediate action intentions, 
or urges to act in relation to experiences of volition (e.g., Fried et al., 1991; Haggard & 
Eimer, 1999; Haggard & Magno, 1999; Libet, 1985; Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 
1983), no research has been dedicated to more distal action intentions and the question 
of how these may influence our sense of agency. This neglect is surprising considering 
that the ability to plan ahead our actions further away in time is considered to be a 
characteristic unique to human cognition (Haslam, 2006; Waytz, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 
2010), and that agency-perception in others has been specifically linked to the capacity 
to both act and plan (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). However, to our knowledge no 
studies simply asked participants to plan ahead their actions (when multiple actions are 
possible), and investigated the influence of such a manipulation on the sense of agency. 
 How would our experience of agency change when we perform a planned action1 rather 
than an action that was not planned in advance? On the one hand it is possible that the 
1 With the terms planned and unplanned we do not wish to imply a presence versus an absence of an action 
decision, but we refer to the temporal distance between action decision and action performance, distal versus 
proximal.
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planning of specific actions increases the sense of agency for the effects of those actions 
compared to actions that are performed without advance planning; the act of planning, 
and a match between planned behavior and actual behavior, may strengthen the idea that 
one has acted deliberately, thereby increasing the sense of agency. Such a finding would be 
in line with the literature showing increases in agency caused by the compatibility between 
expected and actual effects (Gentsch & Schütz-Bosbach, 2011; Sato & Yasuda, 2005; van der 
Weiden, Ruys, & Aarts, 2013).
Implementation intentions
Interestingly, the research conducted in a related domain, specifically the research on 
implementation intentions, may suggest quite the opposite effect. Implementation intentions 
are behavioral intentions that link specific action plans to specific circumstances (Aarts 
& Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994; Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 
2006; Verplanken, 2005)2. Such intentions take the format of `I will do y when situation z 
is encountered‘. For example, in order to work on one‘s shape a person may explicitly make 
an intention to take the stairs after lunch instead of taking the elevator, thereby greatly 
increasing the likelihood of taking the stairs after lunch. 
 Since this technique was first introduced (Gollwitzer, 1999) a great number of studies 
have shown that implementation intentions are powerful techniques with the ability to 
overcome well-ingrained habits and effectuate positive behavioral change (Webb & Sheeran, 
2006; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). For example, it has been shown that implementation 
intentions can increase healthy eating behavior (Verplanken & Faes, 1999); decrease 
unhealthy eating behavior (Armitage, 2004); increase exercise frequency and intensity 
(Prestwich, Lawton, & Cooner, 2003); reduce habits (Holland, Aarts, & Langendam, 2006); 
help fight addictions such as smoking (Conner & Higgins, 2010), and can even reduce the 
behavioral expression of implicit stereotypes (Mendoza, Gollwitzer, & Amodio, 2010).
 The connection between implementation intentions and agency research becomes 
more clear when we investigate the processes underlying this technique. Numerous studies 
have demonstrated that implementation intentions promote the initiation of intended 
behaviors (e.g., Armitage, 2007; Sheeran & Orbell, 1999) and that as a result of forming 
an implementation intention, when the appropriate moment arises, the intended goal-
directed behavior is initiated immediately (Cohen, Bayer, Jaudas, & Gollwitzer, 2008), 
effortlessly (Brandstätter, Lengfelder, & Gollwitzer, 2001; Gawrilow & Gollwitzer, 2008), and 
without conscious intent (Bayer, Achtziger, Gollwitzer, & Moskowitz, 2009). Accordingly, 
the execution of a behavior specified in an implementation intention exhibits features of 
automaticity as identified earlier by Bargh (1992; 1994). 
2 Although we regularly cite the literature on implementation intentions, Hommel‘s (2000) work on the ‘prepared 
reflex‘ follows a similar kind of reasoning, and is recommended to anyone interested in learning more about the 
influence of present intentions on future automatic action performance.
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 An increase in action automaticity is often associated with a reduction in conscious 
action awareness. Given that the initiation of such actions can performed automatically, 
without deliberately requiring effort or cognitive attention, it is likely that performance of 
implementation intentions leads to less agency compared to actions that are performed 
without individuals having had prior intentions. However, to our knowledge no empirical 
research on implementation intentions asked participants about their feelings of agency, 
and this theory therefore remains to be validated. However, the processes that are regarded 
to underlie implementation intentions - action initiation without conscious intent, attention 
and effort - have in previous research been related to reductions in the sense of agency (e.g., 
David, Newen, & Vogeley, 2008; Demanet, Muhle-Karbe, Lynn, Blotenberg, & Brass, 2013; 
Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Frith, 2002). We therefore suspect that implementation 
intentions would be related to reductions in the sense of agency, and that when participants 
plan ahead their action in the present research paradigms, their sense of agency may also 
be reduced.
Responsibility
While the scientific quest for the emergence of agency is an important one, it is equally 
important to investigate how agency can in turn influence human behavior and cognition. 
Unfortunately, much research directed at studying the emergence of agency stops right there, 
and does not further explore how agency – and factors that influence the sense of agency – may 
subsequently shape the way we think and act. For example, while agency and responsibility 
are often seen as intertwined constructs (Moll et al., 2007), and while it is even argued that the 
primary function of agency is to inform responsibility (Frith, 2013), the sense of agency and 
the sense of responsibility do not regularly meet in empirical research. Given the suspected 
close relation between the agency and responsibility, it would be interesting to explore how 
factors that may influence the sense of agency may subsequently also influence the sense 
of responsibility. For example, if it was shown that the planning of actions would reduce 
the sense of agency, could these action plans then also reduce the sense of responsibility? 
The present research 
In the present paper we report eight studies in which we investigated how the formation 
and implementation of action plans can influence the sense of agency but also how action 
plans can influence one‘s sense of responsibility for actions.
 In the first part of the paper we report four studies in which the basic experience of agency 
is investigated in relation to planned or unplanned action. First, we investigated whether 
prior planning could influence the sense of agency compared to situations without planning 
(Studies 6.1 – 6.3). Planning and its influence on agency were measured both explicitly, by 
asking participants the degree to which they experienced causing specific action outcomes 
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(Studies 6.1, 6.2 & 6.4), but also through an implicit measure of agency in which participants 
were asked for their estimation of time between action and effect (Study 6.3). Subsequently 
we went on to explore the importance of the temporal distance between action planning 
and the action, by varying the moment at which participants were able to perform their 
planned action: Either delayed or immediately after the moment of planning (Study 6.4). 
 In the second part of the present paper we report a number of studies in which we 
investigated the degree to which action plans could influence perceptions of responsibility. 
Participants were given moral judgment dilemmas in which they had to make a decision, or 
read vignettes about the actions of another person. The actions were either planned or not 
planned, followed by measures on feelings of responsibility (Studies 6.5 – 6.8). 
STUDY 6.1
The aim of Study 1 was to investigate whether asking participants to plan ahead their 
action would subsequently influence the sense of agency in an explicit agency paradigm. 
Participants were required to plan ahead or were not required to plan ahead their actions 
(the clicking of specific buttons) on trials in the experiment. Subsequently their sense of 
agency for the consequences of their actions (the presentation of tones) was measured. 
If prior planning would strengthen the idea of a match between planned actions and 
actual actions and outcomes, we would expect higher agency ratings on the trials in which 
participants were asked to plan their actions ahead. If however prior planning reduced the 
actual conscious involvement at the moment of action performance, we would expect lower 
agency ratings on the trials in which actions were planned.
METHOD
Participants
Forty-four undergraduate students (31 females; Mage = 21.33) at the Radboud University 
Nijmegen participated in exchange for € 5 Euro‘s or course credit.
Materials & Procedure
Participants performed a mouse-click agency task (see Fig. 6.1). Clicking on presented 
action-buttons would generate tones, and participants were either given the opportunity 
to plan or were not given the opportunity to plan which button they were going to click. 
Participants were told that the presented tones could be generated by their mouse-clicks, 
but could also be produced by the computer (Sato & Yasuda, 2005); participants had to 
indicate the degree to which they felt that they - not the computer - had caused the tone to 
occur. 
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Which button do you intend to click 
on the next trial? Press the 
matching keyboard button
A
D
B C
Click a button when the timer 
reaches 0
A
D
B C2,1,0 To what degree did it feel like you caused the tone to occur?
Not at all                      Completely
plan
act
outcome
agency measure
temporal delay
100, 500, 900 ms
Figure 6.1. Schematic experimental overview.
 On trials in which participants were not required to plan participants were shown small 
yellow rectangles, the action-buttons, featuring the letters A, B, C, & D, that were presented 
in a diamond pattern on the monitor displaying a white background. Participants were able 
to successfully click the action-buttons the moment a presented timer reached 0, which was 
after two seconds. Clicks were followed by 300 ms tones: a 600 Hz tone after clicking on 
the A-button, and 800 Hz, 1000 Hz, and 1200 Hz tones after respectively clicking the B, C, 
or D-buttons. To increase the ambiguity of the task, the time interval between clicks and 
the subsequent tones was manipulated (100 ms vs. 500 ms vs. 900 ms3 evenly divided over 
trials; see Sato & Yasuda, 2005). At the end of each trial, participants were asked to indicate 
on a 100-point scale the degree to which they felt they had caused the tone to occur.  
 In half of the trials, participants were required to plan ahead their actions: they were 
presented with the action-buttons against a grey background, were asked to make a mental 
plan about which button they were going to press and indicate their plan by pressing the 
matching keyboard button (press the A button on their keyboard when their plan was to 
click on the A action-button presented on the monitor). After indicating their plan the 
trial proceeded exactly like a trial without prior planning. One participant was removed 
from the analysis because this person regularly acted incompatible with his/her plans. For 
the rest of the participants, trials in which participants did not click the button they had 
planned to click were removed from the analysis (1.6% of the trials). 
 In the present study there were also a number of filler trials in which participants heard 
a randomly selected tone 2500 ms after their action. The purpose of these trials was to have 
participants experience trials in which (allegedly) the computer clearly produced the tone. 
These filler trials were evenly divided over planning and no-planning trials, but were not a 
part of the main analysis. The main task consisted of 114 experimental and 12 filler trials. 
3 In the presented studies we used different time intervals to determine the generalizability of the effect. The 
results (generally) show that the effects of planning were not dependent on these specific paradigm settings.
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RESULTS 
Agency ratings
A 3 (Temporal delay: 100 ms vs. 500 ms vs. 900 ms) × 2 (Planning condition: planned vs. 
unplanned) repeated-measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on Agency scores showed 
a main effect of Temporal delay, F(2, 84) = 15.50, p < .001, η2p = .27. Shorter delays led 
to higher agency scores compared to longer delays (M100 ms = 69.80, SD = 25.28; M500 ms 
= 56.45, SD = 24.43; M900 ms = 49.47, SD = 23.99). Additionally, there was a main effect 
of Planning condition, F(1, 42) = 7.13, p = .011, η2p = .15. Trials on which participants 
planned their actions resulted in significantly lower agency ratings compared to trials in 
which participants did not plan their actions (Mplanned = 55.33, SD = 20.94 vs. Munplanned = 
61.82, SD = 22.39). There was no interaction between the Temporal delay and Planning 
conditions, F < 1, n.s. The results pertaining to the Temporal delay and Planning conditions 
are illustrated in Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2. Mean agency ratings per Planning condition and Temporal delay conditions.
Reaction times
A 3 (Temporal delay: 100 ms vs. 500 ms vs. 900 ms) × 2 (Planning condition: planned 
vs. unplanned) repeated-measures ANOVA on Reaction Times (RT‘s) showed a marginal 
effect of Planning condition, F(1, 42) = 3.45, p = .070, η2p = .08. Participants were able to 
click marginally faster on the action-buttons (when the timer reached 0) on planning trials 
compared to trials in which participants did not plan their actions (Mplanned = 504, SD = 220; 
Munplanned = 578, SD = 315). There was no main effect of Temporal delay, F < 1, n.s., nor did 
the results show an interaction between the Temporal delay and Planning conditions, F(2, 
84) = 1.34, p = .27. To discover more about the relation between the RT‘s and the agency 
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scores we checked the correlations between these variables within the respective planning 
conditions. These correlations however proved not significant: rplanned = -.25, p = .11, and 
runplanned = .07, p = .65.4
DISCUSSION
The findings from Study 6.1 expand upon the literature on action planning and 
intentionality by showing that prior action plans can actually reduce the sense of agency 
experienced for those actions. Although several theoretical approaches consider prior 
planning as a condition that generally contributes to the sense of agency (Brass and 
Haggard, 2008, Pacherie, 2008; Pacherie & Haggard, 2010), we show that (distal) action 
planning actually reduced agency. This finding suggests that due to our prior made plans, 
we feel less conscious involvement during the actual moment of action performance. The 
present results are in line with the literature on implementation intentions (e.g., Gollwitzer, 
1999), in which it is argued that deliberate action intentions make the execution of those 
intentions more likely and more automatic at the appropriate moment (Brandstätter et al., 
2001). This automaticity may have subsequently lead to a reduction in the sense of agency. 
The trend observed in the analysis over RT‘s shows that planned actions were implemented 
faster than unplanned actions, and seemed a promising indicator of automaticity. However 
the absence of a correlation between RT‘s and agency scores makes it unlikely to have acted 
as a mediator between the planning conditions and the agency scores.
 Study 6.1 featured several methodological choices that may have affected our results and 
our subsequent interpretations. First, participants were not free to choose when - and when 
not - they planned their actions. Second, participants were asked to indicate their prior 
plans by the advance pressing of a keyboard button, which can be seen as an additional 
action beyond mere planning. And third, there was a difference in trial-duration between 
the plan and no-plan trials. All these factors could potentially influence agency beyond the 
condition of planning, and were therefore addressed in Study 6.2.
STUDY 6.2
In Study 6.2 we aimed to replicate the main finding from Study 6.1 that showed that prior 
action planning leads to a reduction in experienced agency for those future actions. We also 
sought to address some potential confounds in the methodology of Study 6.1 that may have 
influenced results in that study. Different from our first study, participants in Study 6.2 were 
able to decide themselves whether they wanted to plan their actions or not; participants 
4 In Studies 6.1-6.3 we conducted several mediation analyses using the RT‘s as a proposed mediator between the 
plan-conditions and the agency scores using procedures outlined by Judd, Kenny, & McClelland (2001). As was 
to be expected based on the correlations, we found no evidence for mediation.
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were only asked to think of future actions without having to indicate that plan; and the trial-
duration of planning and no-planning was kept constant. We hypothesized that again, on trials 
in which participants planned ahead their actions, participants subsequently experienced 
reduced agency compared to the trials in which actions were not planned in advance. 
METHOD
Participants
Thirty-four undergraduate students (30 females; Mage = 22.39) at the Radboud University 
Nijmegen participated in exchange for € 5 Euro‘s or course credit.
Materials & Procedure
Study 6.2 was similar to Study 6.1. Again participants performed a mouse-click agency 
task, and were required to indicate their experience of agency for the tone caused by their 
button-click. However, each trial started with the question whether participants would like 
to plan their action or not, and they could indicate their decision by the clicking of a ‘yes‘ 
or ‘no‘-button. Participants were instructed to do both planning and no-planning trials, 
and it was specifically emphasized they should mentally plan ahead their response on the 
planning trials, but refrain from planning on the no-plan trials. Subsequently, the planning 
trials featured the instruction “Plan ahead your response” for a duration of 6000 ms, while 
the no-plan trials featured the instruction “Wait for the experiment to continue” for the 
same duration. Participants were not required to indicate their plans in advance. In the 
present study temporal delays were set at 100, 450 and 800 ms. There were 120 trials in total, 
of which 108 were experimental trials and 12 were filler trials.
RESULTS
Agency ratings
A 3 (Temporal delay: 100 ms vs. 450 ms vs. 800 ms) × 2 (Planning condition: planned 
vs. unplanned) repeated-measures ANOVA on Agency scores showed a main effect of 
Temporal delay, F(2, 66) = 67.92, p < .001, η2p = .67. Shorter delays led to higher agency 
scores compared to longer delays (M100 ms = 86.18, SD = 11.56; M450 ms = 66.72, SD = 16.46; 
M800 ms = 51.40, SD = 21.20). Additionally, there was a main effect of Planning condition, 
F(1, 33) = 11.04, p = .002, η2p = .25. Trials in which participants planned their actions led 
to significantly lower agency ratings compared to trials in which participants did not plan 
their actions (Mplanned = 65.66, SD = 15.40 vs. Munplanned = 70.54, SD = 12.87; See Fig. 6.3). 
There was no interaction between the Temporal delay and Planning conditions, F(2, 66) = 
1.18, p = .31.
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Reaction times
A 3 (Temporal delay: 100 ms vs. 450 ms vs. 800 ms) × 2 (Planning condition: planning 
vs. no-planning) repeated-measures ANOVA on RT‘s showed a main effect of Planning 
condition, F(1, 33) = 21.63, p < .001, η2p = .40. Participants performed their actions faster on 
planning trials than trials without planning (Mplanned = 919, SD = 302; Munplanned = 1159, SD 
= 364). There was no main effect of Temporal delay, nor was there an interaction between 
the Temporal delay and Planning conditions, F‘s < 1, n.s. Finally, there were no significant 
correlations between the RT‘s and the agency scores within the respective planning 
conditions: rplanned = .06, p = .73, and runplanned = .13, p = .44.
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Figure 6.3. Mean agency ratings per Planning condition and Temporal delay conditions.
DISCUSSION
The results from Study 6.2 replicate the main finding from Study 6.1, showing a reduction 
in agency scores on the trials in which participants planned ahead their action. The fact that 
the difference in agency scores did not disappear when correcting for a number of potential 
confounds, suggests these results are robust, and do not depend on certain methodological 
choices. Although there was already a clear trend in RT‘s in our first study, RT‘s in Study 6.2 
were significantly faster for planned than for unplanned actions. This indicates planned actions 
were implemented faster than unplanned actions. However, we again did not find a significant 
correlation between the RT‘s and the agency scores making the RT‘s un unlikely mediator.
 There is always the possibility that the explicit nature of the agency paradigm influenced 
the results from the previous studies. Since participants were explicitly asked for their 
agentic experience, participants‘ responses may have been influenced by their inferences 
and expectations with regards to the experiment (Gawronski, Lebel, & Peters, 2007; 
Goldstein, Rosnow, Goodstadt, & Suls, 1972; Orne, 1962). In Study 6.3, we therefore used 
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an implicit measure of agency much less susceptible to the effects of potential experimenter 
demand.
STUDY 6.3
A number of studies has reverted to implicit measures to investigate the experience 
of agency or volition (e.g., Aliu, Houde, & Nagarajan, 2009; Bäß, Jacobsen, & Schröger, 
2008; Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998; 1999; 2000; Engbert, Wohlschläger, Thomas, 
& Haggard, 2007; Haggard et al., 2002; Humphreys & Buehner, 2009; 2010; Libet et al., 
1983; Sato, 2008). One intriguing implicit measure that has drawn considerable attention 
is our perception of time itself. It seems that depending on our sense of agency, our 
perception of time can be influenced in such a way that controlled or caused actions 
seem to last shorter than actions without the experience of causation (Moore, Wegner, 
& Haggard, 2009). Specifically, when we purposefully act, the moment of acting is 
experienced as later in our perception and memory, while its effects seem to arise earlier 
in time; a perceptual attraction or binding occurs (Haggard & Clark, 2003). In contrast, 
less deliberate and uncontrolled actions (e.g., passive movements, movements of other 
individuals) show repulsion, as the time of the action is experienced earlier and the 
consequence of that action as later. This intentional binding effect (Haggard et al., 2002) 
is used as a measure of agency, because the binding between voluntary actions and effects 
reliably occurs in situations in which the participant is an agent compared to situations 
in which a participant is not an agent (e.g., Engbert, Wohlschläger, & Haggard, 2008).
 As in Study 6.1, participants were instructed to plan or not plan their actions. However, 
instead of giving agency judgments for the effects of those actions, participants were asked 
to estimate the time interval between their mouse-click and the presentation of the tone. 
We expected that time estimates would be higher, suggesting a lower sense of agency, for the 
trials in which participants planned their actions compared to trials without prior planning.
METHOD
Participants
Fifty-two undergraduate students (31 females; Mage = 20.64) at the Radboud University 
Nijmegen participated in exchange for € 5 Euro‘s or course credit.
Materials & Procedure
Participants performed a mouse-click agency task, and were per trial instructed to plan or 
not plan ahead their action. As in Study 6.1, participants had to indicate their plans with 
keyboard responses matching the presented action-buttons. However, instead of giving 
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explicit agency judgments, participants were now required to give their estimations of the 
time it took for the tone to be delivered following their mouse-click. Tones were generated 
after 500, 900 and 1300 ms, evenly divided over trials, and participants were asked to type 
their answer in milliseconds (with a maximum of 2000; see also Moore et al., 2009). Trials 
in which participant did not click the button s/he had planned to click were removed from 
the analysis (1.4% of the trials). The main task consisted of 72 experimental trials. 
RESULTS
Agency ratings
A 3 (Temporal delay: 500 ms vs. 900 ms vs. 1300 ms) × 2 (Planning condition: planned 
vs. unplanned) repeated-measures ANOVA on Time estimates showed a main effect of 
Temporal delay, F(2, 102) = 187.36, p < .001, η2p = .78. Shorter delays led to shorter times 
estimates compared to longer delays (M500 ms = 647, SD = 396; M900 ms = 920, SD = 398; 
M1300 ms = 1256, SD = 410). Additionally, there was a main effect of Planning condition, 
F(1, 51) = 12.24, p = .001, η2p = .19. Time estimates on trials in which participants planned 
their action were significantly longer, indicating a decreased sense of agency, compared 
to trials in which participants did not plan ahead their actions (Mplanned = 957, SD = 374; 
Munplanned = 924, SD = 388). There was a significant interaction between the Temporal delay 
and Planning conditions, F(2, 102) = 3.25, p = .043, η2p = .06. The mean difference between 
the trials with planning and trials without planning condition was significant (p < .05) in 
the 900 ms and 1300 ms conditions, but not in the 500 ms condition (p = .89; see Fig. 6.4).
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Figure 6.4. Mean time estimates per Planning condition and Temporal delay conditions.
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Reaction times
A 3 (Temporal delay: 500 ms vs. 900 ms vs. 1300 ms) × 2 (Planning condition: planned vs. 
unplanned) repeated-measures ANOVA on RT‘s showed a significant effect of Planning 
condition, F(1, 51) = 7.76, p = .007, η2p = .13. Participants acted significantly faster when 
they had planned their action compared to when they had not planned their actions 
(Mplanned= 937, SD = 295; Munplanned = 1103, SD = 589). There were no significant correlations 
between RT‘s and Time estimates within the respective planning conditions: rplanned = .16, p 
= .26, and runplanned = .25, p = .07.
DISCUSSION
The results again indicate that planned actions lead to a reduced sense of agency in 
comparison to unplanned actions. The fact that this effect is shown using an implicit 
measure of agency, time estimation, decreases the likelihood that the effects presented in 
our prior studies were caused by the knowledge and expectations of participants in those 
studies. 
 The present study also expands the literature on the relation between time perception 
and agency. While a number of studies have already revealed that manipulating the 
experience of acting can influence perceptions of time (e.g., Haggard et al., 2002), a series 
of recent studies have shown that factors more indirectly involved in the experience of 
acting, such as contextual primes (Moore et al., 2009) and prior beliefs (Desantis, Roussel, 
& Waszak, 2011) can also influence time perception. The present study further expands 
these findings by showing the effects of action plans, an internal factor that emerges before 
action performance, but subsequently does influence both action and time perception. 
STUDY 6.4
In our previous studies the time between action planning and moment of action 
performance was held constant over the different trials. However this interval itself may 
influence subsequent experiences of agency. In the next study, we explored the effects of 
different time intervals between action planning and action performance on the sense of 
agency. The results from the prior studies suggest that after action planning we experience 
less conscious involvement during action performance. Instead of a fluent process in which 
a decision is acted upon immediately, the moment of action performance is separated from 
the conscious action decision, leading to a reduction in agency. A prediction following 
from these hypotheses would be that a longer interval between planning and acting should 
lead to an increased reduction in agency. Alternatively, when actions follow plans shortly, 
planning and action performance could be experienced as one fluent process, decreasing 
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the reduction in agency (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Wenke et al., 2010). In the present 
study, we tested these predictions by manipulating the time between action planning and 
action performance in an explicit agency design.
METHOD
Participants
Fifty-one American adults (35 male; Mage = 32.78) participated in this study, in exchange for 
$2.50 dollars. Participants were recruited through Amazon.com‘s Mechanical Turk service, 
an integrated participant recruitment and compensation system that is both diverse and 
reliable (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). The experiment was conducted using the 
online environment of Inquisit 4.0.2 (Draine, 2012). Three participants did not complete 
the experiment and were therefore removed from the analysis.
Materials & Procedure
Participants performed a mouse-click agency task similar to Study 6.1. Participants always 
planned their actions. During the planning phase, participants were shown three small 
yellow rectangles featuring the letters A, B, C. These action-buttons were presented in a 
triangular pattern on the monitor displaying a grey background with the instruction: “Plan 
which button you are going to press”. Participants did not have to indicate their plans. 
After 6000 ms, the trial proceeded and the action-buttons were displayed against a white 
background in the presence of a timer counting down to 0. The timer reached 0, thereby 
allowing participants to successfully click on the action-buttons, either immediately after 
the planning part of the trial (0 ms timer delay condition), or after a delay of 1500 ms5 
or 3000 ms. Clicks were followed by 300 ms tones: a 600 Hz tone after clicking on the 
A-button, and 800 Hz, and 1000 Hz tones after respectively clicking the B, C-buttons. These 
tones were presented after 100, 500, or 900 ms depending on temporal delay condition. The 
main task consisted of 90 experimental trials and 9 filler trials.
Agency ratings
A 3 (Temporal delay: 100 ms vs. 500 ms vs. 900 ms) × 2 (Timer delay: 0 ms vs. 1500 ms 
vs. 3000 ms) repeated-measures ANOVA on Agency judgments showed a main effect of 
Temporal delay, F(2, 94) = 35.64, p < .001, η2p = .43. Shorter delays led to higher agency 
judgments compared to longer delays (M100 ms = 75.68, SD = 19.54; M500 ms = 61.14, SD = 
17.39; M900 ms = 50.46, SD = 19.61). Additionally, there was a main effect of Timer condition, 
F(2, 94) = 4.44, p = .014, η2p = .09. Longer delays between plans and actions led to lower 
5  The timer started at 1 after 500 ms
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experiences of agency compared shorter delays (M0 ms = 63.49, SD = 15.45; M1500 ms = 62.46, 
SD = 14.76; M3000 ms = 61.32, SD = 14.41; see Figure 6.5). There was no interaction between 
the Temporal delay and Timer delay conditions, F(4, 188) = 1.82, p = .126. 
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Figure 6.5. Mean agency ratings per Timer Delay condition collapsed over Temporal delay 
conditions. Error bars represent standard errors.
Reaction Times
A 3 (Temporal delay: 100 ms vs. 500 ms vs. 900 ms) × 2 (Timer: 0 ms vs. 1500 ms vs. 3000 
ms) repeated-measures ANOVA on RT‘s showed a significant effect of timer condition, 
F(2, 94) = 155.37, p < .001, η2p = .77. Participants acted slower on the 0 ms timer condition 
compared to the 1500 ms and 3000 ms timer conditions  (M0 ms = 1306, SD = 714; M1500 ms = 
645, SD = 533; M3000 ms = 645, SD = 464). There was no main effect of Temporal delay, F(2, 
94) = 1.05, p = .353; nor was their an interaction between the Temporal delay and Timer 
delay conditions, F(4, 188) = 1.96, p = .103.
DISCUSSION
The results from Studies 6.1 to 6.3 showed a clear difference in RT‘s between planned 
and unplanned actions, suggesting that perhaps the relative speed and ease with which 
we perform planned actions could drive the reduction in agency. However, the absence 
of significant correlations between the RT‘s suggest this is not the case. The results from 
Study 6.4 suggest an alternative explanation, as a separation in time could in itself lower 
agency. This could indicate that because a separation in time occurs between planning and 
acting, the conscious involvement of the action decision is no longer fluently connected to 
action performance, thereby reducing the experience of intentional action. In other words, 
because we already know what to do, we don‘t really think about it anymore, but just do it at 
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the right moment. The current results are also in line with a previous study by Wegner and 
Wheatley (1999), who showed that primes compatible with the location a mouse cursor was 
about to stop, made participants more likely to declare they had indeed intended to stop the 
cursor right there; but this was mostly so when the prime was delivered just prior to acting; 
agency ratings were weaker when the primes were presented relatively long before action 
performance.
STUDIES 6.5 – 6.8
In the previous studies we have shown that advance planning was able to reduce the sense of 
agency. In our next studies, we investigated whether action plans would similarly influence 
constructs that are related to the sense of agency, such as the degree to which we experience 
actions as positive or negative, and our experiences and attributions of responsibility. 
Although agency is considered an vital aspect of our conscious experience, the degree 
to which agency perceptions can in turn influence human behavior and cognition 
has received only limited empirical attention. This neglect is unfortunate as agentic 
experience is considered crucial for the way we reflect on the actions we perform 
and how we reflect on ourselves, especially in the case of negative events (Bandura, 
Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996). For example, if we act in a way that has negative 
consequences but we do not have the conscious experience of acting, the act itself may 
also be experienced as less negative (Bandura, 1999; Milgram, 1974). Our sense of 
agency may therefore determine the experienced emotional intensity of our actions. 
 Similarly, experiences of agency may also influence the degree to which we experience 
responsibility for our actions. The degree to which we view others as willful agents 
determines how responsible we judge them to be, making perceptions of intentionality 
arguably the most important factor by which we attribute responsibility (Alicke, 2000; Malle, 
2004; Shaver, 1985). Research has indeed shown that moral judgments and attributions of 
responsibility are dependent on the degree to which we perceive others to have intentionality 
and abilities to bring about or avert specific outcomes (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; 
Greene & Haidt, 2002; Hamilton, 1978; Lagnado & Channon, 2008; Ohtsubo, 2007; Shaver, 
1985; Weiner, 1995). Responsibility and perceptions of agency can therefore be seen as 
intertwined constructs. Both our perceptions of others as agents, and our personal sense 
of agency will to a large extent determine our perceptions of responsibility. However, the 
results from our previous studies and the findings in the previously discussed literature 
suggest a discrepancy: While our perceptions of intentionality and planning by others 
increase our attributions of responsibility towards those others, our own prior action plans 
actually reduce agency, and may then also reduce experiences of responsibility. In a final 
series of experiments we investigated this discrepancy.
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 In four experiments we studied whether action planning could influence experiences of 
responsibility and the experienced emotional intensity of actions. In a first study, participants 
were either required to plan ahead their decisions in a moral judgment dilemma or did 
not have to plan ahead their actions. Participants subsequently had to rate the degree to 
which they found their action unpleasant (Study 6.5). In a second study, participants were 
asked to indicate the degree to which they felt responsible for their final decision and action 
within the presented dilemma (Study 6.6). In two final studies we looked at planning and 
responsibility from the observer‘s point of view. Participants were either informed about 
the planning of an action by an actor, or did not receive any cues that would indicate prior 
planning. In Study 6.7 participants were asked to rate the degree to which they believed 
this actor would feel responsibility for the action. In Study 6.8 we investigated whether 
cues related to planning by another actor influenced the degree to which participants 
held the actor accountable as well as the degree to which they believed this actor deserved 
punishment.
 We expected that when participants were required to engage in the moral judgment 
dilemma as an agent, prior planning would decrease the experience of unpleasantness of a 
negative action, and the subsequent feeling of responsibility. However, when participants 
were passive observers of another agent doing the planning and acting, we expected 
planning cues instead to increase attributions of responsibility, accountability, and degree 
of punishment compared to situations without prior planning
METHOD
Participants
Participants – all American adults - were recruited through Amazon.com‘s Mechanical 
Turk service. The experiment was conducted using the online environment of Inquisit 4.0.2 
(Draine, 2012)6. There were 322 participants in Study 6.5 (153 males; Mage = 31.17); 443 
participants in Study 6.6 (216 males; Mage = 32.80); 301 participants in Study 6.7 (176 males; 
Mage = 29.83) and 209 participants in Study 6.8 (134 males; Mage = 36.37). Subjects were 
rewarded $ 0.25 dollars for their participation.
Materials & Procedure
Participants in Study 6.5 were introduced to the following moral dilemma:
 “Imagine the following situation: You are looking at profiles on a dating website and 
suddenly you stumble upon the profile of someone you immediately recognize: it is the 
husband of your best friend Megan. It was clearly updated recently. You knew they recently 
6  Study 8 was presented using the Google-Drive interface
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had some struggles, but Megan had assured you they were 100% committed to working 
things out. Looking at the profile, you are sure that it is Megan‘s husband, with whom 
she has two children. You wanted to confront him to ask about the profile, but he is on a 
business trip for some time and you don‘t have his contact information.”
 After 2 seconds the story continued and participants read the following: “You are 
meeting Megan at her house for your weekly get-together. You sit down with her and decide‘. 
Participants were then able to click on a button that indicated ‘To tell‘ or on a button that 
read ‘Not to tell‘. In the planning condition, participants were first were asked to indicate 
what they would do the next time they saw Megan and to plan whether going to tell or not 
going to tell Megan about her husband‘s profile. They were asked to indicate this plan by 
pressing a 1 on their keyboard if they were going to tell, or a 2 if they were not going to tell. 
Participants were finally asked how unpleasant it was to tell/not to tell Megan about her 
husband‘s profile. They could do this by indicating degree of unpleasantness on a 10-point 
scale (1 = Not at all unpleasant; 10 = Really unpleasant). Twenty-two participants were 
removed from the analysis for not acting in accordance with their plans.
 Study 6.6 was similar to 6.5, with the main difference that participants were asked to 
indicate the degree to which they felt responsible for their decision to tell/not to tell (1 = No 
responsibility; 10 = Complete responsibility). Nineteen participants were removed from the 
analysis for not acting in accordance with their plans.
 In Study 6.7, the story was altered in such a way that participants were instead reading 
about Megan‘s best friend John, facing the decision to tell or not tell Megan about her 
husband‘s dating profile. In this study, John decides to tell Megan about her husband‘s 
profile: “A day later John is at Megan‘s house for their weekly get-together.  He sits down 
with her and starts telling her about her husband‘s profile.” Participants were asked to 
indicate the degree to which they believed John to feel responsible for his decision to tell 
Megan. As in the previous studies, participants in the planning condition received an extra 
trial in-between the first part of the story and the get-together with Megan, in which they 
were told: ‘After contemplating what to do, John comes to a decision and plans to tell Megan 
about her husband‘s profile the next time he sees her.”
 In Study 6.8, participants read a different story: 
 “Your friends John and Peter were having a snowball fight with some other people in 
the neighborhood. Snowballs were flying all over the place, and at first everything was 
really funny. Everybody was having a good time. All of a sudden, John turns and throws a 
snowball at Peter and hits him right in the face. Peter falls down and is clearly hurt.”
 Participants in the planning condition were told in the beginning of the story: “At the 
start of the snowball fight, John already plans that at some point, he is going to throw a 
snowball right in Peter‘s face.” After reading the story, participants were asked to indicate 
the degree to which they held John responsible for his action and the consequences of his 
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action (1 = Not at all; 10 = Yes, very much), and whether John should be punished (1 = Not 
at all; 10 = Yes, severely).
RESULTS
Responses in studies 6.5 - 6.8 were not always normally distributed and regularly featured 
negative skew or negative kurtosis. The reported results are therefore the parameter 
estimates from bootstrapping procedures, an analytic approach that does not require the 
assumption of normality (Hayes & Preacher, 2006). Bootstraps were conducted with bias 
corrected intervals using 5000 random samples.
Action decisions Studies 6.5 - 6.6
In Study 6.5, 66% of the participants overall chose to tell Megan about her husband‘s profile. 
In the planning condition, 61% of the participants told Megan, and 70% in the condition 
without planning. A logistic regression with planning condition as a predictor and Action 
decision as the outcome variable showed this difference not to be significant (B = .36, SE 
= .24, p = .15). In Study 6.6, 68% of the participants overall chose to tell Megan about 
her husband‘s profile. In the planning condition, 65% of the participants told Megan, and 
71% in the condition without planning. A logistic regression with planning condition as 
a predictor and Action decision as the outcome variable showed this difference not to be 
significant (B = .26, SE = .21, p = .22).
 
Unpleasantness and responsibility judgments Studies 6.5 - 6.6
We conducted a 2 (Planning condition: planned vs. unplanned) × 2 (Action decision: tell 
vs. do not tell) bootstrapped comparison on the unpleasantness scores (Study 6.5) and on 
the responsibility scores (Study 6.6). Similar to our findings on the sense of agency, prior 
planning reduced both the perceived unpleasantness of actions in Study 6.5, B = .97, SE = 
.28, p < .001 [95% CI: .44 to 1.51], as well as the subsequent experiences of responsibility 
in Study 6.6, B = 1.07, SE = .38, p = .007 [CI: .31 to 1.81]. Actions were experienced as less 
unpleasant when they were planned in advance, and participants felt less responsible for 
planned actions (See Table 6.1). There was also a main effect of Action decision, as both 
unpleasantness and responsibility scores were higher when participants had decided to tell 
instead of not to tell Megan about her husband‘s dating profile (Study 6.5: B = -.96, SE = .35, 
p = .006, [CI: -1.64 to -.28]; Study 6.6: B = -1.46, SE = .44, p = .001 [CI: -2.31 to -.66]). There 
were no interaction effects between the Planning and Action decision conditions (p = .25).
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Responsibility scores Study 6.7
Using bootstrapping procedures we contrasted the average responsibility scores of the 
planned and unplanned conditions. As shown in Table 6.1, planning cues increased beliefs 
about John‘s feelings of responsibility, B = .83, SE = .31, p = .008 [CI: .18 to 1.48].
 
Responsibility scores Study 6.8
Using bootstrapping procedures we contrasted the average responsibility and punishment 
scores of the planned and unplanned conditions. As shown in Table 6.1, planning cues 
increased both the degree to which participants held John responsible/accountable for his 
behavior, B = -1.85, SE = .31, p < .001 [CI: -2.45 to -1.25], and also increased the severity 
of punishment participants considered appropriate, B = -.82, SE = .36, p = .02 [CI: -1.52 to 
-.12]. 
Response Times Studies 6.5 - 6.7
In a 2 (Planning condition: planned vs. unplanned) × 2 (Action decision: tell vs. do not 
tell) bootstrapped comparison on the Response Times7 we found a main effect for Action 
decision in Study 6.5 (Mtell = 3838, SD = 3108; Mdonottell = 4799, SD = 3977; B = 10462.14, 
SE = 305.42, p < .001 [CI: 9828.96 to 11032.50]), and a marginal effect in Study 6.6 (Mtell = 
3920, SD = 3184; Mdonottell = 5294, SD = 3881; B = 1007.61, SE = 530.55, p = .06 [CI: -1.13 
to 2083.21]). In Studies 6.5 and 6.6 participants were faster to indicate their decision to 
tell than to their decision not to tell. There were no main effects of Planning condition on 
Response Times (p‘s > .38) nor were their interaction effects between the Planning and 
Action decision conditions (p‘s > .36).
Table 6.1
Mean (SD)
Study Planned Unplanned
Dating profile
6.5 Agent – Experiences of unpleasantness 6.99 (2.37) 7.90 (2.00)
6.6 Agent – Experiences of responsibility 4.17 (3.23) 5.13 (3.17)
6.7 Observer – Perceptions of responsibility 7.53 (2.08) 6.87 (2.33)
Snowball fight
6.8 Observer – Perceptions of accountability 8.69 (1.91) 6.85 (2.51)
6.8 Observer – Severity of punishment 6.28 (2.47) 5.45 (2.65)
Studies 6.5 – 6.8 Results Regarding Planning Conditions
7  Given the high latencies we speak about response times instead of reaction times.
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DISCUSSION
In the last series of studies of the present paper we set out to determine whether action planning 
- a factor that in previous studies was shown to influence the sense of agency - also influenced the 
emotional intensity and sense of responsibility related to acting. The present studies showed 
that this was indeed the case, as advance planning of a negative action lead that action to be 
perceived as less unpleasant and reduced experiences of responsibility for the negative action. 
 In a number of theoretical approaches, human and moral agency have been linked to 
selective disengagement as a result of negative conduct (Bandura, 1999; Bandura et al., 
1996). Without the experience of agency, the need for self-regulation or even self-sanction 
is much less prominent when a person has acted in a negative way (Milgram, 1974). 
Interestingly, the present findings suggest that through action planning, we may be able to 
better cope with negative actions, because we experience less agency for them (Studies 6.1 
- 6.3), and (therefore) also find them less unpleasant (Study 6.5). 
 Observing intentional behavior in others has been shown to lead to increased 
attributions of responsibility in previous literature (e.g., Cushman, 2008). Attributions of 
responsibility, and subsequently praise and blame, are more likely to be attributed by us 
when we infer that another person has acted intently (Alicke, 2000; Malle, 2004; Shaver, 
1985). Such an effect was indeed shown in Studies 6.7 and 6.8, where cues and indications 
of prior planning, and thus intentionality, led to increased attributions of responsibility and 
even to increases in the degree to which participants thought that punishment for negative 
actions should be severe. However, the relation between planning and responsibility was 
very different when participants themselves planned and acted, as in Study 6.7 planning led 
participants to experience a reduced sense of responsibility. Probably through a reduced 
sense of consciousness or agency, planning one‘s actions can also reduce the personal sense 
of responsibility. 
 We have to consider some limitations of the studies. First, in the present studies we 
investigated cognitive experiences through moral judgment dilemmas and vignettes. 
Although these are powerful research tools for researchers (Hughes, 1998), caution 
should be used when making inferences with regards to real life behavior. We are however 
confident that the dilemmas and vignettes in the present study serve as a proxy for actual 
behavior for a number of reasons: First, in Studies 6.5 and 6.6 we used the same basic setup 
as we used our our previous studies where we investigated real (not imagined) behavior and 
agency. As in those studies, participants were asked to plan ahead, and were also able to act 
by indicating their decision, thereby incorporating to some degree the actual behavior in 
these paradigms. Additionally, the link between perceived intentionality and attributions of 
responsibility to another individual, as shown in Studies 6.7 and 6.8, has been extensively 
documented in other literature using a wide range of methods (e.g., Cushman et al., 2006; 
Greene & Haidt, 2002; Hamilton, 1978; Lagnado & Channon, 2008; Ohtsubo, 2007; Shaver, 
Damen_NIEUW kopie.indd   125 26-02-15   15:49
Chapter 6126
1985; Weiner, 1995). A second important consideration here is that some inferences that 
can be drawn by comparing the studies, indeed rely upon differences between separate 
studies (and stories), and not on factors manipulated within one experimental design. 
One should therefore take caution in interpreting these results, as different contexts may 
increase or decrease potential effects of planning on perceptions of responsibility. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Agency
In the present investigation we revealed how action planning could reduce the sense of 
agency. A number of theoretical accounts on agency have considered the importance of 
prior plans for the sense of agency (e.g., Brass & Haggard, 2008; Pacherie, 2008; Pacherie & 
Haggard, 2010) but largely consider such plans to contribute to agency. This reasoning is not 
illogical considering that a number of studies have shown that a match between expected 
and actual effects increases agency, while agency is reduced when outcomes did not match 
expectations (Gentsch & Schütz-Bosbach, 2011; Sato & Yasuda, 2005; van der Weiden et al., 
2013). But while it may be very possible that the sense of agency benefits from a comparison 
between outcomes that are intended and predicted, we show in a number of studies that 
the prior planning of actions may actually reduce agency. Therefore, the present findings 
theoretically expand the current literature on agency, specifically on models that emphasize 
the importance of prior thoughts and cognitions for agency (e.g., Synofzik, Vosgerau, & 
Newen, 2008; Wegner, 2003) as the present findings indicate that plans with regards to 
future actions can reduce agency.
 Research on agency has in the past distinguished between two main models, each 
receiving extensive empirical support: The comparator model of agency emphasizes 
automatic processes of motor-prediction as being central to the sense of agency (Blakemore, 
Wolpert, & Frith, 2002). It sees our brain as continuously predicting the consequences of 
actions we are about to perform. When there is a match between predicted and actual 
effects, we experience a sense of agency (Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; Wolpert & 
Flanagan, 2002). 
 Alternatively, the theory of apparent mental causation considers higher-level 
interpretative processes between thoughts and actions to underlie the sense of agency 
(Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). According to this model, the mind attempts to make sense 
of our actions after we have performed them. When effects quickly follow our actions, 
when actions and effects are consistent with any prior thoughts we were having about them 
before we acted, and when there is an absence of other potential agents, we are likely to 
experience a sense of agency (Wegner, 2002; Wegner, 2003). Both models are now seen 
as complementary, the sense of agency being informed primarily by automatic motor 
prediction and subsequently also by inferential processes (Synofzik et al., 2008). 
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 The present research offers a natural fit to an inferential account of agency, because of 
the importance such accounts attach to the relation between actions and prior thoughts. 
When it is easy to relate actions to prior thoughts, the experience of agency is increased. 
When this is more difficult, for example, due to a separation in time between action 
decision and performance, (as in Study 4) agency is reduced. Interestingly, when Wegner 
and Wheatley (1999) introduced their theory of apparent mental causation, they explicitly 
referred to the implementation intentions literature themselves, suggesting a reduction 
in agency is possible in the event of distal planning and that ‘in the absence of thought 
about the action just prior to action performance, even the most distant foresight would 
do little to promote the feeling that one had consciously willed the action‘ (p. 484). Our 
results seem to confirm this theory. Finally, although the inferential model appears to be the 
most applicable account, it would be interesting for future research to investigate whether 
processes of motor prediction also change as a function of action planning.
Implementation intentions
The power of prior plans on actual behavior has earlier been shown in the domain of 
implementation intentions (e.g., Gollwitzer, 1999). A deliberate intention to do X in 
situation Y has been shown to increase the likelihood of acting in the desired way (e.g., 
Armitage, 2007; Sheeran & Orbell, 1999) and leads to immediate and effortless initiation 
of the planned behavior at the right time (Brandstätter et al., 2001; Cohen et al., 2008; 
Gawrilow & Gollwitzer, 2008). These studies show the power of deliberate intentions to act 
in a desired manner. The present investigation complements these findings by showing that 
the implementations of those action plans are actually accompanied with a reduced sense 
of conscious involvement, or agency, for subsequent actions.
 The present findings may suggest an intriguing tension between the effectiveness of 
implementation intentions on one hand and how important it is to experience agency 
and responsibility when performing an action on the other hand. The question is, if it is 
a ‘good‘ thing that this technique can also lead individuals to experience less agency and 
responsibility over their actions, as is suggested by the present results. Often, the actions we 
find most memorable, insightful, and rewarding are the actions for which we experience 
agency, and factors that deduct from agency also deduct from these beneficial experiences. 
We do not however wish to suggest abandoning this effective technique, but just to put into 
a new perspective what can cognitively happen when using implementation intentions. 
Processes underlying the reduction in agency
The question then is: What causes this reduction? As described above, the literature on 
implementation intentions emphasizes an increase in action automaticity - action initiation 
becomes quick, effortless, and can occur without requiring conscious intent - and it is 
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likely that such automaticity is indeed related to the reduction in agency as observed in 
the present research. To be more specific about processes behind such automaticity, we 
explored whether several study parameters were related to the magnitude of the effects. 
 First, from the analyses on reaction times in Studies 6.1–6.3 we observe that planned 
actions are performed more quickly than unplanned actions. This could indicate that 
through planning we may prepare our motor system for acting; the motor system may than 
respond very quickly at the required moment; with the conscious awareness of acting lagging 
behind (similar to how we experience reflexive actions). In other words, the relative speed 
in acting then reduces the sense of agency. However, the absence of significant correlations 
between the reaction times and the agency scores makes the former an unlikely mediator.
 A second explanation may lie in the difficulty or effort one experiences when performing 
a preplanned action; this action may be easier to perform compared to an action that was not 
planned in advance. Recent research on effort and agency has indeed shown that increased 
effort during action performance is related to an increased sense of agency (Damen et al., 
2014; Demanet et al., 2013; Preston & Wegner, 2007). That said, the relative simplicity of 
the actions in the agency studies (Studies 6.1 - 6.4) reduces the likelihood that differences in 
effort played a big role in those studies. 
 Another process potentially underlying the current results may be a difference in 
cognitive involvement during the action performance. Because action decision and action 
performance - and the cognitive involvement that goes with them - become separated in 
time, an individual is less likely to see these two activities as related (Wegner & Wheatley, 
1999). The results from Study 6.4 in general seem in line with this idea, as a greater distance 
between planning and performance led to a greater reduction in agency. Additionally, 
acting upon preplanned actions may also require less cognitive involvement during action 
performance, but studies which can monitor neurological activation are needed to test the 
validity of such ideas.
 A large number of theoretical accounts on motor control and agency emphasize the 
importance of cognitions related to action outcomes (Wenke, Fleming & Haggard, 2010). 
When we perform actions, we use representations of the likely outcomes of our actions as 
a cue to our agency. The process of action planning may however influence the degree to 
which these outcome representations are relied upon. Planning may increase the likelihood 
of (strong) action representation, perhaps even at the cost of outcome representation. 
Participants may then decide what tone to produce, but once a decision is made, all 
that follows is execution and outcomes are no longer considered (Hommel, 2000). A 
related process that may be influenced by planning could be the relative concreteness or 
abstractness of action representation. As shown by Vallacher and Wegner (1987, 1989), 
each action we perform can represented both in very concrete terms (e.g., moving a finger 
to push a doorbell) or more abstract terms (e.g., visiting a friend). The planning of specific 
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actions could lead to a shift, making representations more concrete and related to action-
performance. Such a change may also reduce the degree to which outcomes or abstract 
goals are represented, perhaps thereby reducing the sense of agency.
Potential Moderators
Does this mean we always experience reduced agency after action planning? We believe 
not. For example, when actions are complex it may be difficult for them to be triggered 
or be performed without conscious guidance. Furthermore, when the situation for which 
one has planned to act is rather different from what was earlier expected, a new deliberate 
decision may be made and acted upon. This would then override the earlier decision, 
subsequently leading to a level of agency one would experience without advance planning. 
Next, as suggested by the results from Study 6.4, if prior planning is immediately followed 
by action performance, these events could be experienced as one fluent process, stopping 
the reduction in agency (Chambon & Haggard, 2012). Finally, through repetition or 
prolonged acting, one may eventually master the performed action. Action performance 
then becomes relatively automatized, and plans related to the actions may be substituted 
with plans with regards to the immediate effects of those actions (Vallacher & Wegner, 
1987). Instead of planning to press a certain button, we may already thinking of the effect of 
that action, for example turning on the light. We believe the potential moderators described 
above offer promising avenues for future research.
 There are a considerable number ways in which individuals may differ if it comes to 
their cognitions about action performance. Such differences may influence the degree to 
which individuals are inclined to plan ahead (Schunk, 1991), to engage in deliberative 
processing or act on their gut-feelings (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996), or think 
about their actions in a concrete or abstract manner (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Such 
individual differences may all influence agency and therefore seem promising factors to 
pursue in future research. We expect that individuals who, due to their personality, are 
more inclined to plan for the future in a concrete way, should more often experience a 
reduced sense a agency or responsibility while they are acting.
Emotional intensity and responsibility
In the present investigation we were interested in the influence action planning would have 
beyond agentic experience. Human agency is of central importance to the degree to which 
we fully experience the nature of our emotions (Bandura, 2001), and the characteristic by 
which we experience and attribute responsibility (Cushman et al., 2006). In the present 
investigation we showed that action planning would also influence the intensity by which 
an action is experienced. While perceptions of agency in others have been shown to affect 
beliefs about another‘s ability to feel and experience emotions (Gray & Wegner, 2009), to 
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our knowledge, no empirical evidence has shown that personal agency could influence the 
degree to which we experience the intensity of emotions.
 The present findings also expand the literature on responsibility, by showing that the 
same factors that manipulate the sense of agency, such as the action plans of the present 
investigation, similarly influence personal experiences of responsibility. Crucially however 
is the role of the person in the situation. If the person is an agent, actions plans reduce 
the personal sense of responsibility. If however a person is observing another agent, cues 
related to planning by that other person increase our perceptions of responsibility and 
accountability. While the relation between intentionality, planning, and attributions of 
responsibility towards others has been a well established finding (Cushman et al., 2006; 
Greene & Haidt, 2002; Hamilton, 1978; Lagnado & Channon, 2008; Ohtsubo, 2007; Shaver, 
1985; Weiner, 1995) the present work therefore expands this literature by showing the 
reverse effect in agents. Such actor-observer discrepancies have been illustrated in a number 
of other domains. For example, the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977), or actor-
observer bias (Jones & Nisbett, 1971), describes how we over-value situational explanations 
of our own behavior, and yet under-value situational explanations of others‘ behaviors. In 
the present study we show another such actor-observer discrepancy, in the relation between 
planning cues and perceptions of responsibility.
Implications
Our attributions of agency and responsibility towards other individuals often determine 
how we judge those others. We ascribe responsibility, and subsequently praise or blame, 
when we consider individuals to be personally responsible for their actions and to have 
personal agency over them. Ascriptions of agency and responsibility therefore form the 
cornerstone for many of our legal and social systems (Bandura, 2001; Jeannerod, 1999). 
In these systems, and in general in the way we judge others, planning and premeditation 
are seen as cues of agency and responsibility. Such cues can lead someone to be punished 
more severely, as in virtually every legal system crimes that are premeditated are punished 
more severely than crimes committed in the spur-of-the-moment. We think the results 
we presented in the current research can bring a new perspective in the way we judge an 
individuals‘ theory of mind when performing a planned action: He or she may be less likely 
to experience agency and responsibility at the moment of action performance. 
Limitations
The action alternatives that were presented in the current studies were similar in terms of 
valence. This made it natural for participants to consider both options, and in the case of 
the vignettes made them a true dilemma. However this also means that we need to reserve 
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a degree of caution when making statements about the generalizability of the present 
findings. It remains to be seen what happens when participants decide between a positive 
and negative option, or decide between a personal gain or an action that would lead to 
a greater common good (as in a prisoners‘ dilemma). One option can be more socially 
acceptable than another option. It may be that for individuals who often act in a socially 
acceptable way, (e.g., non-criminals) a plan to perform a socially negative action will remain 
active for a long time after planning (e.g., rumination, guilt). This is important to keep into 
mind in the discussion on the societal implications of the present study.
CONCLUSION
Even though much of human cognition has been shown to be the result of automatic and 
unconscious or preconscious processes (e.g., Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh & Ferguson, 
2000; Libet et al., 1983) the influence of consciousness and conscious deliberations on human 
experience remains large and considerable. As was revealed in the present investigation, 
deliberate action plans may influence the experience of subsequent actions in a number of 
different ways: they influence both our personal sense of agency and the emotional intensity 
of actions, and they can even influence our perceptions of responsibility. Each day we go 
through many moments in which we contemplate our future actions. We may have planned 
our behavior in the coming minute, the next day and some of us may already know their 
plans for the entire week. The present research however shows that such plans can influence 
a large degree of our subsequent conscious experience.
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Chapter 7
Revisiting the Agentic Shift:
Sense of Agency Influences the
Effectiveness of (Self)-Persuasion
This chapter based on Damen, T. G. E., Müller, C. N., van Baaren, R. B., & Dijksterhuis, 
A. (under review). Revisiting the agentic Shift: Sense of agency influences the effectiveness of 
(self)-persuasion. 
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ABSTRACT
In the present study we investigated whether differences in the sense of agency influenced 
the effectiveness of both direct persuasion and self-persuasion techniques. By manipulating 
both the delay and contingency of the outcomes of actions, participants were led to 
experience either a low or high sense of agency. Participants were subsequently presented 
with arguments as to why a clean local environment is important (direct persuasion), or were 
asked to generate those arguments themselves (self-persuasion). Subsequently, participants‘ 
cleanliness attitudes and willingness to participate in a campus cleanup were measured. 
The results show that techniques of direct persuasion effectively influenced attitudes and 
volunteering behavior under conditions of low rather than high agency, whereas techniques 
of self-persuasion were most effective under conditions of high rather than low agency. The 
present findings therefore show how recent experiences of agency, a state based experience of 
control, can influence the effectiveness of both external and internal persuasion techniques. 
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Our beliefs and feelings about the ability to control or influence our actions, environment, 
and lives, represent an important aspect of our everyday cognitive experience. In turn, 
these cognitions can greatly determine our future behavior. Consider for example how 
important our feelings of control are for the extent to which we form deliberate intentions 
and set future goals. Would we still plan for the evening, set New Year resolutions, or try 
out the latest Men‘s Health workout for the perfect six-pack without the belief that we are 
able to make a change? In the present study we investigated how recent experiences of 
action control, or agency, can shape and determine both our ability to effectuate self-driven 
change, as well as influence our susceptibility to external forces.
 The sense of agency refers to the ability to recognize oneself as the controller of one‘s 
own actions and to distinguish these from actions caused or controlled by other sources 
(Blakemore, Oakley, & Frith, 2003; Gallagher, 2000). When the sense of agency is high 
we experience a sense of control over our actions. However, when actions are performed 
without an accompanying sense of agency, it can feel like they are happening to a person 
instead of being authored by that person (Wegner, 2002). Instead of a long-term belief 
of personal control, the sense of agency therefore represents a state construct that binds 
together our thoughts, actions, and action-effects to give rise to the personal sense of having 
successfully influenced the immediate environment. 
 When one has recently experienced the ability to cause such a change in the environment, 
a person is likely to feel a high agentic ability, or, the experience of being a causal force. 
This could encourage an individual to make the most of any opportunities for self-driven 
change. However, when one experiences a low agentic ability, one may respond less to such 
techniques. After all, this person would be less likely to consider him- or herself to be a 
causal force, simultaneously increasing the susceptibility to external sources. 
 Previous research has linked increased long-term control beliefs to self-facilitated 
change (Bandura, 1997; Judge, Jackson, Shaw, Scott, & Rich, 2007; Zhao, Seibert, & Hills, 
2005). For example, individuals with a high belief in the ability to control events in their life 
showed increased attitude change after writing a counter-attitudinal essay (Sherman, 1973). 
Furthermore, an individuals‘ belief in the ability to control situations strongly influences 
the power a person has to seek out challenges (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997) and effectively deal 
with those challenges (Schunk, 1990). Control beliefs are therefore of central importance 
to a wide range of theoretical models of behavioral change (Ajzen, 1985; Bandura, 1997; 
Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Prochaska & DiClemente, 1986; Schwarzer, 1992).
 Low perceptions of control have however been linked to increased susceptibility towards 
others (Avtgis, 1998; Milgram, 1974; Sherman, 1973), as we may be more likely to be 
influenced by external forces when our sense of control is disrupted (Fennis & Aarts, 2012). 
For example, individuals who in general believe having little control over the events in their 
lives are more likely to be influenced and persuaded by external factors than individuals 
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with a high belief of control (Avtgis, 1998; Biondo & MacDonald, 1971). In one of the first 
studies to look at the influence of state perceptions of control, Fennis and Aarts (2012) 
recently showed that individuals who had recent experiences of reduced agency were more 
likely to comply with a request from the experimenter. While this study suggests that a low 
sense of agency seems to increase susceptibility to direct persuasion, the question remains 
whether agency can also influence the effectiveness of other persuasion techniques, such as 
self-persuasion. 
 Research on self-persuasion has long shown that messages that people generate to 
convince themselves can provide powerful and long-lasting changes (Aronson, 1999). Self-
persuasion is more effective in changing the individual‘s attitudes and subsequent behavioral 
intentions than arguments that are presented by others (e.g., Miller & Wozniak, 2001); is 
less prone to correction (Mussweiler & Neumann, 2000) or reactance (Rothman, Haddock, 
& Schwarz, 2001); and even reduces addictive behaviors like smoking (Müller et al., 2009). 
The question however is under what circumstances self-persuasion is most effective; if low 
agency increases the effectiveness of direct persuasion techniques, can experiences of high 
agency then increase the effectiveness of self-persuasion techniques?
 In the present study we investigated the relation between experiences of agency and the 
effectiveness of persuasion techniques. Participants conducted a task in which they either 
experienced low or high agency. Depending on experimental condition, participants then 
received arguments by an authority institution as to why it is important to keep the city 
clean, or participants were asked to generate these arguments themselves. We expected that 
direct persuasion would be more effective after participants had recently experienced low 
rather than high agency. However, we expected self-persuasion to be more effective after 
participants had experienced high rather than low agency. 
METHOD
Participants
One-hundred -and-twenty undergraduate students (93 females; Mage = 23.33; SD = 2.43)1 
from the Radboud University Nijmegen participated in exchange for course credit or €2. 
They all gave written informed consent before participating in the experiment. The study 
was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the 
Radboud University Nijmegen Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Social Sciences.
1 Five participants participated a week later in this study than the other participants due to lab-space considerations
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Materials and procedure
Participants started with the agency manipulation task: Participants were required to press 
a left or a right response button on their keyboard, after which they would hear a tone 
presented through a headset. Participants were told that they could have produced the 
tone by their button-press, but that it was also possible that the computer caused the tone, 
thereby making the sense of agency ambiguous. In the high agency condition, participants 
were presented with a large number of trials in which tones were matched to specific left 
or right button-presses, and these tones always quickly followed the keyboard-presses. In 
the low agency condition, participants were presented a large number of trials in which 
random tones were presented, these tones took considerably longer to occur, or occurred 
even before presses were performed (low agency condition). Both timing and action-effect 
contingency have been shown to elicit strong effects on the sense of agency (e.g., Gentsch & 
Schütz-Bosbach, 2011; Sato & Yasuda, 2005).
 Each trial started with the presentation of a row of X-es for 1500 ms in the center of 
the monitor. Participants were instructed to press a left or a right button the moment the 
fixation-cross disappeared. On high agency trials, button-presses produced a tone 100 ms 
after a button-press. On low agency trials, tones were produced 50 ms before the fixation-
cross disappeared (therefore before a button could have been pressed), or 7750 ms after the 
button-press. On high agency trials left button-presses produced 1000 Hz tones for 500 ms. 
Right button-press elicited 600 Hz tones for 500 ms. On low agency trials the presented 
tone was a randomly selected 600 Hz or 1000 Hz tone. After tone presentation, participants 
had to indicate the degree to which they felt they – not the computer – had just caused 
the tone to occur. They could do this by clicking on a 100-point scale slider, with higher 
scores indicating higher feelings of causation, and lower scores indicating lower feelings of 
causation. The task contained 30 trials in total. The high agency condition consisted of 24 
high agency and 6 low agency trials. The low agency condition consisted of 6 high agency 
and 24 low agency trials
 After the agency manipulation task, participants were presented with a direct persuasion 
or a self-persuasion manipulation, and received the following instructions: 
 “You are going to see a question regarding the cleanliness of the city of Nijmegen. This 
question will be presented on the monitor for two minutes. During that time, you will 
be presented with reasons which are, according the municipality of Nijmegen, the most 
important reasons to keep the city clean (direct persuasion condition) / during that time, 
write down arguments why you think it is important to keep the city clean (self-persuasion 
condition). Carefully attend to the question and the reasons to keep the city clean.” 
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 In the direct persuasion condition participants were presented with 5 arguments 
(mentioned most often in a pilot study2), which, according to the city municipality, 
represented the most important reasons to keep the city of Nijmegen clean (e.g., “People 
feel happier when they walk through a clean city”). Arguments were presented on screen for 
2 minutes. In the self-persuasion condition participants were required to type in reasons for 
why it is important to keep the city of Nijmegen clean. They had 2 minutes to write down 
their reasons. Participants generated 4.58 arguments on average.
 After the agency and persuasion manipulations, participants‘ attitudes toward a clean 
environment were assessed. Participants were given 6 statements related to city and campus 
cleanliness (e.g., “It is important to keep the city clean”; α = .76; M = 7.72; SD = 1.27). 
Participants had to express agreement with each item on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 11 (strongly agree). Finally, participants were asked to contribute to keeping 
the campus clean: The experimenter allegedly worked in collaboration with the University 
board to stimulate environment friendly behavior. Participants were told there will be 
a big cleanup of the university campus in the near future in collaboration with student 
volunteers, and were asked whether they would be willing to participate in the campus 
cleanup. Participants could indicate their willingness to contribute by indicating yes or no. 
 Debriefings indicated that none of the participants realized the true nature of the study. 
RESULTS
Agency manipulation check
An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the mean scores of the reported 
agency ratings, with agency condition (low agency vs. high agency) as a between-subjects 
predictor. Results showed that participants indeed reported increased agency in the high 
agency condition compared to the low agency condition (Mlow agency = 17.00, SD = 8.10; Mhigh 
agency = 33.44, SD = 11.32), F(1, 118) = 83.66, p < .001, η2p = .42.
Attitude ratings
A 2 (Agency: high vs. low) x 2 (Persuasion: direct persuasion vs. self-persuasion) ANOVA 
was conducted, with the mean score of the six attitude ratings towards a clean environment 
as dependent variable. Results showed neither a main effect of agency condition nor of 
persuasion condition, F‘s < 1, n.s. However, there was a significant interaction effect between 
2 Thirty participants were asked for the most important reasons to keep the city of Nijmegen clean in a way 
similar to the described self-persuasion condition of the present study. The direct persuasion condition of the 
present study presented the responses that were most frequently given in this pilot study, which were: 1. A 
clean city looks and smells better; 2. A clean city is good for the environment. Waste on the street is bad for 
the environment; 3. A clean city is more attractive; 4. It‘s important to give a good example as a society towards 
others, especially towards children; 5. Individuals feel happier when they walk through a clean city.
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the agency and persuasion conditions, F(1, 116) = 9.20, p = .003, η2p = .07 (See Figure 1). 
Simple effects showed that direct persuasion was marginally effective when participants 
had recently experienced low compared to high agency (Mlow agency = 7.97, SD = 1.46; Mhigh 
agency = 7.24, SD = 1.41), F(1, 116) = 3.76, p = .055, η2p = .03. However, self-persuasion was 
more effective after experiences of high compared to low agency (Mlow agency = 7.37, SD = 
1.63; Mhigh agency = 8.26, SD = 1.32), F(1, 116) = 5.51, p = .021, η2p = .05.
 To further explore the relation between agentic experience and effectiveness of the 
persuasion techniques we regressed the attitude scores on the persuasion condition and the 
mean agency scores. This analysis showed neither a main effect of persuasion condition, β = 
.07, t (116) = .79, p = .432, nor did the results show a main effect of the agency scores, β = .11, 
t (116) = 1.21, p = .227. The results did however show a significant interaction between the 
persuasion condition and the mean agency scores, β = .24, t (116) = 2.62, p = .010. Simple 
slope analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) for mean agency scores in the persuasion and self-
persuasion conditions showed a significant effect in the self-persuasion condition, β = .35, t 
(116) = 2.62, p = .010. The more individuals experienced agency within the self-persuasion 
condition, the more they were likely to declare a clean environment was important to them. 
The relation between agency scores and cleanliness attitudes did not reach significance 
within the direct persuasion condition, β = -.13, t (116) = -1.03, p = .303.
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Figure 7.1. Mean cleanliness attitudes as a function of Agency and Persuasion conditions. 
Error bars represent standard errors.
Volunteering 
A binary logistic regression on volunteering behavior with agency condition, persuasion 
condition, and the interaction between agency and persuasion as predictors was conducted. 
Results showed only the interaction to be a significant predictor of volunteering behavior, 
b = -2.86, SE = .93, Wald = 9.44, p = .002, odds ratio = .06. Similar to the findings on 
cleanliness attitudes, direct persuasion led to more signups for helping out in a campus 
cleanup after participants had previously experienced low rather than high agency (Mlow 
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agency = .33; Mhigh agency = .10; b = -1.54, SE = .72, Wald = 4.57, p = .033, odds ratio = 0.21; means 
represent volunteering percentages). Within the self-persuasion condition, participants 
who had experienced high agency were more likely to volunteer than participants who had 
experienced low agency (Mlow agency = .20; Mhigh agency = .48; b = 1.32, SE = .59, Wald = 5.01 p = 
.025, odds ratio = 3.73).
 We conducted another binary logistic regression using the mean agency scores 
(standardized) as a predictor instead of the agency condition. Results showed only the 
interaction between the persuasion condition and the agency scores to be a significant 
predictor of volunteering behavior, b = .50, SE = .22, Wald = 5.08, p = .024, odds ratio = 
1.66. There was a marginal effect of agency scores on volunteering behavior within the 
self-persuasion condition, b = .50, SE = .30, Wald = 2.81, p = .094, odds ratio = 1.64, yet no 
(significant) effect within the direct persuasion condition, b = -.51, SE = .34, Wald = 2.33, p 
= .127, odds ratio = 0.60.
DISCUSSION
The present study revealed that the effectiveness of direct persuasion and self- persuasion 
techniques is influenced by experiences of control, specifically the sense of action control 
known as agency. Using a number of different analyses we investigated the influence of an 
agency manipulation on the degree to which different persuasion techniques were able to 
successfully influence attitudes and intentions. Across a number of different analyses, we 
tested whether direct persuasion was more effective after experiences of low rather than 
high agency, and whether self-persuasion was more effective after experiences of high 
rather than low agency. Not every hypothesized difference between conditions reached a 
level of significance and we therefore must take care in interpreting these results, however, 
overall the results convincingly show differential effects of agency for different persuasion 
techniques.
 First, the present results showed the trend that direct persuasion is more effective after 
recent experiences of low agency rather than high agency, with regards to both participants‘ 
attitudes and behavior. Similar findings were obtained by Fennis and Aarts (2012) who 
revealed that individuals who had recently experienced weakened personal control were 
more likely to be susceptible to social influence attempts. The present study extends these 
findings by suggesting that experiences of agency not only influence behavior after a 
persuasive message, but can also promote attitude change. However, such an effect was 
not evident when we used the individual agency scores as a predictor instead of the agency 
manipulation, suggesting future research is needed to definitively validate the relation 
between agency and direct persuasion.
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 In prior research the effectiveness of self-persuasion has often been advocated, as it 
would produce more powerful and long-lasting effects than direct persuasion (Aronson, 
1999). However, in the present study the results did not suggest a superiority of self-
persuasion over direct-persuasion techniques; the degree to which self-persuasion was 
a powerful technique was highly dependent on the agency manipulation. This does not 
directly prove that self-persuasion is no longer a better technique compared to direct 
persuasion; perhaps individuals in general are more likely to experience at least some 
degree of agency, making self-persuasion generally effective tactic in daily life. The present 
research does however complement recent developments in research which have started 
to investigate the boundary conditions of self-persuasion. For example, it has been shown 
that requiring individuals to generate a high number of arguments (e.g., 10) will reduce the 
effectiveness of the self- persuasion technique (van Someren, van Leeuwen, Gloudemans, 
Müller, & Greifeneder, 2013); and that counter-attitudinal arguments are more effective 
than pro-attitudinal arguments (Briñol, McCaslin & Petty, 2012). The present results add 
to these studies by showing that self-persuasion can be hampered or helped by experiences 
of agency, creating instances in which direct persuasion, at least in the short term, can be 
more effective than self-persuasion: When agency is low, and the sense of personal control 
is weakened, techniques such as self- persuasion become less powerful.
 Earlier research on personality traits, such as locus of control (Rotter, 1966) and beliefs 
on self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997), demonstrated that general beliefs of personal control 
are related to susceptibility to persuasion (Avtgis, 1998) and to the ability for self-change 
(Bandura, 2001; Sherman, 1973). The present study extends these findings by showing 
that state-based experiences of control, such as agency, can increase susceptibility to direct 
persuasion after experiences of low agency, and increase the effectiveness of self-persuasion 
after experiences of high agency. 
 In the present study we cannot rule out that the agency manipulation influenced 
alternative processes. Future studies should investigate whether experiences of agency 
can influence self-esteem or self-confidence, and thereby influence the effectiveness of 
persuasion techniques. However, given the fact that the slopes of the actual agency scores 
closely mapped the observed effects that we found when using the agency condition as 
a predictor (especially in the self-persuasion condition), suggests an important role for 
agentic experience herein. A second limitation is that our design did not feature a control 
condition by which we were able to determine the direction of the effects. It is of course 
possible that only experiences of low and not high agency caused changes to occur (or 
vice versa). However, the ability for self-promoted change and external susceptibility have 
both been empirically linked to long-term beliefs about personal control (e.g., Avtgis, 1998; 
Sherman, 1973), and it stands to reason to assume that both processes operate in everyday 
life as a consequence of agentic experience.
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 While the present study focused on the sense of agency, other manipulations of control 
may also influence the effectiveness of (self) persuasion techniques (Fennis & Aarts, 2012). 
For example, Briñol, Petty, Valle, Rucker, & Becerra (2007) found that power, when induced 
before a message, decreased external message processing, while when power is induced 
after a message, a person‘s own thoughts exerted greater impact on their attitudes (see also 
Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). The present findings extend 
such findings by showing the impact of recent experiences of action control, or agency.
 It remains unclear exactly which process underlies the self-persuasion technique. It has 
been suggested that the effort in processing might be of special importance when it comes 
to self-persuasion (Brinol et al., 2012). Besides cognitive demand, research has also shown 
that correcting for externally generated stimuli is much easier (Mussweiler & Neumann, 
2000), that individuals engaging in self-persuasion want to be seen as acting consistent with 
their arguments (Cialdini, 2001), or that they try to decrease cognitive dissonance (Brehm 
& Sensenig, 1966). Hence, more research is needed to further specify the exact mechanism.
 In trying to explain his findings on destructive obedience, Stanley Milgram (1974) 
hypothesized about an agentic shift: a lowered sense of causation that makes individuals 
more susceptible to powerful social heuristics such as authority figures. The present 
study indeed showed that a shift in agency may influence susceptibility, as individuals are 
more susceptible to persuasion after experiences of reduced agency. However, whereas 
experiences of low agency can make one susceptible to outside persuasion, high agency will 
increase the influence of self-persuasion (although we would prefer it if this would not be 
used for the goal of destructive obedience). A number of different approaches in both the 
scientific and the public domain emphasize the power of self-generated change to improve 
individuals‘ behavior, cognitions, and more general, lifestyles. The present findings suggest 
that with a relatively short boost of experienced control, we can help individuals to help 
themselves.
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One of the most exciting aspects of human consciousness is the sensation that we cause 
actions and that we are personally involved in the direct consequences those actions have. 
This sensation, also known as agency, is of great importance to the way we perceive the 
world and to the way we see ourselves as having an important role in that world. Agency 
motivates us to regulate our behavior, helps us learn from the mistakes we make, enables 
us to distinguish the actions we perform compared to the actions performed by other 
individuals, makes us feel good about ourselves when we are successful, but can also give us 
a bad feeling when our actions lead to undesirable outcomes. This sense of agency therefore 
seems to be ‘rather‘ important, but where does it actually come from? Over the past twenty 
years, this question has been crucial for a significant number of studies and researchers 
in different areas within psychology and philosophy, and has been the main focus of the 
research presented in this dissertation.
An intuitive sensation caused by a complex process
Agency appears to be a sensation that is quite logical and intuitive. It is difficult to imagine 
that we can perform actions without actually having the experience of acting. But the 
cognitive processes which produce this sense of agency are deceiving. They pull up a facade 
of simplicity as we are only aware of a final product, and we are left unaware of the cognitive 
processes that lead up to this sense of agency. Indeed, more and more research is showing 
that agency in fact arises from a complex system consisting of several processes involving 
predictions and inferences that work together to create this sensation. And it is precisely 
because agency is caused by a complex system that it can be influenced by a number of 
different factors.
 A good example of the actual malleability of agency is the temporal delay between 
an action and an effect: Imagine that you press a light switch and the light in your office 
immediately turns on. You would probably have a high sense of agency and a strong feeling 
that you just caused that light to occur. However, if it would take ten seconds before the 
light turns on your sense of agency would probably be much weaker, making it appear as if 
the light had turned on by itself. That sense of agency, which we believed to be something 
intuitive and robust, can in practice be influenced quite easily by a number of different 
factors of which a delay between action and effect is only one example. In the present 
dissertation we present a number of research projects in which we have explored multiple 
factors that were able to influence that important sensation of agency. 
Methodology
Before providing an overview of our research findings, we would like to broadly describe 
what a typical agency experiment actually looks like. The task participants were required 
to do in the different studies was often relatively simple: They performed an action, such 
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as the pressing of a keyboard button, and were then presented with an effect, such as a 
sound played by the computer. Subsequently, participants were asked to what extent they 
felt they had just caused the occurred effect. We increased the ambiguity of this situation 
by suggesting ‘the computer‘ would also regularly produce the tone irrespective of whether 
the participants pressed a button or not. By varying the time after which the effects of 
actions occurred we further enhanced this ambiguity. This basic setup was used throughout 
the presented studies, and then slightly altered to allow us to investigate the influence of 
experimental manipulations depending on the research question of that specific study. For 
example, as shall be described below, participants were required to act in the presence of 
specific contextual cues, such as in the presence of an authority figure, were asked to use 
their dominant or non-dominant hand, or were required to plan or not plan their actions.
Acting in the presence of action cues
We regularly perform our actions in a contextually rich environment in which we are both 
subtly and sometimes very overtly exposed to the actions and suggestions by other sources. 
An important question is whether those suggestions can also influence us in our sense of 
agency. In the line of research described in Chapter 2 we show that verbal commands were 
able to reduce the sense of agency. Even if such cues would leave participants‘ freedom 
of choice intact, and even when participants were explicitly told to ignore them, these 
commands were able to exert their influence. The research described in Chapter 3 expands 
on these findings and shows that we do not even have to be aware of these suggestions 
in order to be influenced by them. In these studies, just before participants were about 
to perform their actions, they were presented with words (on a monitor) that were either 
compatible or incompatible to the actions the participants were about to perform. These 
words were either presented clearly visible or so briefly that participants were unable to 
consciously perceive them. The results showed that when the words were visible and in line 
with the actions of the participant, they led to a lower sense of agency than when the words 
did not correspond with the actions they performed - similar to the findings presented 
in Chapter 2. However when these words could not be consciously perceived, the results 
showed the reverse effect: compatible words increased and incompatible words decreased 
the sense of agency. These findings show that when we are not aware of external influence, 
compatible suggestions can facilitate agency, but when we become aware of them they often 
reduce agency instead.
Acting in the presence of authority
The presence of other individuals can influence the degree to which we consider it likely 
we caused something to happen. But does it actually matter in whose presence we act? The 
famous social psychologist Stanley Milgram once theorized that we are very susceptible 
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to individuals with authority, and that in the presence of authority we lose - to a certain 
degree - the tendency to see ourselves as autonomous and independent agents. In the line 
of research described in Chapter 4 we investigated this theory, and stumbled upon a finding 
we did not expect: When participants acted in the presence of an authority individual, 
or acted in the presence of contextual cues of authority, they reported not a reduced but 
an increased sense of agency. We suspect that instead of reducing action awareness, the 
presence of authority cues instead motivated participants to do the task well, increasing 
their task-awareness and agency. 
Experience effort related to non-dominant hand use increases agency
The extent to which we experience difficulty when we are performing our actions can greatly 
influence the extent to which we are fully aware of those actions. We may be more aware of 
the fact that we are walking to the bus-stop when in full sprint compared to when we are 
walking at a leisurely pace. Similarly, we may be more aware of the actions we perform with 
the non-dominant hand compared to use of the dominant hand. At already a young age we 
develop a clear preference for our left or right hand, and non-dominant hand skills will rarely 
reach the level of ability of the dominant hand. Although a relation between perceptions of 
effort and agency would seem logical, the research described in Chapter 5 features two of 
the few studies to have empirically investigated this relation. In these studies, we compared 
the effects of using the dominant compared to using the non-dominant hand on effort and 
agency. Participants performed an agency experiment in which they alternately used the 
dominant and non-dominant hand. The results showed that when participants acted with 
the non-dominant hand, they reported an increased sense of agency compared to actions 
performed with the dominant hand, and the analyses also pointed towards the importance 
of experienced effort herein.
Action planning reduces agency and responsibility.
In the research line presented in Chapter 6 we investigated whether our sense of agency 
for actions can be influenced when we plan those actions in advance. In a series of studies, 
we were able to show that the pre-planning of future actions was associated with a reduced 
sense of agency at the moment of action performance. This is an important finding for 
our understanding of agency, considering that previous research has shown that thoughts 
about outcomes of actions are related to an increased sense of agency, and it was theorized 
that thinking about actions would work in a similar way. However, it seems that precisely 
because we already decided which action we are going to perform when we planned ahead, 
less cognitive deliberation is required at the moment of action performance. The action can 
be performed more automatically, thereby reducing the sense of agency. In a further set 
of studies we were able to show that action planning was similarly able to reduce feelings 
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of responsibility, and these results therefore point towards an important actor-observer 
discrepancy: While we generally consider and hold a person to be more responsible when 
that person plans his or her actions in advance, when we plan and act ourselves, we often 
experience a reduced sense of agency and responsibility.
The influence of agency on cognition and behavior
In Chapter 7 we describe a study in which we investigated whether experiences of agency 
can in turn influence cognition and behavior. Given that our sense of agency can be high 
or low depending on the situation, we wondered whether such agency experiences could 
in turn influence the way we think or act. In the presented study we investigated whether 
experiences of agency would help or hinder the effectiveness of different persuasion 
techniques. The results show that individuals who experienced low agency on several 
occasions were more likely to be convinced by external arguments than people with high 
agency experiences. In other words, the sensation that you have played no causal role in 
the events around you can increase your susceptibility to external sources. In addition, 
the results show that participants with a number of high-agency experiences were better 
able at convincing and motivating themselves, a technique known as self-persuasion, 
than participants with low agency experiences. The sensation that we were able to play a 
causal role in the events around us allows us to put more stock into the validity of our own 
arguments. Therefore, it seems that agency can indeed experience subsequent cognition and 
behavior, and different techniques of persuasion can be more or less effective depending on 
these agency experiences.
Conclusion
The sense of agency is one of the most fundamental experiences of human consciousness. 
While we may intuitively feel that we should know when we have caused something to 
occur and when not, the research described in the present dissertation reveals that the sense 
of agency can be influenced by a number of different factors, including contextual action 
cues and internal action plans, the presence and nature of other agents, as well as hand 
dominance and experiences of effort. Importantly, experiences of agency in turn seem to 
influence our susceptibility to external forces and our ability to cause self-driven change. 
The present findings thereby further our knowledge on how, why, and when the sense of 
agency emerges and how that pervasive experience influences us in turn. 
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Een van de meest enerverende aspecten van het menselijk bewustzijn is ons gevoel dat 
we persoonlijk verantwoordelijk zijn voor onze handelingen en de directe gevolgen die 
onze handelingen teweegbrengen. Dit gevoel, ook wel agency genoemd, is van enorm 
belang voor de manier waarop wij naar de wereld en onze rol in die wereld kijken. Agency 
motiveert ons om ons gedrag te reguleren, van fouten te leren, en de handelingen van onszelf 
ten opzichte van die van anderen te onderscheiden. Ook geeft het ons een goed gevoel als 
we succes hebben en een rot gevoel als iets door ons toedoen helemaal misgaat. Het gevoel 
van agency is daarmee ‘best belangrijk‘, maar waar komt het eigenlijk vandaan? Deze 
vraag is de afgelopen twintig jaar bepalend geweest voor een enorm aantal onderzoeken 
en onderzoekers uit verschillende domeinen binnen psychologie en filosofie, en is ook de 
leidraad geweest in de onderzoeksprojecten die in deze dissertatie worden gepresenteerd.
Het intuïtieve eindproduct van een complex proces
Agency, het lijkt een intuïtief en logisch gevoel. We kunnen ons bijna niet voorstellen dat 
we handelingen verrichten zonder daarbij de ervaring van handelen te hebben. Maar de 
processen die plaatsvinden in ons brein en ons dat gevoel van agency geven, zetten ons 
hierbij een beetje op het verkeerde been: We worden ons namelijk alleen gewaar van een 
eindproduct. Meer en meer laat onderzoek zien dat agency ontstaat vanuit een complex 
systeem waarin meerdere processen van predictie en inferentie samenwerken om ons 
dat uiteindelijke gevoel te geven. En juist doordat dit gevoel ontstaat door een complex 
systeem, kan het beïnvloedt worden door een hoop verschillende factoren. 
 Een goed voorbeeld hiervan is de tijd die zit tussen een actie en een effect: Stel je voor 
dat je een lichtknopje indrukt en dat vervolgens de lamp op je kantoor meteen aanspringt. 
Je hebt dan waarschijnlijk sterk de ervaring dat jij zojuist dat licht hebt geproduceerd en 
dus een hoog gevoel van agency. Stel je nu voor dat je weer op een lichtknopje drukt, maar 
nu springt de lamp niet meteen aan, pas na een poosje, dan is je gevoel van agency een 
stuk minder - het lijkt dan misschien alsof de lamp uit zichzelf aan is gegaan. Dat gevoel 
waarvan we dachten dat het intuïtief en robuust is, blijkt in de praktijk vrij gemakkelijk 
beïnvloedt te worden door verschillende factoren, waarvan tijd slechts één voorbeeld is. 
In de huidige dissertatie presenteren we een aantal onderzoeksprojecten waarin de invloed 
van verschillende factoren op agency is  onderzocht. 
Gebruikte methodiek
Voordat we kort de bevindingen toelichten is het van belang om een idee te schetsen hoe 
een typisch agency-experiment eruit ziet. De taak die de deelnemers in de verschillende 
experimenten moesten doen was vaak relatief simpel: Men voerde een handeling uit, zoals 
het drukken op een knop van het toetsenbord, en deelnemers kregen vervolgens een effect 
gepresenteerd, zoals het door de computer afspelen van een geluid. Aan de deelnemers 
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werd gevraagd in hoeverre zij het gevoel kregen de toon te hebben veroorzaakt. We 
brachten de deelnemers hierover in vertwijfeling door te vertellen dat sommige tonen door 
‘de computer‘ werden veroorzaakt (ongeacht of ze op een knop hadden gedrukt). Deze 
ambiguïteit werd versterkt door het inbouwen van een tijdsvertraging tussen het drukken 
van de knop en het horen van de toon. Dit was de basis-setup die over de verschillende 
studies werd gebruikt. Deze setup werd vervolgens, afhankelijk van de onderzoeksvraag, 
veranderd om de invloed van verschillende factoren te onderzoeken. Participanten werden 
bijvoorbeeld gevraagd om te handelen in een specifieke context, zoals in de aanwezigheid 
van persoon met autoriteit, of werd gevraagd om hun dominante of niet-dominante hand te 
gebruiken, of hun acties van tevoren te plannen of niet te plannen.
Het handelen in een context van omgevingscues
Onze handelingen worden regelmatig in een context uitgevoerd waarin we bewust en 
onbewust worden blootgesteld aan de suggesties van andere individuen of andere bronnen. 
Een belangrijke vraag is echter of wij door dit soort contextuele cues ook beïnvloedt kunnen 
worden in ons gevoel van agency. In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt een onderzoekslijn beschreven die 
laat zien dat verbale commando‘s in de omgeving ons gevoel van handelen verzwakken. 
Dit onderzoek laat verder zien dat zelfs als deze commando‘s onze eigen keuzevrijheid 
intact laten, of zelfs als ze niet eens meer van belang zijn voor de actie die we uitvoeren, 
kunnen ze het gevoel van agency beïnvloeden. 
 Deze lijn van studies wordt aangevuld met het onderzoek zoals beschreven in Hoofdstuk 
3 dat laat zien dat we niet eens bewust hoeven te zijn van deze contextuele cues om er door 
beïnvloedt te worden. Aan de deelnemers werden, net voordat ze een handeling gingen 
uitvoeren, woorden gepresenteerd die gerelateerd konden worden aan de handelingen die 
deelnemers gingen uitvoeren. Deze woorden werden duidelijk zichtbaar gepresenteerd, of 
zo kort dat ze niet bewust waarneembaar waren. Verder konden de woorden overeenkomen 
met de handelingen die deelnemers gingen uitvoeren, maar ze konden er ook van verschillen. 
De resultaten lieten zien dat wanneer de woorden zichtbaar waren en overeenkwamen met 
de handelingen van de deelnemer, deze woorden tot een lager gevoel van agency leiden 
dan wanneer de woorden niet overeenkwamen met de handeling. Waren de woorden echter 
onzichtbaar dan trad er een omgekeerd effect op waarbij de woorden die overeenkwamen 
met de handelingen het gevoel van agency verhoogden terwijl de woorden die niet 
overeenkwamen met de handelingen het gevoel van agency verlaagden. Deze resultaten 
laten zien dat suggesties in de omgeving ons gevoel van agency kunnen beïnvloeden als 
we kort na het oppikken van zo‘n suggestie handelen. Worden we ons gewaar van een 
duidelijke link tussen onze handeling en een externe suggestie, dan heeft dit heel andere 
gevolgen voor ons gevoel van agency dan als we niet gewaar van deze link worden. In de 
eerste situatie wordt agency versterkt, in de tweede situatie wordt agency verzwakt.
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De aanwezigheid van autoriteit
De aanwezigheid van anderen beïnvloedt hoe waarschijnlijk wij het achten dat we iets 
veroorzaken. Maar maakt het voor ons gevoel van agency ook uit wie er daadwerkelijk in 
onze omgeving is? De beroemde sociaal psycholoog Stanley Milgram veronderstelde ooit 
dat de aanwezigheid van een persoon met autoriteit kan zorgen voor een verschuiving in 
agency. De aanwezigheid van een autoriteit zou namelijk ten koste gaan van ons gevoel van 
autonomie, ons gevoel van vrije wil en het besef dat wij onafhankelijk kunnen handelen. 
In de onderzoekslijn beschreven in Hoofdstuk 4 hebben we een eerste stap gezet om deze 
veronderstelling te onderzoeken. We vonden hierbij een onverwacht resultaat, namelijk dat 
deelnemers juist meer en niet minder agency rapporteerden in de aanwezigheid van een 
persoon met autoriteit (of in de context van een cue van autoriteit). We vermoeden dat de 
autoriteitscues in onze experimenten ervoor hebben gezorgd dat deelnemers zich meer op 
de taak focusten, beter hun best wilden doen, en bewuster van hun taak werden waardoor 
zij ook meer agency voelden. Onze bevindingen suggereren dus dat in veel situaties de 
theorie van Milgram niet opgaat. De aanwezigheid van autoriteit lijkt vaak een agency-
verhogende en niet een agency-verlagende werking te hebben.
Het gebruik van onze niet-dominante hand 
De mate waarin we moeite ervaren in onze handelingen kan voor een groot deel bepalen 
in hoeverre we ons volledig bewust zijn van deze handelingen. Zo zijn we misschien meer 
bewust van het feit dat we lopen naar de bushalte als we bezig zijn met een volle sprint 
dan wanneer we in normaal tempo lopen, en zijn we misschien meer met onze aandacht 
bij het gebruik van onze niet-voorkeurshand dan bij de hand die je normaal het meest 
gebruikt. De meeste individuen vormen al vanaf een jonge leeftijd een duidelijke voorkeur 
voor een bepaalde hand, en hoewel men ook vaardigheden met de niet-voorkeurshand kan 
ontwikkelen, zullen deze vaardigheden zelden het niveau bereiken van de voorkeurshand. 
Hoewel het verband tussen de ervaren moeite en agency intuïtief lijkt, is het onderzoek zoals 
beschreven in Hoofdstuk 5 een van de weinige onderzoeken die dit verband daadwerkelijk 
empirisch heeft onderzocht. In dit onderzoek hebben we specifiek gekeken naar moeite met 
betrekking tot het gebruik van de niet-voorkeurshand ten opzichte van de voorkeurshand. 
Zelfs simpele acties die we dagelijks uitvoeren, zoals tandenpoetsen of een theekopje 
pakken, kunnen moeite kosten wanneer we de niet-voorkeurshand gebruiken. Deelnemers 
in het beschreven onderzoek deden mee aan een agency-taak waarbij zij  afwisselend hun 
voorkeurs of niet-voorkeurshand gebruikten en de mate van ervaren agency aangaven. 
De resultaten lieten zien dat de handelingen die werden uitgevoerd met de niet-voorkeurs 
hand tot een hoger gevoel van agency leidden dan wanneer diezelfde handelingen werden 
uitgevoerd met een voorkeurshand hand. 
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Het plannen van onze acties
In de lijn van studies die we presenteren in Hoofdstuk 6 hebben we onderzocht in 
hoeverre het van te voren plannen van onze handelingen onze gevoelens van agency 
en verantwoordelijkheid beïnvloeden als we deze handelingen uitvoeren. In een reeks 
van studies waren we in staat aan te tonen dat het van tevoren plannen van toekomstige 
handelingen is gekoppeld aan een verlaagd gevoel van agency. Dit is een belangrijke 
bevinding voor ons begrip van agency, omdat eerder onderzoek juist heeft laten zien dat 
gedachtes en representaties over de uitkomsten van handelingen kan leiden tot een hoger 
gevoel van agency waarbij er enigszins vanuit werd gegaan dat het nadenken over de 
handelingen zelf op dezelfde manier zou werken. Echter, het lijkt erop dat juist omdat 
we bij het plannen van onze handelingen al een besluit nemen over wat we gaan doen 
we minder hoeven na te denken als het moment van uitvoering daar is, waardoor ons 
gevoel van agency naar beneden gaat. Anders gezegd,omdat we al eerder hebben bedacht 
wat we gingen doen handelen we meer op de automatische piloot. In een verdere reeks 
studies hebben we aangetoond dat het plannen van je handelingen ook gevoelens van 
verantwoordelijkheid kan verlagen.  Deze studies wijzen daarmee op een belangrijke 
discrepantie: Hoewel we over het algemeen personen die hun toekomstige handelingen 
plannen méér verantwoordelijk houden voor hun acties, hebben we zelf na het uitvoeren van 
onze geplande handelingen juist een verlaagd gevoel van agency en verantwoordelijkheid.
In hoeverre zijn agency ervaringen eigenlijk van belang in ons denken 
en doen?
In de eerder gepresenteerde onderzoekslijnen is steeds gekeken naar agency of 
verantwoordelijkheidsgevoel als onze belangrijke afhankelijke variabele; als een 
eindstadium van de verschillende onderzoeken. In Hoofdstuk 7 beschrijven we echter 
een onderzoek waarin de relatie tussen agency ervaringen aan de ene kant, en cognitie en 
gedrag aan de andere kant is onderzocht. Onze gevoelens van agency kunnen afhankelijk 
van de situatie laag of hoog zijn, maar de vraag is of het voor ons uitmaakt of we weinig 
of juist veel agency ervaren als het gaat om hoe we nadenken over zaken, en in hoeverre 
ons gedrag wordt beïnvloed daardoor. In het onderzoek zoals beschreven in Hoofdstuk 7 
hebben we onderzocht of onze agency ervaringen bepalen in hoeverre we gevoelig zijn voor 
externe beïnvloeding, of dat we door onze agency ervaringen juist meer gevoelig worden 
voor de kracht van onze eigen argumenten. De resultaten laten zien dat individuen met een 
laag gevoel van agency eerder geneigd om zich te laten overtuigen door de argumentatie 
van een externe bron dan mensen met een hoog gevoel van agency. Het gevoel dat je 
regelmatig geen causale factor bent geweest in de dingen die om je heen gebeuren zijn 
daarmee dus van invloed op je gevoeligheid voor externe krachten. Daarnaast lieten de 
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resultaten ook zien dat deelnemers met een aantal ervaringen van hoge agency beter in 
staat waren zichzelf te overtuigen, een techniek die bekend staat als self-persuasion, dan 
deelnemers een aantal ervaringen van lage agency. Indien we dus juist wel het gevoel 
hebben dat wij een causale factor zijn in de zaken die om ons heen gebeuren, dan zijn we 
ook beter in staat om onszelf te overtuigen van de wenselijkheid van bepaalde standpunten 
en gedrag. Ons gevoel van agency kan dus wel degelijk van invloed zijn op ons denken en 
doen, en bepaalt hoe gevoelig we zijn voor verschillende methoden van overtuiging.
Conclusie
Het gevoel van agency is een fundamentele ervaring binnen het menselijk bewustzijn. 
Hoewel het voor ons misschien lijkt alsof de ervaring dat we handelen of iets veroorzaken 
een intuïtief en duidelijk gevoel is, laten vele onderzoeken (zoals ook de studies beschreven 
in dit proefschrift) zien dat agency in feite beïnvloedt kan worden door verschillende 
factoren. Deze factoren kunnen contextueel zijn zoals: de suggesties en aanwezigheid van 
anderen, maar deze factoren kunnen ook intern zijn, zoals het bewust maken van plannen 
over toekomstige handelingen, of onze ervaringen van moeite wanneer we handelen. 
Daarnaast is agency op zijn beurt ook weer in staat om ons te beïnvloeden in ons denken 
en doen. De huidige bevindingen vergroten daarmee onze kennis over het ontstaan van het 
gevoel van agency en de mogelijke consequenties van deze intrigerende ervaring.
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Hoewel de meeste lezers deze dissertatie zullen waarderen om zijn wetenschappelijke 
bijdrage, heeft de huidige bundel van pagina‘s voor mij een betekenis die veel verder gaat 
dan de wetenschappelijke inhoud. Deze dissertatie herinnert mij aan een periode in mijn 
leven waarin ik onderzoek heb mogen doen in een fascinerend wetenschappelijk domein, 
maar deze beschrijving doet bij lange na geen recht aan de positieve gevoelens die ik heb 
wanneer ik terugdenk aan mijn periode als AiO. Want als ik daaraan terugdenk, herinner 
ik mij de momenten van een groep mensen, de ‘Negende‘, met wie ik enorm veel momenten 
heb gekend van collegialiteit, blijdschap en geluk, intimiteit, en soms drama. Deze gedeelde 
ervaringen zorgen ervoor dat ik me enorm verbonden voel met de personen die daar werken 
of gewerkt hebben. Jullie warmte en scherpzinnigheid zijn enorm stimulerend geweest en 
ik waardeer jullie daarom zowel als collega‘s en als vrienden. Ik hoop dat we elkaar nog een 
lange tijd mogen blijven ontmoeten op professioneel vlak en daarbuiten. Ik wil een aantal 
van jullie nu in het bijzonder toespreken.
Rick, jou wil ik als eerste bedanken omdat jij mij na afloop van de research master 
de kans hebt geboden om een eerste stap te zetten in de academische wereld. Zowel jij 
als Ap stimuleerden me om mijn eigen onderzoeksinteresses te exploreren, wat niet 
vanzelfsprekend is bij promovendi en hiervoor ben ik echt dankbaar. Ik kreeg daardoor het 
gevoel dat mijn ideeën het najagen waard waren, iets dat me uiteindelijk veel vertrouwen 
heeft gegeven in mijn vaardigheden als wetenschapper. Ik wil daarnaast jou en Jos 
bedanken voor al die keren dat jullie me tot tranen toe hebben laten lachen. Bijvoorbeeld 
toen je jouw officieuze oratie gaf op schrijfweek in Sardinië, of toen je samen met Matthijs 
de ondergewaardeerde relatie tussen boerenknecht en zijn vee bezong op terugweg vanuit 
Gent. De functioneringsgesprekken waren hilarisch en ik hoop dat je de slogan voor 
reinigingsmiddel inmiddels hebt gepatenteerd (#ontsmettend goed!). Los van de vrijheid, 
los van de lol, wil ik toch ook nog zeggen dat ik altijd bij jou het gevoel heb gehad dat ik op 
je kon rekenen en dat je er was als ik je nodig had. Bedankt daarvoor.
Ap, jij bent over de jaren heen een beetje een persoonlijke held van me geworden. Je 
begeleiding was erg fijn en je inspireerde me zowel als wetenschapper maar ook als 
levensgenieter. Ook jij gaf me het vertrouwen om mijn eigen pad te volgen, en binnen dat 
pad waren je suggesties van onschatbare waarde. Ik heb enorm veel van je geleerd. Zo ben 
ik door jouw begeleiding steeds beter gaan schrijven en ook meer gaan nadenken over 
schrijven. Maar ook buiten onze rollen als promotor en promovendus heb je veel voor mij 
betekend. Onze gesprekken, soms op kantoor, soms aan het zwembad in Lissabon, over 
eten en drinken, verre reizen, of personen die we bewonderen, en natuurlijk ook de actuele 
politieke en maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen waren vaak leuk en zinnig; volgens mij zijn 
we ook naar elkaar toe gegroeid gedurende mijn AiO-schap. Ik hoop daarom dat we nog 
vaak zulke gesprekken mogen voeren.
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Mijn dank gaat veel verder dan alleen mijn promotoren. De omgeving waarin ik startte was 
dynamisch.  De Negende knalde van energie met allemaal indrukwekkende wetenschappers 
tegen wie ik op keek en door wie ik me ook soms een beetje geïntimideerd voelde, vooral 
omdat ik ze zo goed vond (en het zijn nog steeds geweldige onderzoekers). De positieve 
energie uit die tijd kwam door een cultuur en een AiO-cohort, die je in staat stelden 
om zowel te excelleren als wetenschapper maar ook als persoon. De bijeenkomsten van 
de verschillende onderzoeksgroepen en ook BBL‘s waren wetenschappelijk inspirerend 
en tegelijkertijd was de groep ongekend sociaal; je liet je werk graag even liggen voor de 
gezellige lunch en er was altijd meer dan genoeg animo voor borrels of het gezamenlijk 
kijken naar films die enorm slecht waren maar wij desalniettemin fantastisch vonden. Door 
deze sfeer voelde ik mezelf vanaf het begin goed bij jullie passen, en ik wil met name mijn 
mede-AiO‘s van toen bedanken voor deze collegialiteit: Annemarie, Aukje, Gijs, Lieke, 
Maarten, Madelijn, Ron, Sanne, Severine, Tila, en Wieteke, dank voor die eerste ontvangst 
en jullie gezelligheid!
Matthijs, jouw rol in is het begin heel belangrijk voor mij geweest. Je deur stond altijd open 
voor een leuk gesprek of een wetenschappelijke vraag en je hebt me goed wegwijs gemaakt 
in de academische wereld. We genereerden een groot aantal toffe ideeën voor toekomstig 
onderzoek, die afwisselend geniaal of gestoord waren. En de schrijfweken die we samen 
met Barbara hebben georganiseerd waren briljant. Tot slot, kunnen we er nog altijd trots 
op zijn dat we het beste feest georganiseerd hebben dat het BSI nooit gehad heeft. Ook 
Simone bedankt voor je hulp en gezelligheid over de jaren heen, vanaf de schrijfweek in 
Sardinië zijn we het steeds beter met elkaar gaan vinden, en ik ben er erg blij mee dat jij 
mijn paranimf wilde zijn.
Dankzij mijn werk heb ik vele reizen mogen maken naar verre en mooie landen. Ik heb 
tijdens deze reizen een aantal collega‘s een stuk beter leren kennen. Thijs en Reine in het 
bijzonder. Ierland, Portugal, maar met name onze road-trip in California waren geweldige 
reizen met een heleboel momenten waar ik graag aan terugdenk. Ik voel ons nog steeds 
stilvallen bij het nummer van Otis Redding gespeeld door een straatmuzikant, een magisch 
moment, maar herinneren jullie je ook nog de ochtend-gymnastiek in San Francisco? Of het 
lopen/rennen langs de eeuwenoude sequoia‘s met nog maar een half uur aan daglicht over? 
We hebben enorm veel leuke dingen gedaan en enorm veel gelachen. Thijs, dat je een nerd 
en party animal bent weten we allemaal, maar in een gesprek ben je oprecht geïnteresseerd 
in anderen zonder dat je er slechts op zit te wachten om jouw verhaal te doen - een super 
eigenschap. Reine, ik ben erg blij dat we nu ‘eindelijk‘ roomies zijn geworden in Utrecht. 
Je bent een ontzettend gezellig persoon, je houdt rekening met anderen in een groep, en 
bovendien lach je ook nog eens vaak om mijn grapjes - een super eigenschap.
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Toen ik wat verder kwam in mijn traject heb ik ook de niet-AiO‘s beter leren kennen. Johan, 
Ad, Rob, Cor, Daniël, Martijn, Hein, Roos, en Harm, personen met compleet verschillende 
karakters die voor mij horen bij de afdeling en zonder wie de Negende de Negende niet 
zou zijn. Martijn, nog extra bedankt voor de koffie gezet op je illegale apparaat en het 
altijd klaarstaan voor een gesprek. Ad en Rob, bedankt voor jullie uitstekende feedback 
tijdens de labmeetings, bijeenkomsten die ik beschouwde als een perfecte mix tussen het 
op hoog niveau bespreken van wetenschap en een goede sfeer. En in diezelfde setting van 
labmeetings, is natuurlijk de feedback van andere AiO‘s zoals Maikel, Kai-Qin, en Maitta 
(ook met betrekking tot de andere labgroup) erg waardevol geweest. 
Er zijn binnen het BSI een aantal pilaren zonder wie mijn onderzoek niet mogelijk zou 
zijn geweest. Ten eerste de vier M‘s: Marijke, Marjo, Madelon en Meta. Bedankt voor jullie 
ondersteuning over de jaren heen, jullie flexibiliteit en vooral geduld als mijn administratie 
weer eens een rommeltje was - regelmatig. Zonder jullie steun en betrokkenheid was ik in 
een wirwar van ‘regeldingen‘ terecht gekomen waar ik helemaal niet mee bezig wilde zijn. 
Daarnaast wil ik natuurlijk ook de new kid van het lab bedanken: Ronny. Wij hebben samen 
zoveel gelachen dat het volgens mij uitgedrukt kan worden in fte‘s, maar laten we dat in het 
belang van onze carrière maar niet doen. Behalve dat het gezellig is geweest, was het mede 
dankzij jouw flexibele inzet en je bereidheid om mee te denken aan de uitvoerbaarheid van 
mijn experimenten, dat veel van de onderzoeken in dit boekje mogelijk waren. Je bent een 
onvervangbaar onderdeel van systeem in Nijmegen dat experimenteren mogelijk maakt. En 
nog bedankt voor het uitleggen van het verschil tussen eneecee en nèk. 
Op de verschillende ASPO‘s, ESCONs, en andere congressen heb ik ook een groot aantal 
mensen leren kennen van de andere universiteiten. Bedankt voor jullie gezelligheid, de vele 
biertjes, en de vette moves op de dansvloer (en respect voor de aanwezigheid de volgende 
ochtend). Anouk, ik wil jou met name even bedanken voor de leuke samenwerkingen over 
de jaren heen. Ik vind je een heel aardig, betrouwbaar en oprecht persoon, en hoop dat we 
binnenkort weer samen een symposium gaan organiseren of een workshop fotografie doen 
(of een onderzoek dat wél een keer uitkomt).
Een aantal hoofdstukken van het huidige proefschrift is tot stand gekomen door de 
samenwerking met de onderzoeksgroep uit Gent. Het was enorm leuk om mee te draaien 
in een andere onderzoeksgroep en daar nieuwe collega‘s te leren kennen. Marcel, bedankt 
voor de uitnodiging destijds, de ondersteuning, en het aanbrengen van nog meer focus op 
zuivere methodiek in mijn onderzoeksprojecten. Hopelijk gaan we in de toekomst door 
met deze samenwerking.
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Het slotakkoord van deze dissertatie is geschreven tijdens mijn nieuwe job in Utrecht. Een 
groep leuke collega‘s waarvan ik een groot aantal al kende, en ook een groot aantal nieuwe 
collega‘s die ik nu al erg mag. Ook hier zie ik een leuke en dynamische groep ontstaan en 
ik ben oprecht blij om daarvan deel uit te maken. Ik kijk er zeer naar uit om samen met 
Henk en met Toon vernieuwend en spannend onderzoek te gaan doen en wil jullie alvast 
bedanken voor het getoonde vertrouwen.
Ik wil, nu bijna op het einde, nog een speciaal woord richten aan Barbara. Vanaf de Research 
Master tot op de dag van vandaag ben je er voor mij geweest. Voor elke vraag, voor elk idee, 
en voor elke reflectie kon ik bij jou terecht. De talloze koffie momenten op de uni, in het 
Lux, of op de schrijfweken in Schiermonnikoog en Bergen-aan-zee waren van bijzondere 
waarde, en ik wil je bedanken voor je ondersteuning en vriendschap over de jaren heen. 
Weet dat je erg dierbaar voor me bent.
Het thuisfront is natuurlijk ook ongelooflijk belangrijk geweest. Mike, Lieke, Peter, Karen, 
Jarno, Daphne, Leo, Marlien, en Milan: In de drukte van mijn AiO-schap was het altijd erg fijn 
om af te spreken met mijn vrienden van mijn middelbare schooltijd (inmiddels aangevuld 
met het nodige vrouwelijk schoon). Hoewel we na de middelbare school allemaal aparte 
kanten zijn opgegaan is het best bijzonder dat wij nog steeds zo‘n vriendengroep zijn. We 
kennen elkaar al langer dan dat we elkaar niet kennen! Afspreken met elkaar voelt daarom als 
ouderwetse gezelligheid, en ik hoop dat we tot en met de leeftijd van rollators en scootmobiels 
blijven doorgaan met nerdy games, het bezoeken van festivals, en de nodige borrels. 
Zonder de hulp van mijn familie over de jaren heen was ik nooit zo ver gekomen. De talloze 
keren dat pap me is komen ophalen van het station en die koppen thee waar mam altijd mee 
klaarstond hebben enorm veel voor mij betekend en zijn van onschatbare waarde geweest 
- en zijn dat nog steeds, dus ga er vooral mee door. Ook mijn kleine broertje Jim heeft 
bijgedragen aan deze thesis, zowel wetenschappelijk, met het doorlopen van experimenten, 
als persoonlijk, met de ontspannende (en inspannende) potjes X-Wing die we hebben 
gespeeld en hopelijk nog vaak gaan spelen. Bedankt voor het altijd klaarstaan, bedankt 
voor de gezelligheid thuis, en bedankt voor de liefde. Weet dat ik heel veel van jullie houd.
Tot slot, een woord voor jou lieve Tirza. Een groot deel van mijn liefde voor Nijmegen 
komt voort door ook jouw aanwezigheid daar. We hebben elkaar in het BSI-lab (!) ontmoet 
gedurende de Research Master, en we werden tijdens onze promotietrajecten pas echt 
verliefd op elkaar. Je betekent enorm veel voor mij, en ik weet niet of ik zonder jou zover 
had kunnen komen. Je bent mijn beste vriendin, mijn partner, en mijn soulmate. 
De beste tijd van mijn leven werd nog beter doordat jij er een deel van uit ging maken. 
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